抄録
We investigate how political elites shape public opinion. The literature of opinion leadership has paid considerable attention to how politicians influence their constituents’ policy preferences. Some show that elites can shift their supporters’ positions by merely announcing the elites’ positions. Others assert that politicians’ position - taking does not change voters’ positions, but that they can persuade voters to believe that the proposed policies are beneficial. By analyzing an original data set from a survey experiment in Japan, we reveal when the government succeeds in shaping public opinion and when it fails. Combining randomized framing and a conjoint experiment, we find that persuasion works when the prime minister provides ideologically well - aligned justification. Moreover, the persuasion effect is attenuated when the persuader takes an ideologically contradictory position. Our study highlights the influence of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and contributes to a better understanding of political communication between elites and voters.
