Under What Conditions Can Voters Make a Rational Choice?

Voter Preference and Choice in Old-Age Pension Reform in Japan

抄録

Democratic theories assume that voters are rational in that they have a transitive preference over alternatives and make choices accordingly. A sizeable amount of literature, however, has shown that most voters are actually irrational, lacking the political knowledge necessary for rational preference formation and choice. Under what conditions can voters make a rational choice? In this paper, we test to what extent voters are capable of rational choice and what the determinants of rational choice are by using original questions in a survey conducted in August 2010 in Japan. First, in the survey, respondents were asked which of three characteristics of old age pension systems they preferred pairwisely to determine whether they have transitive preferences. Second, respondents were asked which of two old age pension systems they preferred to determine if they make choices consistent with their preferences. Finally, we explore the determinants of rational preference formation and choice.