国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
フルシチョフの戦略思想-その確立過程と中国-
中ソ関係と国際環境
仙洞田 潤子
著者情報
ジャーナル フリー

1990 年 1990 巻 95 号 p. 79-94,L10

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抄録

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistence with the United States and Soviet policy related to China during the Khrushchevian period. Peaceful coexistence with the United States was a new strategy and not well received by the Chinese who were at this time a vital part of the socialist block countries.
Khrushchev presented the fundamental framework of his new strategy at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. He did this without the benefit of any military theory primarily because the Soviet military posture was far inferior to that of American forces. Consequently, maintaining the unity of the Soviet block countries as well as upgrading the Soviet military became key points in the framework. It is important to note that Russia had been unable to maintain a strong sense of unity alone and depended on the joint effort with China to do so. As a direct result, the Russians had been obliged to grant certain concessions to the Chinese including assistance with economics as well as technical advancements in the area of development of missiles and nuclear weapons. At the same time Russia wanted to restrain Chinese concessions since they were afraid of Chinese deviation from the socialist camp.
In 1957 the primary fundamental framework changed. With military and scientific achievements, ICBMs and Sputnik, as well as the political strength of the fortieth anniversary of the Russian revolution and Moscow conference for background, Khrushchev introduced a new military theory giving priority to missiles and nuclear weapons rather than conventional ones. However, the military posture of the Soviet Union remained inferior to that of the United Sates since Khrushchev's new theory had yet to be backed by real Soviet missile and nuclear powers. Actually the new theory was political propaganda directed at the United States for the purpose of pursuing the peaceful coexistence policy.
Meanwhile Khrushchev turned his attention toward China; he concluded an agreement with respect to “new technology” with China in October 1957. He had two main reasons for this. First, the Soviet missile and nuclear powsers remained inferior to the American forces; and second, the Russian effort to maintain the unity of the socialist camp was unsuccessful without the Chinese. Support form the Chinese was especially needed after the disturbance in East Europe at this time.
Regardless of Khrushchev's political care, Mao tse-tung expressed his own strategy at the Moscow Conference in November 1957. His strategy was in direct opposition to that of Khrushchev; Mao tse-tung persuaded the socialists to confront the imperialists more radically.
Since the Moscow Conference, Khrushchev had been focusing his attention on accelerating the build up of the Soviet military strength while decreasing the Chinese role in his strategy.
The agreement concluded in October 1957 was broken by the Soviet Union in June 1959. Soviet forces were more confident at this time due to the new Strategic Rocket Forces estimated to be sufficiently capable of threatening the North American continent by the end of that year.
Khrushchev, armed with the Strategic Rocket Forces, introduced a new military theory into the primary framework of his strategy to the Supreme Soviet Ministry in January 1960. At this time his strategy was firmly established; however, he made no mention of China to the Ministry. Khrushchev clearly decided he no longer needed China to support his plan.

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© 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
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