社会心理学研究
Online ISSN : 2189-1338
Print ISSN : 0916-1503
ISSN-L : 0916-1503
2次的ジレンマ問題に対する集団応報戦略の効果 : コンピュータ・シミュレーション研究
寺井 滋山岸 俊男渡部 幹
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2003 年 19 巻 2 号 p. 94-103

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Using computer simulations, this study examined whether mutual cooperation can occur in social dilemmas characterized by the absence of a central authority. In the absence of a central authority, provision of a sanctioning system that administers selective incentives-a well referred solution to social dilemmas-constitutes a second-order social dilemma. The purpose of this study was to examine whether the generalized tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which is an extended version of tit-for-tat that is applied in n-person games, can help solve the second-order social dilemma. The results of computer simulations indicated that the second-order social dilemma could be resolved when group members adopt the Generalized TFT. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the Generalized TFT strategy could survive and prosper in a population originally dominated by "probabilistic actors."

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© 2003 日本社会心理学会
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