To study the efficiency of banks in monitoring small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China in the 1980s, we estimate coefficients in various empirical equations for bank finance, firm' s performance and other indicators, using a sample of small and medium-sized SOEs in Guangxi province from 1985 to 1989. We distinguish between the will and ability of banks to monitor borrowers. The results show that banks failed in both the first and second stages of monitoring to those SOEs: the screening process and enforcing repayment of loans. This failure was directly due to inadequate will of the banks to monitor SOEs

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Chinese fiscal reforms have continued in various forms. with the "1994 Tax & Financial System Reform"being a turning point. However, there still remain significant tasks involving the entire state system. including the political balance between the central government and local governments and the desirable government functions. Therefore. in this paper. I will examine the actual state of insufficiency of the functions as well as problems with the systems and structure causing such deficiency. while focusing on the actual state of central-local relation from the fiscal aspect. The administrative and financial reform is being promoted in China. From the aspect of efficiency and decentralization. this movement is considerable. and also really important for the intergovernmental reform in China. The main point of this paper is to clarify the situation regarding promotion of enhancement of financial base. creation of a revenue source allocation system to ensure consistency in policies between central and local governments， and clarification of the division of roles. And how the "autonomous and self-responsibility" system should be created is also the key factor and urgent need. In addition. increasing transparency of public finance (especially in local levels) is indicated as an essential issue for the reform in China. Therefore， I will focus on the period after the "1994 Tax & Financial System Reform". and analyze the current state of central-local fiscal balances and financial transfer. as well as examine the budget system and administrative reform. Some experiences of fiscal and administrative reform in Japan are suggestive for the reform in China.

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Shunpei Takemori, professor at Keiogijuku University, insisted that when a kind of pessimism caused by"Knightian uncertainty" prevailed in the late 1990s, it was the aggressive liquidity supply by the FRB that acted as "aggressive optimist" and swept away pessimism. On the other hand, emerging economies such as China and India are expected to sustain the growth of the world economy through vitality and optimism. If so, what has been sustaining this optimism in the Chinese economy? Likely, it is not the central bank or central government. In the reform era, it has been cooperation among local governments, local branches of major banks, and developers that have been acting as "aggressive optimist". The pattern of economic development in China in the reform era can be characterized as follows. First, because the market mechanism is not perfect, there is always the chance of rent-seeking. Second, under chronic fiscal deficit, local governments attempt to maximize their non-tax revenues. Third, the lack of an efficient financial system dictates that intervention by local governments into local financial markets has a strong effect on local economies. However, in the late 1990s, when a series of fiscal and financial reforms were enacted, the type of intervention by local governments changed from that in the 1980s. Roughly speaking, the main means of rent-seeking in local economies in the1980s was intervention into local financial markets. A representative example of this pattern of intervention is development in the Sunan area, labeled as "local state corporatism" by Jean Oi. Meanwhile, after the mid 1990s, local governments tended to intervene in local land markets, using the status of monopolistic supplier with regards to property rights for land. Compared with the pattern of intervention in the 1980s, rent-seeking through the land market has tended to distort the market and adversely effect economic welfare. In this case, local governments do not take any risk by themselves, but require opportunities for rent-seeking through political means and thrust the risk on ordinary people, especially peasants. In short, whether or not local governments can regain the role of "aggressive optimist" in terms of aggressive risk taker and promoter of market competition will play a key role in the sustainable development of the Chinese economy in the future.

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The purpose of this paper is to outline the trend in recent years of real estate prices in major cities in China. based on data that has been made public. and to examine the factor of the fluctuation. The main findings as follows: First, it is important to know that changes in real estate prices in China vary to a large degree in different regions. It appears that multiple waves of changes surge alternately in different regions. Second., we studied the reasons for price changes on the assumption that real estate prices are affected by a combination of multiple factors. In terms of the demand side， the actual demand is steady. At present, investments in stocks and investment trusts are reviving and thus there are not circumstances where investments concentrate only on real estate. In terms of the supply side， the amount of land disposal in city areas has tended to decrease since 2005, indicating that the developer was delaying the land development on purpose. Third, so far, the central government has tried to suppress rapid hikes in real estate prices by throwing a wet blanket on investing when investments in real estate start to overheat in some areas. If its medium-to-long term policies (such as supplying medium to low income housing, guaranteed housing and taxing idle land) are implemented properly as planned by the central government, any mismatch in supply and demand would be improved and contribute to stabilized real estate prices. However, there are many systemic and structural problems including， the tax system, local government finances associated with the disposal of land, and excessive liquidity. The prospects for solutions to these problems are still far from certain. It is a serious question whether the central government can control local governments, or not. It seems to be important for China to solve such fundamental problems in the medium and long term range, in order to establish a stable real estate market.

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