抄録
In this lecture, I compare and examine the philosophies of C. S. Peirce
and Nishida Kitaro. I illuminate both the philosophical continuity and interpreted and criticized as his disregard for individual subjectivity.
However, Nishida’s philosophy, which sees the individual self as “the
creative element of the creative world,” defies such simplification. The
question arises: can we equate the “shutai” that Nishida employs here
with so-called “individual subjectivity” in the first place?
In this paper, we will clarify that the concept of “shutai” suggested by
Nishida in his latter period does not have the conventional connotation of
“individuum,” but rather carries the connotation of “species.”
Subsequently, we will discuss the reasons why the individual self had to
be distinguished from the “shutai” in Nishida’s philosophy. Rather than
seeking to deny individual subjectivity by asserting that the self is not a
“shutai,” Nishida made the statement to see the creativity of the self that
is not reduced to a mere “shutai.” By saying that the self is not simply a
“shutai,” Nishida attempted to see the creativity and freedom of the self
that is not reduced to something continuous, processual, and teleological.
https://ror.org/01wspgy28 
