This paper studies relations between top executive turnover and performance, in comparison of state-controlled companies and private companies in China. Although the likelihood of top executive turnover in both types of companies is significantly related to the performance of the company, top executive turnover in private companies reacts more sensitively to negative earnings than state-controlled companies. Moreover, the difference of the improvement in return on assets subsequent to turnover between two types of companies is also found obviously. In private companies substantial improvement in performance occurs after nonroutine turnover in both short and long terms, while there is only small performance improvement in short terms in state-controlled companies. I find that the performance of state-controlled companies deteriorat so rapidly from the second year subsequent to nonroutine turnover that it become similar to pre-turnover performance. On the other hand, the performance of companies is positively related to the de facto ownership in possession of executives. I conclude that state-controlled companies failed in the dismissal and assignment of top executive, while they succeeded by means of de facto privatization. Anyway, de jure privatization is indispensable to the success of the reform of state-controlled companies from now on.

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This paper aims to confirm the historical process of establishing the official statistical system in prewar China. This is of great significance when we use the government statistics particularly for the prewar period, since perfection degree of the statistical system reflect the effectiveness and reliability of those statistics. We clarified the collecting and editing system of statistical information in central and provincial statistical offices since late Qing China. This is realized by mainly examining government laws and regulations, detailed information available from the periodical Tongji Yuebao (The Statistical Monthly), and historical records of government organization. The cases of major statistics for population, agriculture and the manufacturing industry are confirmed in the concrete context. We obtained the following findings: (1)The strength of administrative power in the Central Government was crucial for establishing the official statistical system. In other words, the construction of the national statistical organization was greatly dependent upon control power of the Central Government over local governments; (2)In this sense, the system of Chinese statistical organization was almost established in the middle of 1930’s. This means that the compilation of statistical information was gradually under the charge of professional staff in statistical offices, and that the quality of government statistics was improved a lot since this period.

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