ECJの政策形成への政治的インパクトと限界

EUの食品の自由移動と安全規制を事例として

抄録

This article discusses the political role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in setting food policies and its limits. To play an active role, it must form a coalition with the European Commission, which monopolizes the ability to make propositions.
This role has two aspects. The first is to present suggestions through judgment. Interpreting this judgment, the Commission makes proposals for legislation. This process is observed in the ‘mutual recognition principle’ introduced in the Cassis de Dijon Case (1979), or the ‘precautionary principle’ introduced in the BSE Case (1998). The second is to introduce principles that serve as a basis for case law, which put pressure on and constrain other institutions or Member States to agreement.
However, this political role of the ECJ has limits. Firstly, the ECJ can neither make a judgment nor present a suggestion unless a suit is filed. Secondly, any judgment presented by the ECJ has no political power if the European Commission does not support it, as seen in the ‘Food labeling case’. Additionally, the organization of the European Food Safety Authority and the network surrounding it, responsible for forming food policies, has further excluded and diminished the influence of the ECJ.
To investigate and maintain the political role of the ECJ, it is necessary to focus on its interdependence and coalition with other organizations.