The main objective of this article is to study the impact of international factors on democratization. After the end of Cold War, both democratic consolidation and a free market-oriented economy have been accepted as universal values in Central Europe. Thus, international actors from the EU, WB, and IMF to Western social organizations, such as foundations, NGOs, and churches launched into democratic assistance. Among them, I focus on the role of Western foundations' assistance that support societies in development and in transitions to establish democratic norms and values.
According to existing literature, there are four ideal types of international influence. First, the ideal type is “contagion, ” which implies the demonstration effect. By developing the technology of communication, the experience of democratization in one country spreads to others. The second type represents “consent, ” based on prevalent norms and expectation through some foundations, NGO or international organizations, which enlighten the people who are not accustomed to democratic norms and attitudes. The third, the type of international influence is “control, ” which includes punishments, economic sanctions and rewards given by external forces. They encourage the transformation of a non-democratic into a democratic country. Finally, the fourth type shows “conditionality, ” which intends to make a non-democratic regime restricted by a donor country or some multilateral organization. Currently, this ideal type of international pressure is prevalent throughout the world.
Therefore, I pay attention to the role of foundations' assistance through “consent, ” that is why their aid programs include both party-reform, political institution-building and establishing social infrastructure of democracy. These roles of foundations will empower civil society forces to reform the state.
In the case of Poland, under Communism for forty years, the Polish state dominated by the Communist party controlled all spheres of social and political life. Thus, transition to democracy means rebuilding civil society, a task which more than sixty Western foundations took part in supporting. Even while the authoritarian regime controlled all state-society relations, some democratic dissidents, like intellectuals and non-official labor unions, could continue to exist under Communist rule, because Western foundations, such as German foundations or NED, had provided democratic aid to Poland through the network of foundations' assistance. In the transition phase, some foundations tried to reform party
organizations. Others coped with economic problems or provided the social infrastructures of a democratic regime to build civil society. After the transition to democracy, Poland faces obstacles to keep civil society united for cooperation and collective action. As the authoritarian regime is no longer there, the challenge has shifted from cooperating in a common goal of removing old rulers to the functioning of various groups and organizations in civil society. So, the democratic government may experience a democratic competition between the interests and views of each group in the population. In this point, foundations' assistance through “consent, ” can only deal with the difficulty of integrating them in democratic consolidation.
Thus, a democracy will be consolidated when democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life as well as in calculations for achieving success, through foundations' assistance.

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欧州議会の直接普通選挙が各国ごとに来年6月に挙行される。これはECの政治統合の進展のうえで画期的意義をもつことになろう。これにかんがみ、本報告は、ECの政治統合を沿革的にふりかえってみようとするものである。
(1) 政治統合の狭い意味と広い意味
(2) レジスタンスから「欧州運動」へ
(3) 欧州審議会と欧州石炭鉄鋼共同体・欧州防衛共同体・欧州(政治)共同体
(4) ジャン・モネのヨーロッパとドゴールのヨーロッパ(欧州経済共同体・原子力共同体とフーシェ・プラン)
(5) 欧州同盟へ向かって(ドゴール以後)
(6) 政治統合をめぐる諸思潮の総括

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国連安全保障理事会は、LGBTに対する戦時性暴力についてどのような議論を展開し、どのように対立してきたのであろうか。それにはどのような展望があるのか。それを明らかにするのが、本稿の目的である。LGBTに対する暴力と差別の問題は、大国間・地域間対立が先鋭化しているテーマの一つでもある。欧米諸国、ラテンアメリカ諸国、イスラエルは、LGBTの権利の擁護に積極的である一方、ロシア、中国、アラブ諸国、アフリカ諸国、アジア諸国の多くがLGBTの権利の擁護に消極的あるいは否定的な立場をとっている。両者の対立は、国連安全保障理事会においても繰り広げられている。国連安全保障理事会は、「女性・平和・安全保障」のアジェンダを構築したが、LGBTの権利の擁護を目的としていない。しかし、このアジェンダに関する国連安全保障理事会の決議、議長声明、議事録を分析することで、国連安全保障理事会がLGBTに対する戦時性暴力に対して一致した行動がとれない状況にある一方、国連LGBTIコア・グループに所属している理事国が戦時性暴力からのLGBTの保護に積極的な発言をしていることがわかるであろう。現在のところ、国連安全保障理事会において、戦時性暴力からのLGBTの保護に積極的な国家と、消極的あるいは否定的な立場の国家は拮抗しており、多くの理事国の賛同を得て決議や議長声明を採択することが困難であることに変わりはない。

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This paper aims to indicate that discussions on policy effects regarding dispatching Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) abroad for collective security seem to have hardly taken place in the National Diet over the past quarter of a century. It also intends to promote the revitalization of policy debate through showing disputing points that should be concretely discussed in the Diet. In general, policy debate should include discussion of both whether implementation of the policy is legally permitted (legality debate) , and whether implementation leads to the achievement of the expected goals (policy effect debate) . This is because there are policies that are legal but ineffective and those that are effective but illegal. However, almost all discussions of joining in collective security in the Diet have been centered on a legality debate.

On collective security, experts have mainly discussed (i) whether the deployment of forces influences peacekeeping and peacebuilding in intervened states, (ii) whether the deployment of forces has a harmful effect on intervened states, and (iii) whether the definition of policy effect is appropriate in the first place.

Regarding these disputing points, the debates are still on-going. On the other hand, in the Diet, it appears that policy effects have been addressed as if they were simply obvious. If one is to support the active deployment of the SDF to missions abroad, an assessment of policy effects should be presented as its basis. However, their discussions have focused on the interpretation of Article 9. It has been a “policy debate without policy effect debate.”

Considering this, this paper recommends that the Diet start an assessment of the policy effects of SDF deployment in past cases, based on the three points of dispute mentioned above. After the assessment of past cases, it will be possible for the Diet to carry out a “policy debate with both legality debate and policy effect debate.”

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Why do intervening states have difficulty deciding whether to withdraw from armed peace operations? Previously, it has been argued that intervening states lack the will or ability to plan exit strategies, but this paper argues that even with those traits, they struggle with justifying withdrawal.

When intervention begins, intervening states need internal and international support. From the intervening statesʼ perspective, it is necessary to portray the intervention objective as a “just cause” to obtain as much support as possible. Intervention objectives tend to be ambiguous. For example, if an intervening state announces that its objective is to “prevent hotbeds of terrorism,” almost all states and people will agree with the objective because they can interpret it to suit their own purposes.

However, ambiguous objectives are accompanied by complex criteria with which to evaluate whether those objectives have been achieved. For example, if the objective is to “prevent hotbeds of terrorism,” does this goal require the elimination of all terrorists in the intervened states or does it only mean protecting civilians until the intervened statesʼ security forces are prepared to protect them?

Given this ambiguity, termination factions emphasize the least demanding criteria for achievement of the objective, for example, that protecting civilians has been achieved. In contrast, continuation factions emphasize the most demanding criteria, for example, that the elimination of all terrorists has not been achieved. Owing to these different evaluation criteria, the continuation factions fail to persuade the termination factions and vice versa. Thus, both factions end up talking past each other.

In summary, ambiguous objectives may justify intervention, but the very same objectives may not necessarily justify withdrawal. Every advantage has its disadvantage. Intervening states face a dilemma that I will refer to as the dilemma of exit strategy.

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Discussions around the concept of the security guarantee have increased in recent years. One of the main points of these discussions concerns the issue of so-called “Redefining Security:” modern security is so complicated that it cannot be reduced to the traditional military-centric national security model. Areas outside of military affairs need to be examined as security challenges. The range of security activities and the rapid manifestation of new threats in recent decades need revising. In a multipolar world, the subject matter encompassed by the field of Security Studies is substantial.

As the “New Security Agenda” becomes more prevalent, the concept of national sovereignty, which is at the core of the security guarantee, and the limitations of military force now receive greater recognition. However, the military-centric conception of a national security policy remains deeply rooted. Particularly since 9/11, because of the muddled status of the ideas of “Old Wars” and “New Wars,” there is a need for a theoretical framework that captures the conceptual perspectives characterizing the relationship between military and non-military security policy.

This paper will reevaluate the theoretical debate, and the symbolic struggle for the political legitimacy surrounding the concept of the security guarantee, against the backdrop of the globalization of security policy. The majority of the discussions concerning the concept of the security guarantee since the end of the Cold War have tended to address the problems of the “Security Dilemma.” The divergence between the concept of security itself and national security policy is now treated as a genuine theoretical problem. Furthermore, this paper examines the theoretical significance of Critical Security Studies in recent years and the limitations of this field, while focusing on the impact of the historical structure and the discursive meta-structure surrounding the concept of security.

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Who are the agents of peace? In international politics, we often use the terms peace-building and peace-making, but tend to avoid asking a simple question: who will make peace and for whom? Not only the Realists but also the Liberalists presuppose the United States, a major power, as the main actor to end wars and make peace. However, as we know from the experiences of military intervention and anti-terrorist wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it seems obvious that peacemaking is not possible without popular support from the grassroots level.

In this paper, the author introduces the alternative approaches in terms of the Subaltern Studies as well as Gender Studies. Both have their intellectual origins in popular movements for empowerment and advocacy: the former was proposed by a group of historians who witnessed people power in 1977 to overthrow a coercive Indian government under Indira Gandhi, while the latter has developed in tandem with women’s movements in various parts of the world and backed by international society since the International Women’s Year of 1975.

The Subaltern Studies criticize the state-centric discourse that was planted by European imperialism and reestablished by nation-states in postcolonial societies. When people resist, they are “pacified” by the military and police. Gender Studies counters the framework of male-dominated societies. When women disobey patriarchal order, they are cruelly punished. Such marginalized people and women have not had the power to have their voices heard until very recently.

As Sigmund Freud discovered about individuals, in order to create inclusive and sustainable peace, it is essential to listen to the voices of people who have been suffering violence and oppression. The Subaltern studies and Gender Studies propose new intellectual methods to break the silence of marginalized people and learn from them, and this may open a gate to reconciliation and peace and lead to a democratic order in the true sense.

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The objective of this study is to redefine peace in peaceful times by reconsidering humanitarian assistance and the concept of human security. This approach has been chosen in part because of the author’s background. I am a researcher, as well as a practitioner, having been involved in humanitarian assistance in conflict zones over years as an NGO aid worker.

Another reason for this approach is that humanitarian assistance is a crucial notion, as well as an important practice in redefining peace in the sense that assistance is offered in the context where peace has been longed for; on the other hand, humanitarian assistance often contradicts the creation of peace, having tense relationships with structural violence.

The other analytical framework applied here is the notion of human security. It is a concept that has been exposed to many critical discourses. In this study, however, the concept of human security is utilized based upon its strength―that is, human security is employed as an operational guideline, not as an analytical framework. As an operational guideline, human security overcomes the shortcomings of current aid, which is highly specialized but also highly subdivided, based not upon people’ s needs but upon agencies’ organizational missions and specialties, such as food, medicine, landmines, health, education, or children. As an operational guideline, human security encourages a more comprehensive approach to secure the human needs of recipients by adopting a multi-sector, multi-agency approach. Another strong point is that if the “human” in human security refers to all the people in the world, it helps to highlight the rights of the invisible marginalized population by focusing on their human security. In addition, when one person’s human security is in opposition to another person’s, it fosters the viewpoint of transcending the confrontation, rather than the zero-sum viewpoint, after making the difference visible. In this way, the human security concept clearly relates to peace and the study of peace.

After discussing peace through humanitarian assistance, this study urges that we utilize this human security concept to redefine peace, as well as to achieve peace in peaceful times.

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This paper discusses the blind spot in “Global Responsibilities (GR).” It has been proposed that all humanity shares a GR, which includes the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P).” However, is it actually possible to fulfill responsibilities in a complex, unpredictable world? In fact, even when we attempt to fulfill our responsibilities, we experience repeated failure.In spite of good intentions and noble pronouncements, the discourse on GR did not consider the actual practice of peace-keepers in the field.To overcome the uncertainty and inconsistency that continues, we need to consider the problem of GR from the perspective of practice rather than from one of concept.

This paper clarifies the blind spot of GR according to three points.The first point is the limitations of response responsibility and collective responsibility, which are the constitutive elements of GR.Response responsibility limits the responsibility of responding of those who are actually in a position to respond. Collective responsibility is based on the premise that people have a certain sense of identity within a group, such as a nation, which constitutes the parameters of this collective responsibility.It is doubtful whether this sense of identity exists within the “international community” and, if so, whether it exists to a sufficient degree. The second point is a certain lack of clarity in the actual practice of GR, for example, in R2P.The actual content of GR becomes unclear in terms of “who,” “for whom,” and “what,” when it is put into practice.The third point is that, in practice, the complete responsibility is actually given to the peace-keepers, in that they will be held responsible for harmful consequences.Although GR remains vague from the perspective of conceptualization, those who promote GR pursue the individual responsibility of peace-keepers.

A new institutional design for GR, sufficiently cognizant of the actual practice in the field, is necessary to overcome this blind spot.

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Since the U.S. President Obama’s Prague Speech on “A World without Nuclear Weapons” in April 2009, the tide and expectation toward it are mounting all over the world. But his vision itself is a reflection of the U.S. strategic and security interests and it is now facing a grave difficulty emanating from U.S. domestic politics and the logical gap between the U.S. pursuit of superiority and the search for “a world without nuclear weapons”.

This paper tries to situate the agenda for “a world without nuclear weapons” in a broader perspective of transformation of the world into less conflict prone structure where mutual confidence rather than mistrust could play a larger role. We argue that without such structural transformation in perspective those efforts for “a world without nuclear weapons” may turn out to be fatally flawed. The paper first tries to discuss the problems originating from the security dilemma where fear and uncertainty of the future force the states into a spiral of mounting mistrusts in an anarchic structure of international politics. We argue that if the security dilemma remains the basic feature of the international politics it is quite difficult to create a stable structure of “a world without nuclear weapons”. Then the paper talks about the process of the end of the Cold War as a concrete example of solving the security dilemma. We argue that the redefinition of the security issues as a common one by Palme Commission and the capacity and the security dilemma sensibility of the political leaders were the keys to creating a mutually trusting relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and overcoming the Cold War. The paper goes on to discuss the asymmetric conflicts between the powerful nations and the nuclear proliferators, the failing states and terrorists. We call for a unilateral action for tension reduction from the side of the powerful in order to create a more preferable environment for a less conflict prone and trust based world.

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In order to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapon states as well as nuclear weapon states must reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies. Japan is no exception to this rule. Appealing to the world for nuclear disarmament not to repeat the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it has relied on nuclear deterrent provided by its ally, the United States, for decades.

Recently, however, Japan’s political environment for discussing the nuclear policy has changed inconspicuously. In the past, it had been impossible even to seriously discuss ways to reduce the role of U.S. nuclear deterrent for Japan under the so-called 1955 regime. But the sharp confrontation between the left and the right over the Japan-U.S. alliance came to an end as a result of the end of Cold War and the dissolution of the 1955 regime. Today, there seem to be no insurmountable political obstacles for major political parties, which support the Japan-U.S. alliance, to enter policy discussions over the function of U.S. nuclear deterrent for Japan’s security.

Actually, it is reasonable for them to do so, because the current policy is not without defects. The Japanese government has refused to support the “no-first-use” policy, tacitly accepting the U.S. policy of “calculated ambiguity”, for the former policy would harm U.S. nuclear deterrent. Such an argument, however, contains illogical elements and is not totally consistent with the realities of international politics. Moreover, the policy of “calculated ambiguity” involves the risk of falling into a “commitment trap” in a contingency situation. On the other hand, there are merits in renouncing the policy to lower Japan’s dependence on U.S. nuclear deterrent. Although it would not be easy to revise the current policy for various reasons, it should be reexamined for Japan to contribute more actively to promoting nuclear disarmament.

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