At the beginning of 1945 American forces landed in the Philippines and Manila fell. As the war situation grew still more desperate, Konoe Fumimaro attended the court on February 14 for the first time in over three years and presented a long memorial to the Throne. In this memorial Konoe adomitted that defeat was inevitable but reasoned that defeat itself did not necessarily mean the end of the national polity, as the real threat was a communist revolution which could occur as a result of defeat. Therefore Konoe concluded that Japan should seek to terminate the war as immediately as possible.
Until now studies about this memorial have focused mainly on his fear against the danger of a communist revolution. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to reexamine his aim in this memorial.
Not only Konoe but also the Jushin, Hiranuma, Kido, and Wakatsuki, had strongly expressed the same view. It is natural that the ruling class has such feeling, and Konoe, who was a prince, has been frightened by the fear of a communist revolution from his youth.
Konoe also stressed that the Manchurian Incident and Sino-Japanese War and their expansion into the Pacific War were skillfully plotted by one group within the army which have long time aimed at a communist revolution. But Konoe was strongly influenced by Ueda Shunkichi, Yosida Shigeru, and other some adherents of Kodoha, who had helped draft this memorial to begin to hold this conspiracy. Moreover this idea has been developed and intensified by his strong anger toward the army, which regarded his detachment as negativism and watched him with deep suspicion, the Sorge Incident, and his political motive to attempt a Kodoha revival.
More noteworthy is Konoe's grasp of the international scene. On the one hand he pointed out that the Soviet Union was pushing revolution not only in Europe but also in East Asia. On the other hand he observed that America and Britain had not yet decided over forcing Japan to abolish the national polity. Through obtaining much accurate information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and other channels, he was somewhat optimistic about American opinion. Amongst his contacts, Ogata Shoji, chief of the second section of the Investigation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, played a most important role by talking and submitting the memorandum to Konoe about the international situation.
In particular Konoe was very sensitive to the trend about Japan in America and knew well that there were some influential persons like Joseph Grew and Hugh Byas, who understood the position of Konoe and Japan. He concluded that Japan must terminate the war immediately by negotiating with America in order to avoid a communist revolution and to preseve the national polity.
Four months later Konoe agreed to go to the Soviet Union as special envoy by the Emperor's entreaty. Though he personally distrusted the Soviet Union, he had one secret plan to negotiate directly with America using this chance. But his plan was not realized, as the Soviet Union did not accept the Konoe mission.

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Konoe Fumimaro served three times as prime minister for over almost three years in prewar Japan. He played an important role in the Sino-Japanese War, the Axis Alliance and the advance to southern French Indochina to guide Japan closer to war. In ideology he was very complicated making efforts for peace with the Allied Nations at the sacrifice of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, while he claimed to break the status quo from his youth (For example his article ‘Ei-Bei Hon'i no Heiwa Shugi o Haisu’)
In the postwar period the estimates of him were divided broadly into two categories, namely, those who felt he was a tragic premier and those who saw him as a warmonger. Konoe himself regarded his cabinet as having only a weak existence manipulated by the army. But was he usually passive or not.?
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine how Konoe saw international relations and how Japan's diplomatic policy was influenced by them in the first cabinet from the Marco Polo Bridge-Incident to the New Order in East Asia Proclamation.
A true peace based on international justice which Konoe stated immediately after the inauguration of the new cabinet put emphasis on the justificaiton of Japan's policy towards East Asia from the Manchurian Incident. But international justice converted from negative to positive meanings would lead to the New Order in East Asia through Sino-Japanese War. It was not the result of no clear prospect on the future of the war, but the embodiment of Konoe's world view.
On the other hand though Konoe tried to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact, the issue split the Konoe cabinet to lead to a general resignation by the rejection of key ministers of the Cabinet. After all the Axis Alliance was concluded in the second cabinet.
In spite of such hard-line policy of the Konoe cabinet toward Britain and America, Konoe himself did not intended to appeal to arms. He flattered himself that Britain and America would recognize Japan's situation sooner or later if Japan checked them more strongly.
In any case the New Order in East Asia based on international justice was an attempt to escape from the Washington Treaty System in Japan's Diplomacy.

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大宅壮一 (1900-1970) は本格的な活動を1950年に再開した．同年戦後初の単著『日本の遺書』『人間裸像』を刊行した．前者は，1950年代以降の資料収集を基盤とした活動の起点に位置づけられる．後者は，それまで本名あるいはペンネームで発表した人物評論を集め本名で刊行したものであり，本名での再出発のところに位置づけられる．また，特定のイデオロギーに属さないことを標榜した戦後の活動との連続性を見出すことができる．

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In a Japan that was becoming increasingly isolated as a result of the Manchurian Incident and its withdrawal from the League of Nations, two noteworthy positions were unfolding, with the goal of seeking a new diplomacy in the mid-1930s. These consisted of the “argument of colonial readjustment”, which was directed at the global community, and the “controversy concerning the propriety of unifying China”, which was directed at China.
The “argument of colonial readjustment” reflected the state of global politics at a time when Germany had rearmed itself and occupied the Rhineland while Italy had invaded Ethiopia, and was primarily advocated by the likes of E. House and other politicians and intellectuals in have-nations. This was later submitted by S. Hoare, the British foreign minister, to the League of Nations in 1936 and translated into reality through the establishment of the League of Nations' Committee for the Study of the Problem of Raw Materials in 1937.
Thus, this thesis aims to identify the unique elements of the Japanese position relative to those of the West by sifting through the “argument of colonial readjustment” as it had been embraced in the West and analyzing the given position as it had taken root in Japan, where the influence of the argument had been felt. In this connection, the Japanese position was distinct from the positions of Germany and Italy, as well as those of various other western countries, in that the fundamental rule of freedom of commerce was maintained, a new world order was pursued, and the principle behind independence from colonialism was respected. Advocates who had taken up this position in Japan included Fumimaro Konoe, Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, Masamichi Royama, and Tadao Yanaihara.
The fact that Japan sought various breakthroughs after withdrawing from the League of Nations has been revealed in recent research findings. This research also takes that position and will analysis the contents of the reconfiguration of the international order according to the “argument of colonial readjustment”.

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本稿の目的は 「新体制試案要綱」 の策定に関わる民間シンク・タンク国策研究会と陸軍省軍務局幕僚の関係を再評価すると共に, 軍務局幕僚の新体制構想の実像を明らかにすることにある。従来, 国策研究会は陸軍のブレーン・トラストと考えられており, 同会が策定した 「新体制試案要綱」 は, 未発見の陸軍の新体制構想を代替するものと明確な根拠を欠いたまま推測されてきた。しかし 「新体制試案要綱」 の策定過程を確認すると, 同要綱が多様性に富んだメンバーによって立案され, 審議の過程や結論が広く公開されたこと, その内容も議会や旧政党を尊重するものであったことが分かる。この事実は同要綱と軍務局幕僚の関係を一見否定するものである。にもかかわらず, 既存研究はこの矛盾について全く説明しえていない。本稿は, 当該期に軍務局幕僚が陥っていた政治的苦境を指摘し, 軍務局幕僚にとっては国策研究会の 「中立性」 や 「公開性」 にこそ同会の利用価値の本質があったことを指摘する。そしてこの考察の過程で, 当該期の軍務局幕僚の新体制構想が, 議会政治や政党政治に肯定的評価を与えるものであったことを明らかにする。

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Konoe Fumimaro is generally thought to have been a feeble and volatile political leader. But in his first government, he was the one who attempted to overcome the gigantic ‘Kogi Kokubo Shugi’ policy or ‘Military centralized industrialism’ which no one had ever been able to stop. And he tried to run Japan's economy by a peaceoriented ‘Kyogi Kokubo Shugi’ policy or ‘Regular industrialism’ instead.
Being involved in the Marco Polo bridge incident unexpectedly, however, Konoe still convinced himself that Japan could punish China soon by using Japan's economic power. Because he had a strong belief in Japan's monetary‘power policy’ which had been proceeded all through the Manchurian Empire, inner Mongoria and Northern China challenging the circulation of Chiang Kai-shek's ‘Legal Tender’. This was the reason why Konoe did not repress Kôgi Kokubo Shugi's landslide escalation in the eary stage of the war.
Finally at the end of 1937, the ‘currency war’, turned against China, and Chiang Kai-shek resigned his seat in the Cabinet.
In January 16, Konoe proclaimed his famous ‘Aitetosezu’ (or refuze to deal) statement against China. By this statement Konoe wanted to thrust his sword in Chiang Kai-shek's political reputation. But it failed to lead to Chiang's military collapse. On the contrary Wang Ching-wei and ‘the East-west military cliques’ lost their power in the Chinese government who both had once organized the ‘anti-Chiang movement’ in the ‘Kuomintang’ (the Chinese Nationalist Party).
Chiang Kai-shek revived his influence three months later and this time he strengtend the alliance with CCP (the Chinese Communist Party) and fully used CCP's power to increase his power.
In June 1938, Konoe's political initiative was at last nominal, and ‘Kogi Kokubo Shugi’ had already replaced Konoe's treasure, ie, ‘Kyogi Kokubo Shugi’.

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This thesis picks up Ishibashi Tanzan (1884-1973), a Japanese leading liberalist in Meiji-Taisho era. He is known for “Little Japanism”—the idea that Japan should develop sorely by peaceful economic expansion in a world where the high degree of economic interdependence among nations had rendered territorial expansion obsolete. Researchers have praised his liberal worldview almost uncritically. However, his international theory which was based on the fundamental peacefulness of economic relations had some serious weaknesses. Confronted with Japanese immigration exclusion in the United States, Tanzan stressed that U. S.-Japan relations were not at stake because their economic relations were still peaceful. Yet, the experience of W. W. I revealed the vulnerability of the unorganized economic interdependence. Japanese People began to feel awkward about Tanzan's “Little Japanism, ” and insisted that Japan, who was rejected to enter the white countries, had no choice but to expand to Asia.
However, Tanzan was not a naive believer in natural harmony of national interests. He was a “realist” who recognized a fundamental disagreement about a desirable world order between Japan and Anglo-Saxon countries. His “realists” aspect was revealed in his response to American “New Diplomacy.” During W. W. I, American President Woodrow Wilson declared “New Diplomacy.” and demanded that each nation should adopt a more liberal foreign policy. Many Japanese liberalists sympathized with American “New Diplomacy” and encouraged people to share it. However, most people looked at American “New Diplomacy” with suspicion, saying that Americans still excluded Japanese immigrants from their country and violated the very principles that they advocated. Confronted with people's cynical attitudes, the leading liberalists like Yoshino Sakuzo just stressed that American “New Diplomacy” was not such a self-interested slogan as most people thought. They never discussed American racial attitudes for fear of stimulating Japanese people's anti-American feeling. Some opinion leaders like Konoe Fumimaro criticized their pro-American attitedes, and insisted that Japan should not hesitate to fight against Anglo-Saxon contries for a truly just order.
Tanzan did not subscribe to the widespread cynical views on American “New Diplomacy.” Yet, he was also different from the uncritical followers of it. He clearly realized that American “New Diplomacy” did not provide satisfactory solutions of colonialism and racial discrimination, and advocated that Japan should fight for their realization. In this sense, he was a “realist.” Yet, unlike Konoe, Tanzan tried to achieve a just order by throughgoing liberal means. When the United States proposed the Washington Conference (1921-1922) in order to frame a new order in Asia and Pacific, he suggested that Japan should abandon all colonies and imperialistic interests in order to gain the colonial people's support, and then fight against colonialism and racial discrimination with them. His vision of a “liberal struggle” was the product of his realistic insights into the international power relations and his fundamental belief in the powerful trend toward global liberation.

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