Many philosophers suspect that the emotion of
shame
cannot play a significant
role in morality because
shame
is the reaction to others’ contempt and therefore, a
heteronomous emotion. This paper aims to defend the view that
shame
is a morally
significant emotion by focusing on one form of reproach —“
shame
on you.” We employ
this reproach, for example, with a President who establishes discriminatory
policies or a scientist who falsifies data in his academic paper and in these cases, we
assume this reproach is morally important. Therefore, what does “
shame
on you”
imply? How can it be morally justified? Moreover, what are its characteristics? In
this paper, I answer these questions by clarifying the notions of
shame
and self-respect.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I resolve the issue of autonomy and heteronomy
in the emotion of
shame
based on Gabriele Taylor’s observation that
shame
contains two elements — a self-directed adverse judgment and a notion of an audience.
I argue that the adverse judgment is always rendered autonomously, but the
audience can be either autonomous or heteronomous; essentially, agents feel
shame
either in their own eyes or in the eyes of others. Second, I explain the meaning of
“
shame
on you” and demonstrate the moral validity of this reproach by referring to
the nature and classification of self-respect. Finally, I examine the distinctive significance
of “
shame
on you.” Examining the different characteristics of
shame
and guilt,
I argue that this form of reproach involves more a comprehensive assessment of
the agent than other forms of reproach that concern, for example, the violations of
moral rules.
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