The United States Constitution gives the President the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate (Art.II, Sec.2, Para.2). The Senate approves a treaty with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present. By adopting such a system, the Framers intended to restrain the presidential treaty-making power and protect the states' interest. The Framers' intent to restrain the presidential treaty power was undeniably respected until the Senate refused to give its consent to the Treaty of Versailles. However, since the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, criticism that the Senate's monopoly of the consenting power is not only undemocratic and inefficient, but also unfitting in the age of internationalization has been constantly raised. At present, many of the United State's international agreements with foreign governments are concluded with the approval of the majority of both Houses of the Congress. Such an international agreement is called a congressional-executive agreement. It covers almost all fields, such as affiliation with international organizations, conclusion of economic and military agreements, etc., which fall within the sphere of the treatymaking power. Moreover, its legal validity is regarded the same as that of a treaty internationally and internally. Therefore, a congressional-executive agreement is said to be an alternative to a treaty. The Constitution has no provision to empower the Congress to approve an international agreement. Nevertheless, Congress' power to approve an international agreement has been under discussion from the beginning, and when the United States tried to join the WTO, vehement controversy arose with respect to the constitutionality of the congressional-executive agreement. This problem has drawn further attention since the Senate failed to give its consent to the CTBT. Scholarly views on this issue are roughly divided into two. One is that the Congressional powers enumerated in art.I, Sec.8 including the necessary and proper clause support the constitutionality of a congressional-executive agreement. The other is that it is clearly unconstitutional in the light of the words and construction of the constitutional provision in Art.II, Sec.2, and Para.2. So far, the US Supreme Court has not handed down its judgment on the constitutionality of a congressional-executive agreement, and so this problem is not legally settled. This paper will examine how the Senate's power of consent has been changing and study the significance and constitutionality of a congressional-executive agreement as an alternative to a treaty.
抄録全体を表示