This study attempts to establish the limits of the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s perception of Japan based on negotiations over the Fourth Japan-China Private Trade Agreement and the Nagasaki national flag incident. It explains the underlying rationale for and reason why the Chinese decided to break off relations with Japan, what their perceptions of the situation were, and what they had failed to perceive. In addition, this study analyzes the interaction between Chinese intelligence acquisition, data analysis and the perception of Chinese policy-makers.
When the trade negotiations began in Beijing in September 1957, China’s policy-makers, albeit wary of the Kishi cabinet’s attitude towards China, were optimistic about the prospects for Japanese domestic approval of Sino-Japanese trade; China’s negotiators were not ready to compromise. After the negotiations broke down, demand for trade with China grew strong in Japan and the Kishi cabinet actively worked towards concluding an agreement, whereby the Chinese leaders, although holding fast to certain principles, displayed a more flexible stance. Negotiations were reopened in February 1958, but there was no change in the ambivalent position of the Chinese policy-makers on Japan and their negotiator won some concessions from the Japanese side. During these negotiations, any arbitrary analysis of information obtained by China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies was checked and nothing suggested that the policy-makers entertained any noteworthy misunderstandings of Japan.
China turned to stronger methods when Taiwan’s objection to the Fourth Japan-China Trade Agreement developed into a dispute between Japan and Taiwan. At the time of Japan’s general elections, Chinese policy-makers tried to encourage a more China-friendly public opinion by criticizing the policy towards China that the Kishi cabinet was practicing, thereby hoping to alter the Kishi government’s position on China. These moves were consistent with China’s existing policy of “Japan neutralization”. However, there was limited domestic criticism of how Kishi dealt with China, a fact that Chinese intelligence agencies were to some extent informed of. Motivated by a disapproval of the Kishi cabinet and high hopes for Sino-Japanese trade, they made arbitrary deductions based on gathered information suggesting that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results.
In these circumstances, Chinese policy-makers adopted an even tougher position on Japan in the wake of the Nagasaki national flag incident and decided to break off relations. The Chinese did not intend a complete and permanent cessation of relations, but rather wanted to apply pressure on Kishi. As such, the decision was in line with China’s policy of “Japan neutralization”. On the other hand, Kishi perceived China’s hard-line stance as interference with Japan’s general elections, and chose to observe calmly how events unfolded. Japanese opinion continued to support Kishi government policies. However, China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies disregarded this fact and produced arbitrary intelligence that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results. Hence Chinese policy-makers persisted with their hard-line stance and did not modify their “Japan neutralization” policy.
In retrospect, this chain of events suggests that one cause for China’s failed Japan policy was the failure of its intelligence agencies to comprehend that mounting Japanese domestic demand for trade with China had the potential to alter Japan’s foreign policy. Chinese intelligence analysis had backed up its policy-makers’ hard-line stance, and hence China continued to maintain the ambition of achieving its “Japan neutralization” policy.
The limited insight of China’s Japan-related intelligence agencies was the result of the following three factors: firstly, their abilities to collect and analyze intelligence were not yet fully developed;

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This article challenges the notion that the ideas and strategies for foreign students designed in the report of the Council for the Asia Gateway Initiative at the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office have had a great impact on the subsequent strategies for foreign students formulated by the Education Rebuilding Council, by Prime Minister Fukuda’s Plan of 300,000 Foreign Students, and by the interim report of the Special Committee on Foreign Students of the Central Council on Education. The current investigation is based on the analysis of the major characteristics of the Asian Gateways Initiatives.
Next, the article studies the possibility and feasibility for UMAP to meet the needs of short-term student exchange programs which will emerge as the major programs of international education, instead of the current programs of sending students to other countries with the intention of obtaining the skills needed for national development in modern society.
Finally, the author makes concluding remarks emphasizing the new patterns of short-term student exchange programs in future Asian societies, as have emerged in EU countries.

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本研究では，木曾漆器の産地である長野県旧楢川村を対象に，1980年代以降の生産構造の転換と中国産漆器製品との関係を明らかにし，漆器業者による「伝統」の再構築について考察した．方法論として，漆器業者へのアンケート調査と，特定の業者へのインタビュー調査を組み合わせた．その結果，事業所の生産形態，規模，歴史などによって中国産製品の扱い方はかなり異なっていることがわかった．中国産製品を取り入れている事業所は，製造過程の一部に組み込み，販売面では安価品の提供と考えている．一方，中国産製品を排除する事業所は，自家製造のオリジナリティに「伝統」を再発見しようとしている．ゆえに，「伝統」のとらえ方は一元的なものでなく，中国産製品との関係性の中で常に変化しているものだといえる．中国産製品への評価は，必ずしも品質の悪さに帰結することはなく，漆器業者ごとに多様なとらえ方がある．なお，本稿では歴史-地理的な視点を用いて個人誌に注目し，国境を越えた特定個人間のつながりが，この漆器産地を支えていることを明らかにした．

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Even though Japan continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Japan was able to conclude the fourth “non-official” trade agreement with the People's Republic of China on March of 1958. It was through this agreement, Japan hoped to increase the volume of trade with mainland China and thereby stimulate her domestic economy. Mainland China, on the other hand, considered this agreement as a good opportunity to transcend her private relation with Japan toward official recognition.
Taiwan, which did not want to recognize any relation Japan had with mainland China, strongly opposed the provision in the memorundom attached to the agreement allowing the Chinese trade mission to fly its national flag in Japan. Therefore, Taiwan threatened Japan using various resources including prohibiting trade with Japan.
The first purpose of this paper is to describe how the strained relationship between Japan and Taiwan was solved. The second is to analyze the decision making process in the Japanese government, especially focusing on how each minister, LDP dietman and bureaucrat acted.

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The ratification of the December 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty established formal diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Seoul. In terms of diplomatic negotiation process, on the one hand, it did nothing more than confirm the relationship between Japan and the Korean Peninsula which was already in existence following the Korean War; on the orther hand, it also announced the birth of a new international system among three countries, Japan-US-South Korea. The conclusion of the Japan-South Korea treaty itself, was Japan's first diplomatic initiative since the end of war and the first act of Japan-US burden-sharing. However, it didn't deny the existence of another government in the Korean Peninsula i. e. North Korea nor did it put constraints on future relations with it. The Japanese leaders clearly limited the treaty's scope of application to the southern half of the Peninsula; subsequent relations with North Korea would be entrusted to the international situation in the future.
From that point of view, the 1972 U. S. detente with the Soviet Union and China, and the opening of the North-South Dialogue, brought a new perspective to Japan's relations with the Korean Peninsula. In fact, after Kissinger's July, 1971 China visit, in response to North Korea's invitation, Japanese-North Korean exchanges in the fields of sports, culture, and economy, rapidly developed. Furthermore, not only journalists, but also ruling and opposition Diet members began to visit to Pyongyang and hold discussions with Kim Il Sung. The Japanese government also clarified its policy on enlarging exchanges in nonpolitical fields. However, the North Korean side demanded establishing official diplomatic relations with Japan, which in essence, signified breaking relations with South Korea. In other words, North Korea would accept “coexistence with Japan” but would not permit “coexistence with South Korea.” With North Korea's announcement of suspending the North-South Dialogue, Japanese-North Korean relations took a turn to the worst.
However, with the start of the Roh Tae Woo administration, when South Korea announced abandoning its policy of isolation with North Korea, in July of 1988, an atmosphere of improved relations prevailed once again. Interestingly enough, this time, it was the Japanese side that demanded contact between the two governments. Also, both countries did not, nor do they, seek the establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future. The North Korea side fears setting the spark to the issue of cross-recongnition if it were to establish diplomatic relations with Japan. Nor does the Japanese side believe cross-recongnition is possible. In other words, Tokyo-Pyongyang relations cannot go beyond the level of Moscow-Seoul relations. It is possible however, that after “squaring up” issues from the “unfortunate past, ” “limited coexistence” short of diplomatic recongnition, would comprise no more than cooperative economic relations. The resilience of this relationship i. e. Japan and North Korea, will be tested by whether or not it will be able to withstand the Tokyo-Seoul-Pyongyang “game of diplomacy” with all its complexity.

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During the 1950s, there were many incidents of Japanese vessels and crews being detained or seized in the East China Sea as well as in the Yellow Sea by China.　To resolve these issues, the Japanese and Chinese governments met and then decided upon the First Civilian Fisheries Agreement Between China and Japan.　The rationale for seizure had been the preservation of fishing area resources but the lengthy detainment of persons involved proved to be a most distressing development for Japan.　For this reason, civilian negotiations were between the Japanese and Chinese representatives, leading to the emergence of activities assuring the safety of all involved in these waters.　Initially, the Chinese government was unresponsive to this request, but the cessation of hostilities at the end of the Korean War proved to be an impetus for furthering better relations with Japan, with the result that many vessels and crews were repatriated towards the end of 1954.　From January to April of 1955, negotiations were initiated with the Chinese government within the limited scope presented by the Japanese government which, although refusing to negotiate on a nation-to-nation level, still allowed things to proceed through the Sino-Japanese Fishing Industry Alliance.　Much difficulties were encountered, but the final result was that the primary goal as stated by the Japanese representatives of ensuring safety to all concerned was actualized through reasonable compromise.

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