6　人道主義のパラドックス　冷戦終結後の人道危機対策再考

抄録

The purpose of this paper lies in clarifying why the increasingly dire humanitarian situation did not necessarily improve, despite the initiatives taken by the international community, after the end of the Cold War. Much of the existing research argues that the international community did not have a sufficient desire, nor did it take sufficient actions to improve the humanitarian situation during the two decades after the end of the Cold War. This paper first demonstrates that this explanation alone is not complete, and then raises the issue of the “paradox of humanitarianism.” There was a succession of new policies relating to preventing and reacting to humanitarian issues, as well as rebuilding following the rise of these issues, that were created based on previous lessons learned when a humanitarian crisis took place, escalated, or was unable to be prevented from reoccurring. One of the results of these policies was the expansion of the content of the actions taken through rebuilding policies, known as post-conflict peace building, and a lengthening of these policies’ timetables. It has become difficult to implement these rebuilding policies without constraining the sovereignty of the nation where the humanitarian crisis is taking place, and without arousing anxieties in the leadership of that nation. Due to this anxiety about the future, even if the international community requests improvements to the humanitarian situation during the reaction phase in the form of a peacekeeping force or humanitarian assistance force, it is not easy to have the country in question give their consent to such interventions. This could potentially lead to even creating obstructions to the improvement of certain humanitarian situations. This paper identifies a total of four situations in which these types of paradoxes can occur.