U. S. extended nuclear deterrence is understood to mean that the U. S. is committed to use nuclear weapons, and escalate to the strategic level if necessary, in the event of a major Soviet conventional and/or nuclear attack on its allies in Western Europe and the Far East. Extended nuclear deterrence continues to pose some of the most vexing problems of modern strategic policy. America's policy of extending nuclear deterrence to its allies can often conflict with the requirements of strategic stability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. U. S. extended deterrent objectives might make the U. S. more prone to develop destabilizing counterforce damage-limiting capabilities for its central strategic nuclear forces in order to enhance the credibility of its overseas commitments. This policy would run counter to the concept of stability of U. S. -Soviet mutual deterrence.
U. S. extended nuclear deterrence for Western Europe has one dominant aspect: the U. S. reserves the right to employ its NATO-based nuclear weapons early and first, and escalate to the strategic level if necessary, in the event of a major Soviet conventional attack on its West European allies. This posture has long been deemed essential since NATO's conventional strength has rarely seemed adequate to deter a full-scale Soviet conventional attack or to defend Western Europe effectively once war began. Because of this, in Europe, the conventional, U. S. non-strategic nuclear, and U. S. strategic nuclear coupling is a prominent component of NATO strategy and is regarded as cardinal to the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence.
In sharp contrast to Western Europe, the function of conventional and nuclear coupling is not as relevant to the viability of the extension of the U. S. nuclear umbrella to Japan. This is because the status of conventional forces in Northeast Asia, naval and air forces confronting the U. S. S. R. in particular, has not been so adverse for the U. S. and Japan. Accordingly, the U. S. does not need to rely heavily on nuclear weapons to defend Japan. For this reason, U. S. extended nuclear deterrence to Japan has been, in essence, a U. S. retaliatory nuclear deterrent against a Soviet nuclear first use against Japan. Deterrence rests with the fear that the U. S. would use its nuclear weapons to respond to a Soviet nuclear threat or attack on Japan, which would risk escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange.
A two-track policy is necessary for the maintenance of credible U. S. extended nuclear deterrence. One track is to implement measures to prevent an outbreak of nuclear war between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. The other track is to strengthen the ties between the U. S. and its allies in order to prevent the Soviets from misunderstanding the American nuclear commitment.
For the first track, there are two broad policy dimensions: 1) the pursuit of a balanced policy between the maintenance of a credible U. S. nuclear deterrent power and stable U. S. -Soviet mutual deterrence, and 2) the maintenance of the regional conventional military balance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. An important policy orientation for the first policy dimension should be a balanced deterrence, not simply deterrence by existential nuclear threat or by increased prompt counterforce. threats. The latter should complement the former, up to the point short of destabilizing the U. S. -Soviet mutual deterrence. For the second dimension, we must first recognize that if the Soviet Union employs its conventional forces against major U. S. allies under the condition of U. S. -Soviet mutual vulnerability, it is likely to be only when a quick conventional victory or fait accompli seems possible. Thus, it is crucial for U. S. allies, with the assistance of the United States, to maintain at least not too unfavorable immediate and short-term regional conventional military balance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that would prevent the Soviets from perceiving

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During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other as arch enemies and yet avoided direct military engagements. According to some analysts, the development of nuclear weapons did much to arouse, intensify, and/or perpetuate the hostility between the two. It is commonsensical, moreover, that the growth of nuclear stockpile dramatically increased the danger that the U. S. -Soviet confrontation might someday result in a global conflagration.
On the other hand, nuclear forces contributed to the absence of hot war between the superpowers. Among other things, their accumulation of nuclear arms may well have strengthened the stability of the international system by reinforcing its bipolar structure. The presence of nuclear weapons doubtless induced the leaders in Washington and Moscow to act with the utmost caution in crisis situations, thereby allowing for “rules of the game” and even “security regimes” to evolve.
Divergence of opinion on whether the development of nuclear weapons has transformed the nature of world politics has underlain the debates about the utility of nuclear threats in superpower crises that recurred in the heyday of the Cold War. The “nuclear revolution” thesis asserts that the inevitability of mutual devastation has made any attempt to fight and win a nuclear war totally irrational. Its proponents either minimize the significance of nuclear threats or attribute their effects to the “balance of resolve” between the U. S. and Soviet leaders. Those opposed to the “nuclear revolution” thesis deny the inevitability of annihilation and contend that victory in nuclear conflict can rationally be pursued. In their view, the effects of nuclear threats derive from the “balance of [nuclear] power.”
The disagreements on the nature of nuclear world have also affected the disputes over certain criteria for peacetime nuclear policy. Developed mostly in the latter half of the Cold War period, those criteria include the enhancement of “strategic stability, ” the maintenance of “extended deterrence, ” the control of “vertical” proliferation, and the prevention of “horizontal” proliferation. In particular, challenges to the orthodox interpretation of “strategic stability” and to the main features of strategic arms control in the 1970s and 1980s highlighted the absence of consensus on the validity of the “nuclear revolution” thesis.

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Nuclear deterrence, the foundation of peace since the end of the Second World War, has now entered into a period of transition. As US-Soviet strategic nuclear forces reached “essential equivalence, ” the strategy of Assured Destruction began to be questioned. Doubts about the efficacy of this strategy produced the concept of a limited nuclear war strategy, as can be seen in the search for flexible options and the advocacy of “discriminate deterrence, ” and of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which emphasizes strategic defense. The US and the Soviet Union both continue their arms race, both in terms of quantity and quality. Yet, in December 1988, the two superpowers signed the treaty to abolish Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). Furthermore, the US and the Soviet Union continue to negotiate to reduce their strategic forces by half. Both countries have place a brake on increasing their nuclear forces, and it is possible that they will be able to go a step further and reduce these arsenals. Arms control policy has also entered a period of transition.
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was seen as a rational strategy in the 1960s. However, since the early 1970s, those responsible for US security policy began to entertain doubts regarding MAD. Moreover, the increase in Soviet military activism in the Third World only increased American suspicion. In 1974, the US Secretary for Defense, James Schlesinger, began to revise the MAD strategy, and since then, both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have subscribed to a “countervailing strategy, ” and have undertaken the modernization of American strategic nuclear forces.
The Soviet Union, even after it achieved parity with the US, continued to increase its nuclear forces. However, based on General-Secretary Gorbachev's “reasonable sufficiency” concept, the Soviet are moving away from an “offense-oriented” strategy and toward a “defense-oriented” strategy. It would appear also that the Soviets are moving away from their strategy of fighting and winning a nuclear war.
If the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction can no longer be relied upon, what type of strategy will break the stalemate of nuclear deterrence? President Reagan has proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). However, many people have expressed their doubts about the technology, the cost, and the military strategy of SDI. Furthermore, confusion on Western strategy exists within the alliance. The Treaty to abolish INF has both surprised and confused the countries of NATO, which have relied on nuclear deterrence throughout the postwar period. Arguments exist in Europe for the modernization of nuclear forces as well as for the denuclearization of Europe, and the debate is very confused.
Arguments about the future of nuclear strategy can be divided into three views. First, there is the view that a strategy based on MAD will be unavoidable in this century, and therefore we should return to MAD. The second view argues that MAD, based upon the murder of masses of people, is immoral, and therefore we should pursue and promote the SDI. And, a third view sees deterrence based on nuclear weapons as dangerous, and advocates a departure from nuclear deterrence. It is unclear which direction the US and the Soviet Union will choose in addressing strategic issues.
What we need is deterrence against war. In the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that we will find an effective method of maintaining the peace other than nuclear deterrence. But, we need stable deterrence. The Western countries need to find a balance between an effective strategy and arms control. It is irresponsible to simply reduce nuclear forces without paying attention to strategic concerns. However, excessively increasing nuclear forces only provoke the other side, and it is destabilizing. What we need to do now is to construct a new conception of deterrence stability.

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Although the United States and the Soviet Union seriously competed with each other through nuclear arms racing, they never fought each other directly. This is a puzzle because the more severe the conflict is, the higher the incentives become for the conflicting parties to fight. To tackle this issue, I pick up two classical hypotheses explaining the surprising stability of the international system. H1 is the theory of nuclear revolution developed by Robert Jervis. H2 is the stability of bipolar world constructed by Kenneth N. Waltz. The Cuban Missile Crisis is used here to test these hypotheses. This case study is timely because we now know the details of this important political event. As a result of testing these two hypotheses, H1 passed and H2 failed: U.S. decisionmakers, especially John F. Kennedy, first got angry about the Soviet’s sudden installation of nuclear missiles’ sites on Cuba, but he gradually come to favor a quarantine because he was afraid of nuclear retaliation if the U.S. military attacked Cuba. This evidence confirms that H1 is valid. As for H2, this assumes that superpowers do not have to care about alliance politics in the bipolar world because their security is ultimately threated only by the other power, so it should only balance against the other superpower internally. Nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet Union both did worry about how their allies reacted, the US even endangered the missile deal with the Soviets for the sake of its relatively minor ally, Turkey. This evidence of superpower behavior is inconsistent with H2. In sum, the stability of the international system was maintained by the nuclear revolution, at least during the Cold War.

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近代以前のヨーロッパでは、キリスト教、その聖職者が心の問題を公式に扱っていた。いわゆる「魂の世話」である。近代以降に心の問題に取り組む仕事として新しく参画したのが、心理臨床、臨床心理学である。第3回では、心の問題という視点からキリスト教、ルターの改革と近代以降の臨床心理学との関連、類似性を考えることを試みた。臨床心理学に関してはその基礎を築いた人々のうち、フロイトとユングを中心に取りあげた。キリスト教、ルター、フロイト、ユングに共通し全体を貫くテーマは、人間の「悪」であるというおおよその見通しをたて、500年（あるいは2000年）の旅に出発した。

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