ベトナム戦争と中ソ対立-六三年～六五年のベトナム労働党の政策展開と中国・ソ連-

中ソ関係と国際環境

抄録

The political turmoil in South Vietnam after the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963 presented both the United States and the Vietnam Workers' Party with hard choices, and led both sides to escalate the War.
This was a crucial moment for the Vietnamese Communists, both in regard to the South and in their relations with the Soviet Union and China. The Party wanted to take advantage of the chaotic situation in the South and seek a quick victory, while its leaders viewed the increasing Sino-Soviet split as a disadvantage to their own cause, since it prevented the formation of an international united front of the socialist camp to deter direct U. S. intervention in the Vietnam conflict.
While it believed it possible to contain the U. S. within its “specila war” efforts, the Party view was that Vietnam was a peripheral state of the socilaist camp and her role was to mediate the dispute between the two “centers” of the socialist camp. But when the Party was compelled to fight a total war with the U. S. in 1965, the Vietnamese Communists began to view the Vietnam conflict as becameing the “focal point” in the world-wide rivalry between the revolutionary forces and the anti-revolutionary forces. This implies that they began to shift their role from mediation to expoitation of the Sino-Soviet dispute trying to take the initiative in creating an international united front against the U. S. intervention in Vietnam and to gain more positive aid both from the USSR and China.
While the Sino-Soviet dispute impinged on the Vietnamese Communist war efforts and both the USSR and China were only reluctantly helpful, it was difficult for both of them to abandon the “holy revolutionary cause” of Vietnam since the two Communist giants disputed with each other over the subject of “champion of the world revolution” in the 1960s.