This study examines with a dual-task method whether visuo-spatial rehearsal within working memory can be divided into spatial and visual rehearsal components. Experiment 1 showed interference effects from both a complex-tapping task and a shifting-spatial attention task on a visual-pattern recall test that involves spatial-movement processing. Experiments 2 showed no effects from a simple-tapping task, and a shifting spatial-attention task on a visual-pattern recognition test that does not involve spatial-movement processing. These results suggest that the complex-tapping task and the shifting spatial-attention task do not interfere with visual rehearsal, and, moreover, that the mechanisms of visuo-spatial rehearsal in working memory may be divided into visual and spatial rehearsal, component mechanisms.

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Within the evolutionary framework, some studies on facial recognition have demonstrated that recognition is better for faces presented as non-cooperators than for the faces of cooperators (Mealey, Daood, & Krage, 1996; Oda, 1997). However, it remains unclear as to whether level of cooperativeness is remembered as well as faces. In the present study, 60 participants saw photographs of individuals with fictitious labels indicating their behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game. One week later, the participants were presented randomly with both old and new photographs and asked to judge which faces had been seen before and which individuals they would transact with. The results from this study are not consistent with previous findings. the participants recognized the faces of cooperators and non-cooperators equally well. On the other hand, there was a preference to transact with cooperators rather than with non-cooperators. Interestingly, that tendency was observed not only for remembered faces but also for forgotten faces. These findings suggest that an implicit memory mechanism contributes in distinguishing between cooperators and non-cooperators.

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This study investigates the facial structural variables involved in the recognition of facial expressions of emotion. While some studies using schematic faces have reported the structural variables of “slantedness” and “curvedness/openness”, subsequent studies, employing both real face images and schematic faces, have indicated three variables. In order to further examine this issue, this study created new schematic faces to be used as stimuli that cover the variability in the real facial expressions used in Yamada, Matsuda, Watari, & Suenaga (1993). Participants were asked to judge 102 face stimuli in terms of six basic emotion categories (happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, anger, and disgust). A canonical discriminant analysis, with displacements for nine feature points as independent variables and category judgment frequencies as dependent variables, revealed the three structural variables of “slantedness of eyebrows and eyes”, “slantedness of lips” and “curvedness/openness”, which match those in Yamada et al. (1993). These results indicate that emotion judgments for both real and schematic faces are based on the same facial structural variables.

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The role of color in object recognition has been a controversial issue. Tanaka and Presnell (1999) claim that “color diagnosticity”—the degree to which an object is associated with a specific color is important. Thus, color plays a role in the recognition of high color diagnostic (HCD) objects (e.g., banana), but not for low color diagnostic (LCD) objects (e.g., table). However, previous studies also suggest that color is more beneficial for the recognition of natural objects (e.g., fruits, animals) than for artificial objects (e.g., tools, furniture). This study examines the relation between color effects, color diagnosticity, and object category. The results from four classification experiments suggest that color plays a major role in the recognition of HCD objects, irrespective of their category, but also that color diagnosticity effects are dependent on experimental context.

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When attempting to suppress thoughts about a target object, intrusive thoughts about the target object increases: this phenomenon is referred to as the paradoxical effect of thought suppression. This study examines this paradoxical effect with more ecologically-valid procedures than those employed in previous studies. Initially, 51 participants tried to solve the “tumor problem”. Next, in a suppression period, the participants in the “suppression” group were instructed to suppress any thoughts about the “tumor problem”, while the participants in the “no-suppression” group were instructed to think freely about anything that came to mind. Finally, in a subsequent free-think period, all the participants were instructed to think freely. Half the participants were asked to sit quietly facing towards a glass screen, while half performed a monotonous task. During the suppression period and the free-think period, the participants made a mark every time thoughts about the “tumor problem” intruded. In addition, after each period, the participants rated degree of intrusion and difficulty of suppression. The suppression group made more marks, i.e., they experienced more frequent intrusive thoughts, and they reported more intrusion and difficulty of suppression than the no-suppression group. These paradoxical effects were equally evident in both the monotonous-task condition and the no-task condition. Moreover, the suppression effects lasted for about a week. The no-suppression group showed superior incidental memory for the tumor problem. The diversity of intrusive thoughts is discussed based on the introspective reports by the participants.

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Some fundamental aspects of the emotion system and the cognition system are discussed from the perspective of urge theory. Urge theory, developed by the present author, regards the human mind as software that has evolved primarily to survive in the wild environments in which evolution has taken place. As major subsystems of the mind, the emotion system and the cognition system are two separate systems that closely interact in their functions. This paper first presents a general framework of the emotion system, and then outlines some specific operational modes of the cognitive system that are foundational for certain functions of the emotion system. These discussions touch on a number of topics, such as the here-and-now effect, attention traps, cognitive controls of emotion, and dynamic schemas as a tool for thinking, as well as imagination, language. These are all essential concepts for understanding the operation of the mind as the software that drives humans as well as animals.

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