In the market where consumers do not perceive noticeable differences in the quality of products, or in the mature and saturated market, the marketer of a new product sets the price by taking prices of its competing products into consideration. This practice is called market-oriented pricing. According to this pricing, the price of a product is determined by customers’ perceptions of the value of the product. In many industrial markets, customers’ perceptions of the value of the product depend on performance variables. Performance variables in turn depend on design characteristics. Several market-oriented pricing methods with multiple design characteristics have been proposed: weighting by experts in the field of several simple regression equations of price on each design characteristics; principal components analysis; weight analysis by design parameters; coordinative planning method. In this article, we propose graphical and interactive “multiple regression analysis”. Graphics such as adjusted variable plots, C_p plots, normal quantile-quantile plots, residual plots are successively used to construct the best multiple regression pricing model in this analysis. Unlike traditional regression techniques, this analysis relies little on numerical summaries. Instead it is an interactive decision-making system whereby an marketer can construct the best pricing model by carefully examining several kinds of informative graphics on the display. We illustrate the graphical and interactive “multiple regression analysis” through an example from the mature and saturated market, the Japanese automobile market.

Traditional breakeven analysis has been expanded into many variations, such as multiproduct CVP analysis, CVP analysis under uncertainty. Breakeven analysis under absorption costing is also the variation of it, which is useful when we can not assume an identity of sales and production amounts. But, this analysis gives management no information about corporate income taxes. It is necessary to provide tax-related information for management.

To provide useful information for short-term profit planning, this study will:

(1) derive the taxes functions of sales and production amounts based on the accrual basis and introduce these functions to breakeven analysis under absorption costing;

(2) derive the breakeven function and some target functions, such as the target profit function, the target margin of safety ratio function, and the target return on sales function, of sales and production amounts; and

(3) demonstrates above target functions with some constraints, such as the sales constraint and the production contraint, to show attainable and feasible region.

The purpose of this paper is to propose the accounting measurement and control of currency option transactions, especially call option transaction and written option transaaction for hedging. It illustrates the transaction models about protective-put and covered-call-writing for hedging.

These transactions have each economic subustance. Protective-put makes a nearly perfect hedge for the hedged item, because its intrinsic value increases by the same amounts as the losses from the hedged item. On the other hand, covered-call-wrting has a chance to gain, but it hedges only within the premium at the sacrifice of gains. Then, there is a possibility to suffer indefinite losses from unfavarable shift of currency rate. Accounting for protective-put should reflect the economic substance of the transaction, and measure the intrinsic value increased by the same amounts as the losses from the hedged item. If managers can use the accounting informations to control these transactions, protective-put makes a nearly perfect hedge for the hedged item as long as the same currency, but managers should find present position of gains or losses in covered-call-wrting.

In the principal-agent setting, it is often the case that the agent receives private information prior to contracting. Because of this information asymmetry, the principal suffers from substantial cost due to the adverse selection (and the moral hazard). Thus, we need some informational devices for the purpose of performance evaluation. There is no doubt that one of the most useful devices is communication. It plays three rolls in the agency relationship potentially: (a) improves incentive structure, (b) enables the principal to implement a given incentive structure at lower cost and (c) leads to improved risk-sharing. Focusing on the communication in the agency model, we measure its economic value in the numerical example and identify the cases where it is valuable or not.

Our analysis proceeds as follows. In section 2, the basic model is described and the optimization program with and without communication (PROGRAM 1 and 2, respectively) is proposed. This construction is explored in detail in section 3. In section 4, we examine the general cases in detail. Concluding remarks are contained in section 5.