6　NPTの不平等性と「非核兵器国に対する安全の保証」の論理

抄録

The purpose of this paper is to examine the logic of ‘Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States’ in the context of inequality in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The ‘Negative Security Assurance’ (NSA) and ‘Positive Security Assurance’ (PSA) measures have so far been regarded as significant security assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Since the 1960, international society has called upon Nuclear-Weapon States to provide ‘Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States’ in the form of an internationally legally binding instrument. In particular, the legally binding NSA is expected to (1) ease the inequality in the NPT, (2) rule out the possibility of a nuclear attack by Nuclear-Weapon States, (3) diminish the political and military roles of nuclear weapons, and as a result, (4) bring the world closer to nuclear disarmament.

Scholars have made numerous attempts to propound the logic of inequality in the NPT and ‘Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States’. We can divide their view into two categories. The first is that legally binding ‘Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States’ would ease the inequality in the NPT, and the other is that such legally binding security assurances would not only strengthen the inequality in the NPT, but also cause further nuclear proliferation in the world. However, previous research has never examined which conditions would ease and/or strengthen the inequality in the NPT.

First, this paper confirms the relationship between the inequality in the NPT and ‘Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States’. Second, it considers why legally binding ‘Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States’ would ease or strengthen the inequality in the NPT. Finally, it pays much attention to the roles of security commitments, and examines which conditions would ease and/or strengthen the inequality in the NPT.