In this paper, I reflect on the correlation between the formation of Korean Worker's Party (KWP) and KIM Il-sung's maneuver to wage the Korean War. For a long time, it was believed that KWP was formed through the merging of South Korean Worker's Party (SKWP) and North Korean Worker's Party (NKWP) from June to July in 1949 with KIM Il-sung as the chairman of the Central Committee. However, new materials prove that the formation of KWP just meant the integration of the Central Committee of both KWPs and had a close connection with the tactical defferences between PAK Honyong, the top leader of SKWP, and KIM Il-sung who had been pointed out the leader of Korean Communist Movement by Stalin in 1946.
PAK pursued the overturn of Rhee Syng-man's regime by guerrilla conflict of SKWP in South Korea and tried to avoid the civil war between South and North regimes by appealing for a ‘peaceful unification plan’ which the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF) proposed. DFUF was established under PAK's initiative in June 1949. In this tactics it seems that SKWP and NKWP formed a ‘Joint Central Committee’ to manage activities of DFUF between June 28 and July 7 in 1949, when KIM Il-sung failed to take up the chairmanship of the Central Committee since the appeal of DFUF was not only one to withstand invasion of South Korea but also to contain KIM Il-sung's tactics. His tactics had dual purposes to achieve Korean unification and to seize the actual initiative of Korean Communist Movement with KIM's head position of KWP through advancing Korean People's Army into South Korea.
KIM opened up his tactics in a conversation with T. Shtykov, Soviet Ambassadar to North Korea, in August 1949 after his agreement to the ‘peaceful unification plan’ of DFUF. Although in September 1949 the Central Committee of Soviet Communist Party rejected this military option and ordered KIM and PAK to develop the latter's tactics with alerting KWP to the intervention of U. S. forces into the civil war, KIM Il-sung made a use of an opportunity of the favorable turn of Sino-Soviet relation. Finally, KIM gained his end in January 1950 that Stalin allowed him to prepare to open the war on condition that Mao Tse-zung should agree with KIM's tactics. Before the agreement of Stalin and Mao to open the civil war in Korean Peninsula, PAK had no other choice but to cooperate with KIM's tactics. Therefore the Korean War broke out in June 1950 and KIM began a purging of KWP after failing to accomplish his purposes through the war.

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American policy toward Korea had its own character during the time from the summer of 1947 to the outbreak of the Korean War. It differed from the policy up to that time, because the possibility of negotiating with the Soviet Union had disappeared. Also, it differed from the policy after that time because the American direct military commitment to South Korea had not yet been established. The American policy during this transitional period may be defined as containment by limited means.
The U. S. did not recognize the strategic value of Korean peninsula in the context of the war against the Soviet Union. The U. S. tried to maintain a non-communist government in South Korea for political reasons. First of all, the U. S. could not endure the loss of its prestige, which had been staked on Korea since the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and its two years Occupational Administration in South Korea. Secondly, the U. S. had to prevent political repercussions throughout the Far East. Unless the U. S., upon withdrawal of its troops from South Korea, left sufficient indigenous military strength to enable South Korea to defend itself against any but an overt act of aggression, U. S. withdrawal could be interpreted as a betrayal of its friends and allies in the Far East. Thirdly, the overthrow by Soviet-dominated forces of a regime established in South Korea under the aegis of the UN would constitute a severe blow to the prestige and influence of the UN.
From the end of 1949 to the spring of 1950, this policy was authorized in the larger context of its Far Eastern strategy, which was formulated under the influences of the Chinese Revolution. Although the level of American commitment to South Korea was increasing, there was no change in the policy to contain the communist threat without direct military commitment.

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