アクラシア，高階性，通時的合理性

抄録

    We, as deliberating agents, are temporal beings and can face the general problem of maintaining diachronic rationality. However, this problem has various aspects, and “akrasia” can be understood as one of them. In this paper, I define akrasia as acting against one's higher-order judgment, which includes the consideration of future alternatives. Indeed, there are objections to this type of definition of akrasia that involves higher-order attitudes. Some philosophers have concluded that akrasia is not necessarily hierarchical. However, contrary to this belief, I defend the hierarchical character of the concept of akrasia by appealing to a constructivistic and functionalistic characterization of a higher-order definitive evaluation or judgment. Moreover, I distinguish akrasia from other types of phenomena that share common elements with it, although they are not hierarchical. The view that the higher-orderness (i.e. the hierarchy) of attitudes is essential to the concept of akrasia is, if my argument is correct, more tenable than some philosophers have considered it to be.