知の有形象性をめぐるクマーリラとプラジュニャーカラグプタの対論――Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra ad PV 3.385を中心に――

抄録

According to the sākāravijñāna theory of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school, cognition possesses mental images in itself. However, this theory was criticized by others, such as Mīmāṃsakās. This article examines the controversy between Kumārila and Prajñākaragupta in the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra on Pramāṇavārttika (PV) 3.385. The reasoning behind the sākāravijñāna theory in this context is that cognition (i.e., grāhaka or the grasping) is necessarily remembered along with the image of its object (i.e., grāhya or the grasped). A counterargument is that some cognition is remembered without the image of its object, where this kind of recollection is explained, such as “I don’t know what I saw then.” In other words, a person can remember the act of cognition during a previous direct experience but not remember the specific object. This argument can be traced back to Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, Śūnyavāda 82–85. Prajñākaragupta’s answer to this objection is that this kind of recollection is not an instance of remembering only the grasping; rather, it is an instance of indistinctly (sāmānyena) remembering the grasping and the grasped together. A similar idea is found in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha 2075–2076 and its commentary by Kamalaśīla.