This paper delves into the concept of theopolitics, which was originally coined to depict ecclesiastical geopolitics within the Eastern Orthodox Church. Through an exploration of its historical roots and theoretical foundations, the study reevaluates the Russo-Ukraine conflict from a diachronic perspective, focusing on the inter national balance of power within the Orthodox Church. This paper scrutinizes the antecedents of the conflict in the following manner. First, the local church system of the Eastern Orthodox Church and Canon Law are summarized. Second, the dialogic efforts among the local churches to convene a Pan-Orthodox Council during the 20th century are examined.

In the context of evolving global relations, the dynamics of power politics among autocephalous churches, defined as theopolitics, are undergoing a serious reassessment. The 2018 excommunication by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, acknowledged as the highest authority (primus inter pares) in the Eastern Or thodox world, and the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, boasting the largest Orthodox population, underscored the theological tensions surrounding the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. This paper attempts to examine the maintenance of diversity and pursuit of a unified faith in the Orthodox Church during times of crises.

In order to discourse on the relationship between religion and war, I will focus on the case of War Theory (WT) as developed within Christianity. Once a functional conspectus of WT as developed within Christian thought is elucidated, I will consider the possibility of reconstructing a WT within contemporary Christianity, which is strongly anchored in the Free Church.

Historical Christian thought on WT can be categorized into the following three categories. A. Pacifism (Based upon Jesus’ words as recorded in the gospels. Even though this interpretation has never been in the mainstream, certain contemporary Christian sects such as the Mennonites continue to espouse this stance.). B. Holy War (War which is advocated on religious grounds and which is understood as being the duty of adherents who are commanded by God. Examples of this type are wars such as the Crusades which were prosecuted under imperial and papal edict or sanction.). C. Just War (A consequence of the adoption of Christianity as the state religion by the late Roman Empire. This interpretation began to be implemented in the late 4th century through the 5th century and was formalized by Thomas Aquinas in the middle ages. A standing presupposition of Just War Theory was that war should be avoided at all costs.). Interpretations A and B were later compromises which grew out of the historical context of nation-state and state religion forged earlier. This fact can be broadly confirmed with regard to Christianity. The erstwhile premises of nation-state and state religion ended up crumbling with the emergence of the Free Church, with its emphases on separation of church and state and freedom of conscience, situated though it was, within the ideology of the modern nation-state.

Based on the preceding historical survey, I will examine the following two questions. Q1: How is it that Just War Theory (C) became so prevalent in postmodernity? The religious paradigm, which traditionally has leaned heavily upon the concept of the nation-state, continues unabated, even in modern democratic states. Of course, this situation varies between the traditions of the western Christianity and eastern Christianity.

Q2: What sort of possibilities exist for the Free Church as a spontaneous association of like-minded individuals within democratic states? Is there a role for the church with regard to monitoring and even criticizing the nation-state, even while fulfilling its obligations to the nation-state? Are there any parallels with the role of academia vis-a-vis the nation-state?

Many of us were shocked by the news of the Russian advance against Ukraine and have unilaterally blamed Russia for it. Rather than such a reaction, we should carefully consider the growing presence of NATO in Eastern Europe after the Cold War and the internal disorder of Ukraine ascribed to the so-called Maidan revolution. However, we are indeed aware that the war as a means of politics has become obsolete. Using Nietzsche’s words, one could say, “the god of war is dead.” The development of military technology in the 20^th century, especially the monstrous invention of weapons of mass destruction, has made it nearly impossible for mankind to resort to war in its entirety. This does not imply that we have achieved world peace; on the contrary, it means that we are now fighting with the shadow of the dead god of war. In her posthumous work Introduction to Politics, Arendt made a thought-provoking observation about the change in the nature of war. According to her, modern warfare is characterized by the concept of “war of annihilation.” From this perspective of total war, the goal of war is no longer a peace treaty between warring governments, but the total political or even physical destruction of the enemy. In the modern world after the Cold War, where the dominance of the American forces is literally global, we realize that the ideal of the victor annihilating the loser remains alive.

Le but de cette étude consiste à montrer quelle était la lecture par Ricœur de l’ouvrage de Kant La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison et de quelle façon il a exploité cette lecture pour sa propre penséeher méneutique. La doctrine philosophique de la religion de Kant, telle que la comprend Ricœur, est une « herméneutique philosophique de la religion » prenant pour objet spécifique l’« espérance ». Par cette lecture affirmant que la doctrine kantienne de la religion n’est pas une simple extension de la Critique, Ricœur tentait d’intégrer cette « herméneutique philosophique de l’espérance » dans sa philosophie herméneutique. D’après nous, sa visée était de restaurer la dynamique animant la pensée particulière à la doctrine philosophique de la religion de Kant et, par là, d’en reprendre certaines structures et mouvements dans sa recherche herméneutique autour de la « liberté religieuse ». Notre conclusion est ainsi qu’en étant incorporé dans le discours de Ricœur lui-même, celui sur la religion dans les limites de la simple raison, La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison présente une structure partant de la théorie du mal radical pour aller jusqu’à la théorie du service de Dieu, et repartant de la théorie du service de Dieu pour retourner à la théorie du mal radical. En outre, sa signification est alors celle d’une philosophie herméneutique de la résurrection selon l’herméneutique philosophique de l’espérance.

Die Ansicht, dass Aristoteles die Metaphysik als Onto-theo-logie beschreibt, wurde von Heidegger vertreten und von zeitgenössischen Philosophen einschließlich Levinas aufgegriffen. Allerdings ist Levinas’ Beschreibung der Philosophie des Aristoteles als Ontotheologie nicht auf den heideggerschen Kontext beschränkt. Levinas erkennt einen ontotheologischen Ansatz nicht nur in Aristoteles’ Definition der ,ersten Philosophie‘, sondern auch in dessen Begriff des ,unbewegten Bewegers‘. Vor dem Hintergrund der kantischen Kritik an der Ontotheologie im Sinne einer Philosophie, die das ontologische Argument aufweist, kritisiert Levinas ferner Aristoteles’ Vorstellung von der Existenz des unbewegten Bewegers und den damit verbundenen astronomischen Hintergrund. Aristoteles’ Begriff der ,Bewunderung‘ (θαυμάζειν) angesichts des Himmels wird von Levinas sogar als, Götzendienst‘ bezeichnet.

Um die Hintergründe von Levinas’ Auffassung und deren Bedeutung innerhalb seiner Philosophie zu untersuchen, wird in diesem Aufsatz seine frühe Schrift „Die Aktualität von Maimonides“ betrachtet. In dieser lobt er Maimonides’ Widerlegung von Aristoteles, die in Führer der Unschlüssigen ausgearbeitet wurde.

Die Untersuchung erfolgt in vier Schritten. Im ersten Abschnitt wird Levinas’ Sicht auf Aristoteles’ Philosophie als Ontotheologie dargestellt. Im zweiten Abschnitt wird Aristoteles’ Planetentheorie betrachtet und es wird erläutert, in welchem Zusammenhang diese mit seinem Beweis für die Existenz des unbewegten Bewegers steht. Im dritten Abschnitt wird Maimonides’ Widerlegung von Aristoteles’ Planetentheorie sowie der Ewigkeitsthese dargestellt. Der vierte Abschnitt zeigt, wie der junge Levinas diese Kritik des Maimonides an Aristoteles mit der kantischen Kritik der Ontotheologie vergleicht.

The paper investigates the formulation of the concept of shūyō in the aftermath of the second “Clash between Education and Religion” Controversy, with a focus on Zen layperson Katō Totsudō (1890-1949). Totsudō, driven by his adherence to the Imperial Rescript on Education, aspired to enhance society through the moral advancement of Buddhism. This ambition faced obstacles with the Ministry of Education’s prohibition of religious education in July 1899. Amid the ensuing controversy, Totsudō, who believed in the indispensability of Buddhism for morality, aligned with the “ethical religion” advocated by philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō (1856-1944). He argued for his own version of Zen-inspired “ethical religion,” replacing Tetsujirō’s “phenomena are reality” (genshō soku jitsuzai) theory with the Buddhist doctrine of the three treasures. As a critic of contemporary Zen, Totsudō looked to Suzuki Shōsan (1575-1655) for the foundational principles of Zen tradition, adapting his “self-powered other-power nembutsu” ( jiriki no tariki no nenbutsu) into a form of modern self-cultivation. In the pursuit of societal transformation through Buddhism and morality, as well as the exploration of the “self,” Totsudō responded to the contextual demands of his time by developing a concept of shūyō that, from his perspective, transcended both temporal and sectarian boundaries.