“
Autonomy
,” which is a key concept for diagnosing the ethical legitimacy of
one’s actions, has been argued in various ways in philosophy and ethics. In one
way, the concept of
autonomy
is perceived as individualistic in the sense it authorizes
excluding interventions by other people. In another way, it is employed
by feminists to protect women’s rights. Then, along with these two ways of understanding
autonomy
, care ethics, which began with In a Different Voice by
Carol Gilligan in 1982, was forced to deal with the predicament whether it
should criticize the concept of
autonomy
as relational ethics against individualism
or accept it as feminist ethics.
The aim of this thesis is to raise a question about the current form of care
ethics which uses the concept of
autonomy
as a criterion for good care to address
the issue of oppression suffered by caretakers. To guide the conclusion, in
the first section, I confirm that at the beginning care ethics criticized the concept
of
autonomy
as being individualistic. Feminists criticized that by excluding
the concept of
autonomy
, care ethics could not protect caretakers’
autonomy
in
oppressive situations. In the second section, I suggest that together with developing
the theory of relational
autonomy
, care ethics incorporated the concept of
autonomy
as a criterion for good care in response to the feminists. In the last
section, though, I criticize that incorporating the concept of
autonomy
into care
ethics continues the ideology of
autonomy
and then makes a certain care relation
invisible. So, I propose that care ethicists must distinguish the issue of oppression
from the issue of
autonomy
, and that they can address the issue of oppression
more adequately without using the concept of
autonomy
.
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