This paper examines Kant’s thesis, “I can do it because I ought to,” by analyzing his confrontation with the Carmelite philosopher Edith Stein. Stein criticizes Kant’s thesis in “Critique of Practical Reason” in her main work “Finite and Eternal Being.” Unlike Kant, who justifies the connection between “should” and “can” based on moral principles, Stein locates the grounds for this connection in the Christian faith. The former demonstrates the cognitive capacity to understand necessary actions, whereas the latter emphasizes the belief in the realization of miracles based on God’s grace.
However, Kant reiterated the thesis in his subsequent work titled “Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.” Thus, both philosophers should have been allowed to engage in a second confrontation. In his later years, Kant particularly emphasized that the “can” in the thesis is not merely a presumed cognition but rather embodies the reality of the power of practice. Concerning this matter, he should have been able to identify a specific resemblance to Stein. According to Stein, power originates from a life force of the divine entity, whereas Kant believes that the subject who exercises power is not God but humans. This paper delineates the confrontation between the two philosophers as such.
