The general evaluation of the Beijing government's treaty revision diplomacy is not high because the Beijing Special Tariff Conference from 1925 to 1926 resulted in a barren result. However, the fact is that the Beijing government built an important cornerstone towards the revision of unequal treaties. It was not accidental that political estrangement was caused between Japan, America, and Britain; and that a better environment for Chinese treaty revision was created.
What has been emphasized on this point conventionally was the materialization of the Kellogg-Johnson line as a pro-Chinese line. This should be, at least partly, interpreted as the result of Chinese treaty revision diplomacy. In particular, the formation of the pro-Chinese line in the Department of State was, to a large extent, the response to the plan which the Beijing government instigated. Chinese Foreign Minister Shen Ruilin esteemed relationships with America to ensure diplomatic support from Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, while the activity of Chinese Minister to America Alfred Sze satisfied the expectation of the Beijing government Foreign Ministry. Considering the political process of the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference, that situation was rather an exceptional success in Chinese diplomacy history.
British diplomacy, whose mediation between America and Japan had been effective in the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference in the past, did not work this time. This, again, was the result of what the Beijing government had planned. The Chinese side differentiated their attitude towards Britain from their policy towards America and Japan, because of the fact that Britain had shown the severest attitude at the beginning. When British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs J. Austen Chamberlain approached America in order to convert his previous policy, Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro's stiffened economism was revealed. In this sense, the isolation of Shidehara diplomacy could be understood in context as a result of Chinese treaty revision diplomacy towards America and Britain.

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This paper deals with the East Asia policy by Britain in 1928. The international relation in East Asia during 1928 had made a tension over Manchuria between Japan and China. How Britain had considered, and corresponded it is considered in this study. When The Tsinan Incident had been happened, Britain first had showed a sympathetic attitude to Japan, but later showed a critical opinion to the Manchurian Policy of Japan. However, Japan requested Britain's cooperation with Japan afterwards. When negotiating over the customs autonomy of China, where the confrontation between Japan and China had been going on, Britain understood for cooperation with Japan to some degree, and executed a policy to advance well the negotiation between Japan and China over the customs autonomy. The purpose of this policy was to maintain The Maritime Customs. It was necessary for The Maritime Customs maintenance that the negotiation of Japan and China have advanced well under the most-favored-nation status.

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All of the papers published in this number were read at the third annual conference of the Business History Society of Japan which was held at Waseda University on the 20th of November, 1967.
In the opening address, Kazuo Yamaguchi emphasized the extent of the competition the western-style enterprises in Japan had to fight with foreigners before they were firmly established by the beginning of the 20th century, and he pointed out the six conditions required for their effective competition in the world market.
The second speaker, Kanji Ishii, of the University of Tokyo, explained that there were two types of silk-reeling mills, the mills which produced the common grade of raw silk and the mills which specialized in fine raw silk, both being exported for the American market.
He also emphasized that the patterns of behavior of the two mills, the Katakura of the former type and the Gunze of the latter, were quite different in financing, purchasing, and labor recruitment. The commentator, Naosuke Takamura of Yokohama National University, raised the question whether these two types were not related to the two different stages of development of the Japanese silk-reeling industry.
Yoichiro Inoue of Hiroshima University followed the technological development of the Nagasaki Shipyard of the Mitsubishi Co. and concluded that the prosperity of the Nagasaki Shipyard was based on its technical superiority over the competitive yards. Shigeaki Yasuoka of Doshisha University commented that the technical aspect should have been discussed in closer relation with other management factors.
Tsunehiko Yui, of Meiji University, reported on the Tokyo Marine Insurance Co. formed by Eiichi Shibuzawa and subscribed by some aristocrats, mostly former daimyos. He emphasized the role of Kenkichi Kagami, who led the company successfully through a number of difficulties, devising an effective method of calculation and skillfully exploring the world market.
Toshimitsu Imuta of Osaka Municipal University suggested that the success of Tokyo Marine Insurance should also be considered in relation to the development of industrial enterprises, to the cooperation among the competitive insurance companies and finally to the generous government subsidies. The final reporter, Yoshio Togai of Senshu University, traced in detail various challenges the Mitsui Trading Co. had to respond to in its formative years.
Keiichiro Nakagawa of Tokyo University asked for further clarification of the competitive situation between the general and specialized merchants on the one hand and between the shipping, insurance and/or foreign exchange functions of those general merchants and the same kind of subsidiary businesses operated by independent firms on the other.

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Il Conte Raffaele Ulisse Barbolani (1818-1900) fu un diplomatico italiano di alto livello, nato il 13 agosto 1818 a Cesapiana di Colledimacine, in provincia di Chieti, da un ramo cadetto, trasferitosi in Abruzzo, della famiglia gentilizia toscana dei Barbolani di Montauto.

Non ancora trentenne, il conte Barbolani iniziò la carriera diplomatica tra le fila della burocrazia borbonica nel Ministero degli Affari Esteri del Regno delle Due Sicilie, dove era entrato con regolare concorso nel 1847. Dopo incarichi importanti svolti presso numerose sedi in Europa e nel mondo per conto del governo borbonico, essendo sospettato di avere contatti col Regno di Sardegna e Casa Savoia, nel 1859 fu trasferito in Brasile in qualità di Incaricato d’Affari. Sensibile tuttavia agli avvenimenti contemporanei in Italia durante gli anni cruciali della Guerra d’Indipendenza, il giovane diplomatico scelse comunque, a rischio della carriera, di tornare in patria, abbandonando i Borbone e schierandosi dalla parte dei Savoia.

Entrato nelle grazie del Presidente del Consiglio Camillo Benso conte di Cavour, il conte Barbolani proseguì l’iter diplomatico al servizio del neonato Regno d’Italia occupandosi in particolare dell’organizzazione del Ministero degli Esteri del giovane Stato, di cui diventò Segretario Generale tra il 1867 e il 1869. Concluso l’incarico di Segretario Generale presso il Ministero, nel 1869 fu destinato a Costantinopoli e nel 1875 a Pietroburgo. Il 31 dicembre 1876 venne promosso Inviato Straordinario e Ministro Plenipotenziario di 1a classe e, con Regio Decreto 13 febbraio 1877, destinato alla guida della Legazione italiana di Tokyo.

Forte dei suoi contatti personali nei piani alti del Ministero degli Esteri e di un’ormai consolidata esperienza diplomatica maturata sul campo, il diplomatico abruzzese sbarcò a Yokohama per sostituire il conte Alessandro Fe’ d’Ostiani il 10 maggio 1877 con l’intenzione di proseguire le amichevoli relazioni di amicizia con quel Paese sulla scia dei suoi predecessori. Durante i quattro anni in cui resse la Legazione di Tokyo, il Barbolani si dedicò infatti alla promozione dell’immagine dell’Italia quale paese legato al Giappone da un rapporto di amicizia disinteressata, stringendo forti legami con gli esponenti della classe dirigente Meiji e sviluppando una politica diplomatica che, senza interferire in questioni di politica interna, servisse ad approfondire le relazioni politico-commerciali tra i due Paesi.

Tra le iniziative più significative della sua attività alla guida della Legazione di Tokyo, vanno senz’altro ricordati i negoziati svolti per la revisione dei trattati vigenti, che il diplomatico italiano avviò nel gennaio del 1879 con l’allora Ministro degli Esteri giapponese Terashima Munenori (1832-1893). Con l’obiettivo di ampliare l’interscambio tra l’Italia e il Giappone, il Barbolani, di propria iniziativa, propose al governo Meiji un nuovo trattato commerciale che, abrogando quello stipulato nel 1866, sancisse l’autonomia tariffaria giapponese e che, in cambio della possibilità per gli italiani di circolare, risiedere e commerciare liberamente fuori dai porti aperti, concedesse l’abolizione graduale dell’extraterritorialità. Si trattava per l’epoca di un progetto di revisione radicale e ambizioso, che avrebbe permesso al Governo Meiji di fare notevoli passi avanti nel processo di revisione dei cosiddetti “trattati ineguali”, consentendo intanto al Regno d’Italia di ottenere maggiori possibilità di ampliare la propria rete commerciale in Asia Orientale e di stabilire più intimi rapporti diplomatici con la classe dirigente giapponese, con tutti i vantaggi politici che questo avrebbe comportato per il futuro.

Scopo del presente lavoro è illustrare nel modo più esauriente possibile le modalità dei negoziati svoltisi nel

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Yoshino Sakuzo is not only the most important leading thinker in Taisyo Democracy, but also well known as a specialist on Sino-Japan relationship, who wrote many about China from Xinhai Revolution to the Manchurian Incident. This paper will discuss the views of Yoshino Sakuzo regarding China, especially Japan's interests in China during the Paris Peace Conference, the Washington Conference, and the nationalist revolution. Besides, to make clear the significance of Yoshino's views regarding China in the history of Sino-Japan relationship this paper will also compare Yoshino's opinions about Sino-Japan relationship before the Manchurian Incident with Wang Zhengting's, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in China.

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Treating the roles of Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro and Deputy Minister to China Shigemitsu Mamoru concerning the Chinese foreign debt redemption negotiations from 1929 to 1931, this paper examines two choices within the Japanese Foreign Ministry symbolized by these two influential diplomats.
When the National Government came to power in China in the late 1920s, a great amount of debt to foreign countries, such as Japan, Great Britain, and the United States of America, had already been accumulated. Redemption of this Chinese foreign debt became an international issue between the National Government and the related countries. In particular, Japan had extended huge credits to China, such as the so-called Nishihara Loans during the First World War. It could almost be considered a test case for Japanese economic diplomacy led by Shidehara for Japan, Britain, and America to recover their foreign credits to China and at the same time maintain good relations with China.
Sino-Japanese negotiations over the Chinese foreign debt redemption began formally in the spring of 1930. However, some political leaders within the National Government of China, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Cheng-ting, repudiated payment of the Nishihara Loans. Although the international creditors conference was later held in November of the same year, the participating countries failed to reach agreement and Shidehara's attempt to search for Anglo-Japanese cooperation was in vain.
Approaching Chinese Minister of Finance Sung Tzu-wen, Shigemitsu, on the other hand, tried to break the deadlock by conceding to reducing the amount of the Nishihara Loans. Shigemitsu envisioned aiding Chinese nation building led by Chiang Kai-shek and Sung Tzu-wen by linking the foreign debt redemption with Japanese reinvestment into China. Shigemitsu firmly believed economic cooperation with China was indispensable to Japan because the policy of cooperation with America and Britain was no longer working well.
Shigemitsu's plan was seen as going beyond that of Shidehara, whose basic foreign policy outlook was that of cooperation with America and Britain. Shidehara sought to keep Japan in line with America and Britain when he negotiated with China on issues including extraterritoriality and the transfer of foreign legations. Although Shigemitsu went to Tokyo and talked with Shidehara, the gap between them was not bridged. Returning to China, Shigemitsu resumed negotiations and a foreign debt redemption plan was agreed to informally between Japan and China. However, in the end, the debt was not recovered due to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.
In the conclusion to this paper, after reviewing the two foreign policy options within the Foreign Ministry symbolized by Shidehara and Shigemitsu, the influence of the Japanese Army after the Manchurian Incident on these two options is discussed.

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