本稿は、行為遂行的な主権が生きている台湾の政治理論の分析を通じて、主権そのものの存在に関する説明を終えたとする現代政治理論に対抗して、主権論の意義を再検討する。その際、1970年代の台湾の主権的地位の歴史的な変化や80年代以降の民主化運動の中で蓄積された主権論を読み解くとともに、近年のヒマワリ運動にも伏在する主権概念を明確化する。第2節では、20世紀後半を通じて、台湾の主権論がどのように形成されたのかを追体験しつつ、国民主権論の定着を確認する。第3節では、主権論におけるマイノリティ問題への論及を皮切りに、ポピュリズムとの格闘という世界史的なテーマに対する固有の切り口や、中華圏での民主化運動とのつながりを確認し、台湾主権論が提起する理論的成果を明らかにする。本稿では、台湾主権論における行為遂行的な側面の強靱さと、それが実効的な民主主義と政治共同体の自立性とを同時に正統化する根拠となっている点を指摘する。

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Japan's English language education system is often compared with that of Korea, China, and other East Asian countries. Research on English language education in Taiwan is increasing, but much remains to be studied. This research used a comparative and international education perspective to explore high school English education in Taiwan. The investigation focused on lesson topics that appeared in 1971 Ministry of Education (MOE) accredited textbooks, examining particular political factors that influenced lesson content and topic choice. The goals of this study were to analyze English textbooks for the universal problem of nationalism (national identity and national pride with patriotism) typically found in social studies, history and geography textbooks. If such incidences of nationalism were found, subsequent research aimed to focus on clarifying the factors behind the inclusion of these elements in Taiwanese English language textbooks. Nationalism was indeed found in English textbooks from the 1970s and 1980s. The decision-making process for selecting specific lesson topics and content was found to be influenced not only by educational concerns but also by socio-cultural, politico-economic, and historical concerns. The research revealed that the postwar Taiwanese government clearly recognized the need for education as an investment in human capital. Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, the close politico-economic and socio-cultural relationships between Taiwan and the US complicated the picture in terms of lesson topic and subject emphasis.

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In East Asia, under dictatorial rule that was institutionalized through wartime laws, emergency laws and martial law, state-sponsored terrorism hit hard peoples.
In South Korea, there were many massacres perpetrated by the state from the "Cheju 4.3 Uprising" of 1948 to the "Kwangju Massacre" of 1980, claiming up to one million victims. Ten thousands were killed in Taiwan, under the massacres of the "2.28 Uprising" of 1946 and of the "white terrorism of the 1950s".
With the collapse of the Cold War, the crimes began to be brought to light and movements for reparation of the victims were emerged. In South Korea, the establishment of a law on compensation for victims related to "the Kwangju democratization movement" was a big breakthrough in the struggle against the Cold War/National Division-based ruling system.
Then in October 1999, AP released a massacre by U.S. troops during the Korean War of people of Nogeun-li. In December 1999, including a special law on the Cheju 4.3 Uprising, three laws to "bury the past" were concluded. In Taiwan, a "Compensation Act for Victims of 2.28" was established in 1995 and a law to compensate victims of the white terrorism of the 1950s was passed in 1998.
The reparation for victims of state sponsored terrorism in South Korea and Taiwan has been closely connected with demands for democratization and has been a driving force for its promotion. But the "red complex" still persists to this day. And there are a lot more cases of state-sponsored violence that have not been dealt with. Overcoming the legacy of the Cold War will be achieved through the movement for restoration of the victims' humanity, and pursuing the work of remedying the damage caused by state terrorism will lead to an age of peace and human rights in East Asia.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze from a historical viewpoint, the characteristics of China's Taiwan Policy, and its decision-making primarily during the period 1979 to 1987, when the “peaceful unification” and “one country two systems” policies were formulated.
After Deng Xiao-ping's revival and the normalization of relations between the United States and China, China changed its Taiwan Policy drastically.
Firstly, China replaced its policy of “liberation” with the “peaceful unification” policy. During the “liberation” period, peaceful measures were the supplement to the use of force, but during the “peaceful unification” period, force became the supplement to peaceful measures.
Secondly, the “peaceful unification” and “one country two systems” policies were formulated in tandem beside the formulation and implementation of economic reforms. Both were based on similar thoughts, such as “Limited War Theory, ” pragmatism, economy-first, and peaceful coexistence.
Thirdly, Taiwan Policy began to include some consideration of the Nationalist government and the Taiwanese people. China appealed to Taiwan for the opening of “three direct communications” and the start of Cross-Strait talks with no precoditions. At the same time, China extended the object of the United Front. Some native Taiwanese businessmen were charmed by various business opportunities in mainland China which were carefully created by the Chinese authorities.
Fourthly, interaction between China's Hong Kong policy and its Taiwan policy was strengthened. China originally planned to take over Taiwan first, however, as Taiwan ignored China's proposal, China could not help taking over Hong Kong first, and using it as a model case of “one country two systems” to let Taiwan see.
Finally, China's diplomatic struggle against Taiwan was successful. The normalization of relations between the United States and China, and the Joint-Communique issued by both countries successfully isolated Taiwan.
In conclusion, although China did not have enough power to take over Taiwan though the use of force, she began to offer proposals which seemed to be profitable or acceptable. Taiwan was forced to change its “Three No Policy” cue to China's “peaceful unification” tactics and the subsequent diplomatic struggle.

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This paper clarifies the significance and implications of Chiang Ching-kuo’s ‘cultural construction’ and his ‘Taiwanization’ (localization) policy that brought a drastic change in the Kuomintang’s cultural policy in postwar Taiwan.
‘Cultural construction’, launched by Chiang Ching-kuo, is the name that has been given to the last of the twelve major construction projects beginning in 1977, and includes the construction of local cultural centers and the establishment of a Cultural Commission in cabinet. By the construction of cultural centers in every county and major city, this ‘cultural construction’ is acknowledged as the most important cultural policy in the 1970s, having a strong impact on cultural developments in Taiwan thereafter.
The major findings of this paper are concerned with the implications of Chiang’s ‘cultural construction’ and his intention of promoting a ‘Taiwanization’ policy, not only in political administration but also in cultural administration. The basis of this discussion will be centered on the following observations.
Firstly, Chiang Ching-kuo’s landmark announcement to launch his own cultural policy marked a clear transition from Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of the 1960s.
Secondly, the highly symbolic appointment by Chiang Ching-kuo of Ch’en Ch’i-lu, a prominent Taiwanese scholar in the field of Taiwanese aboriginal studies, to the chair of the newly founded Cultural Commission in 1981, represented the first time the KMT was to place a local-oriented personality as the head of the government’s national cultural administration. As a result, Ch’en’s concern with local culture and the notion of Chinese culture opened up new horizons for the KMT’s cultural policy.
Thirdly, Chiang Ching-kuo’s policy of cultural localization is evident through the establishment of Taichung’s first cultural centre, founded in 1976 by the well-known Taiwanese poet Ch’en Ch’ien-wu. When examining the significance of Chiang’s localization policy, we should not neglect the fact that the ideas of a single Taiwanese intellectual became the base upon which Taiwan’s cultural policy was formed after 1970.
Fourthly, the establishment of display rooms and museums in local cultural centers, exhibiting notions of the ‘tradition’ and ‘uniqueness’ of various local places, presents a good illustration of the enhancement of local history and culture to represent the cultural policy of the new age. Such museums, initially conceived by Ch’en Ch’i-lu, can nowadays be seen everywhere, while the concept itself continues to be strongly promoted by the present government.
Finally, following the ‘Local Autonomy Act’, enforced in 1999, local cultural centers were gradually reorganized into local cultural bureaux. In short, it can be said that Chiang’s cultural centers became a prototype that since the 1990s has provided the basis for the decentralization of cultural policy. Hence, due to the above reasons, it is possible to state that Chiang Ching-kuo’s ‘cultural construction’ was a significant part of his ‘Taiwanization’ policy, which can be defined clearly as the ‘turning point’ in the KMT’s cultural policy.

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