This paper investigates the causal effects of elite favoritism for the case of cocoa production in rural Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire through the pathways of government support policy and de facto land tenure systems using secondary cross-sectional data from 2,228 cocoa households. Econometric models motivated by spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD) framework were adapted to capture the causal effect of being elite farmers in Ghana. The results showed that elites in Ghana were less likely to suffer black pod disease infection due to their social status relative to non-elites in Ghana. Further investigating possible causal pathways to these effects, elites in Ghana were more likely to receive pesticides, cocoa seedlings, and liquid fertilizer from government. There was no evidence of stronger land rights by elites in Ghana. Hence, better access to policy might be a relevant factor in explaining elite favoritism in pests and diseases management than stronger land rights.