Since the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, Japan has been struggling to deal with nuclear energy issues. Crisis can be an opportunity, but it seems that Japan has not learned lessons well enough from the accident to change the society for better relationship between science/technology and society.

　 There are, in general, three ways to verify whether the society actually learned a lesson from the accident well. They are; (1) deep understanding of what really happened, (2) understanding of what should be done to prevent future accident, (3) implementation of the changes necessary for the society. This paper examines what happened after the accident until now from all these three aspects, primarily from the perspectives on the relationship between science/technology and society, and concluded that Japan, as a society, has not learned well from the Fukushima accident yet. While technical measures against severe accident have been enhanced, social, political and institutional reform has not been done well. This paper argues, in particular, transforming the decision making process of the government and establishment of an independent organization to conduct technology assessment and to provide objective information so that public can trust such information.

　 As learning from the experience of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) proposed 30 engineering knowledge which should adopt into nuclear regulation. These points introduced to new regulatory requirements, but there is a question about the sufficiency of the requirement. By Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear disaster, this author has an acute feeling that it is not fully conveyed or misinformed about the dangerousness of nuclear power plant and the risk of radiation exposure. This report considers constructive lessons by reviewing government’s response toward the risk of radiation exposure, regulating authority and electric utilities’ response toward compliance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s new regulatory requirements, and local government’s response toward the safety agreement.

　 It is indispensable for the survival of the State and local communities around nuclear facilities to take effective measures for controlling catastrophic damages from a nuclear severe accident. Japanese people keenly realized this lesson from the nuclear disaster in Fukushima began on 11 March 2011. This paper discusses three topics concerning the Fukushima accident, and severe accidents of nuclear facilities in general．

　 First, we evidently conclude that the developing process of the Fukushima nuclear accident could be understood by ordinary people with certain professional knowledge about nuclear severe accidents． A circumstantial evidence is my own experience at the beginning of the Fukushima accident. On the contrary, the Japanese government consistently hesitated to inform the actual state of affairs concerning Fukushima disaster (chapter1 to 3)．

　 Second, we make a comparative analysis between the damage caused by nuclear explosive devices and that of nuclear facilities like nuclear power plants, to clarify the characteristics of damage from nuclear severe accidents (chapter4 to 6)．

　 Third, we analyze the characteristics of the failure of the Japanese government, local governments, and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) at the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and indicate the challenge of improving Japan nuclear disaster countermeasure system (chapter7, 8)．

　 Issues to be considered from a viewpoint of nuclear engineering discipline, and issues to be considered from a perspective of STS discipline as well, are discussed on the basis of reflection of the Fukushima nuclear accident. From field experiences of public dialogue conducted prior to the Fukushima accidents, necessity of developing an efficient method to proceed from mutual trust building to social consensus formation has been identified as a key issue to be pursued. From attempts to provide messages of situation assessment during the accident, collaborative information collection and compilation conducted by multiple assessors with different background has been recognized as an effective approach toward trustable information provision. Post-accident activities have been carried out toward enhancing safety of nuclear facilities by applying a methodology called resilience engineering. A compact introduction of the methodology is provided. As for issues related to STS discipline, several inquiries have been mentioned concerning difficulties experienced by practitioners with engineering background. The central proposal in this paper for engineers and for STS specialists as well is that further efforts should be made to facilitate practical implementation of seemingly promising ideas and concepts.

　 Perception of uncertainties and unknowns is the basis for rationale decision-making regarding the nuclear safety. They imply that there may be a lack of knowledge and/or misunderstanding about issues concerned. Control of the uncertainties and unknowns depends on the performance of risk management. Risk governance is a framework to sustain the voluntary risk management process continuously for ensuring safety through time. Defense-in-depth is a philosophy of ensuring safety to prepare for uncertainties and unknowns by an appropriate pairing of prevention strategy and mitigation strategy. Ceaseless efforts and activities for nuclear safety under the risk governance framework are to be delivered to public through communication and dialogue. The risk management strategy supported by the safety and risk culture is a key element of ensuring safety that cannot be separated from uncertainties and unknowns.

　 In 2004, a new technical discipline, “Nuclear & Radiation”, was established in P. E. Jp (Professional Engineer, Japan) system mainly in order to restore social trust for nuclear technology. More than ten years have passed since that time. During this period, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident occurred on March 11, 2011.

　 In 2014, Nuclear & Radiation Group of IPEJ（The Institution of Professional Engineer, Japan）celebrated its 10th anniversary and decided on its policy of the next ten years. The author will report on the past ten years activity of Nuclear & Radiation Group as it is, and will help the discussion about possibility of engineering ethics in the nuclear field.

　 Concerning to the severe accident of the Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, characteristics of the damages and risk communication emerged by the accident are reported from the point of view of a resident in Fukushima. Information and communication about the ongoing crisis have been quite insubstantial and insecure, while the residents have tried to tackle the matters under the circumstance of each. Under the uncertain information about the radiation risk, large perception gaps are laid between the government or expertise and the residents. As the peculiarities accompanying the scales of the nuclear severe accident are clarified, usefulness of some STS theories has been reevaluated about the science transfigured after 1970's. Recognizing the emergence of the Beck's “Risk Society”, safety oriented society and the new rolls of expertise are expected.

　 On March 11th in 2011, a huge earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident struck Japan and resulted in many victims and various damages. Although a lot of effort for reconstruction has been done, the impact and damages of these triple disasters, called “Higashi-Nihon-Daishinsai” or “3.11,” continue to this day.

　 To consider various issues resulting from “Higashi-Nihon-Daishinsai,” we must understand the continuing damages and social structural issues behind the devastated areas. At the same time, scholars participating in researches on this triple disaster are required to think about “realities”. How to describe? What should be discussed? Moreover, can we speak this triple disaster?

　 The author conducted many dialogue forums on issues concerning severe accidents before the occurrence of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident. In this essay, the author describes a self-reflection about the nuclear accident from a standpoint of a research practitioner about science communication. After 3.11, the author have been meeting those identified as responsible for the accident (some employees of the Tokyo Electric Power Company), and have talked them concerning the issues such as “What kind of damage have the victims suffered?” and “What can the responsible enterprise's employees do for the victims?” The author also examined another type of accident, the JR Fukuchiyama Line train derailment. The results of these investigations reveal that apart from focusing on providing support to victims of accident, we should also consider providing better resources for those responsible for preventing accidents. The author realizes that it is important to stay beside the person not to support them directly too.

　 The system of license for nuclear installations has been administered within the technological framework of thinking. In administrative law cases, the defendant, i. e. the authority, always explains that she should only examine only the “basic design” of the reactor at the time of the procedure for license. The authority considers “basic design” for a technological concept. But I will not support this view. It is the legal concept of “hindrance to prevention against a disaster” (the former Atomic Law §24(1) Nr. 4) that determines what should be examined in the procedure. In the “Ikata-decision” of 29th April 1992, the Supreme Court followed the popular principle of the civil procedure law that it is plaintiff who should bear the burden of proof, albeit it was an administrative law case. On the other hand, the Court required that the authority should first “prove” that her conclusions were not unreasonable. This means that the Court will accept the consequence of technological thinking of the authority, if she succeeded in “proving” that her conclusions were not unreasonable. But the technological way of thinking is not enough for a good administrative decision. I will state in this essay that the authority should aim at mixing of the related sciences and quest for the best mix of knowledge.

　 The fourth Science and Technology Basic plan was supposed to start in April 2011, but the Great East Japan Earthquake followed by the accident of Fukushima Nuclear Power Plants struck in March. Then the Council for Science and Technology Policy decided to revise the Plan. In this process a government bureaucrat informally asked STS researchers to give advice for revising the plan. Several STS researchers discussed the revision of the plan and the result was sent to the bureaucrat.

　 This article describes how STS researchers cooperated the revision of the Basic Plan as objectively as possible by citing materials used in the discussion by STS researchers in those days. This is a historical report of STS researchers who thought to be proactive in giving expert advice to the government facing the great disaster.

　 Issues relating to nuclear safety regulations in my own research, such as regulatory capacity and public private partnership, nuclear safety regulatory regime (independence, ensuring capability of experts), role of local government, managing complex risk governance, are summarized. Then, actions taken by the Government after the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident were analyzed and remaining issues are identified. Strengthening the independence of nuclear regulatory body and achieving transparency of its operation were realized. Despite these efforts, the NRA (Nuclear Regulatory Authority) has been facing a challenge of human resource development, including staff capacity building and career path development, even though the size of staff of nuclear safety regulation became much larger because of the integration between NRA and NISA (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency). In addition, one of the failures revealed by the Fukushima accident is the lack of sensitivity to the issue of seismic risks, tsunami risks. But actions related to how to develop sensitivity beyond the main jurisdiction of the regulatory authority and how to ensure interdisciplinary communication among segmented fields are not enough. Finally, restructuring the role of industry self-regulation and the roles of local governments in nuclear safety regulations still remains.

　 From History of Japan’s Trade and Industry Policy, the official history of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the positioning of nuclear technology in Japan was discussed. The nuclear power generation had the economy that could compete with thermal in the 1960s, and the power companies began to introduce. Along with this, domestic production of nuclear equipment, the location of nuclear power plants, and securing of nuclear fuel had become issues of MITI. Since many initial failures occurred, the improvement and standardization of nuclear equipment had become issues of the industrial technology policy of MITI. This policy was pushed forward in the 1970s. The result remained only a marginal, because it was required the consent of the American company that had developed the technology. The nuclear technology was no longer a critical part of the policy after the 1980s and is hard to expect the innovation in Japan. However, it would not become the factor avoiding the accident of Fukushima even if the technology mentioned above made progress. The cause of the accident is that the emergency diesel generator was destroyed by the tsunami. It is regretted that measures to defend it against the tsunami were not taken in advance.

　 This paper deals with Triple Disaster in 2011 at Japan from the perspectives of social responsibility of scientists as well as responsibility of STS researchers. First, the meaning of “unexpected” in several official reports of Fukushima nuclear accident are reviewed and politics of “beyond assumption” are examined. Second; this paper focus on the gap between the information that citizen wanted to know and the information professionals wanted to provide. Citizen who lived in Fukushima wanted to know impartial, non-partisan, broad information; however, professionals wanted to provide decisive action guidelines and limited, absolute information. These gaps raise questions on the responsibility of scientists. Which behavior is responsible on the part of scientists: to disclose only unique knowledge decisive enough for action guidelines or to disclose a variety of knowledge? Third, the discussion on “techno-orientalism” is examined and finally, examples are shown on how the STS perspective can provide the platforms for the discussion on health effects by radio-activities. At the same time, the responsibility of STS researchers and the distance between the target and STS researchers are discussed.

　 In response to the severe accident in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants, some STS researchers prioritize criticizing the discourse and attitudes of radioactivity experts. This phenomenon could be due to the academic and social approach of STS to criticize paternalistic authoritarianism and scholar biases in science and technology to invite non-experts to govern S&T. Even though this approach is necessary in ordinary times, it leaves a negative impact in crisis situations. Particularly, in case of the Fukushima accident, heavy criticization towards radioactivity experts would degrade the reliability of proper scientific knowledge and lead to confusion about the evaluation of radiation health risks. Tackling this issue, I propose a Double Interpreter Model between local people and experts, and a Two-front War against Anti-intellectualism and Expert Paternalism. Together, these frameworks (suggesting that in complex modern society, the enemy of our enemy is not always our friends) could inspire further communication between reliable experts and local people.

　 The nuclear disaster in Fukushima and its ongoing repercussion remind us of the potential of STS as an intellectual enterprise with significant social consequences. This article discusses the field's unique possibilities in three interconnected domains: research, liberal arts education, and democracy. First I briefly touch on STS's unique key insights, which highlight the entanglement and co-production of science, technology, and society. Then I discuss how these insights can enrich research on historical developments behind the 2011 disaster; facilitate the cultivation of critical thinking - especially about the entwined relationships among science, technology, and society - in undergraduate education; and shed light on both rights and obligations of the public to participate in decision-making processes regarding science and technology (e. g., nuclear power) as citizens of a democratic society. I draw from my own research on nuclear governance in Japan and the United States and involvement with the undergraduate STS program in the U. S. Insights from STS suggest how thinking about energy issues also means thinking about the future of society. I argue that, ultimately, they prompt both experts and lay public to engage with deliberations on science and technology governance with reflexivity, openness to different knowledges, and commitment as active agents.

　 After the Great East Japan Earthquake, the reputation of STS has fallen into the ground because its act fell short of netizens’ expectations. In other words, STS was labeled a “social justice warrior”, deriving harm to society by its excessive demand for political correctness. What was wrong, and what should STS do on ongoing and upcoming arguments in spreading the horizon of ICT? Based on the socio-scientific arguments that had occurred on Twitter after the disaster, this paper will first discuss the current state of social networking services, regarded today as an incubating device for partisanship rather than deliberation. Furthermore, the value of affect, which had been disregarded in comparison of rationality, would be reexamined. In future, it is expected this article would open for collaborative dialogue on divided SNS.

　 After Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, Japanese STS is questioned whether it retains critical function against science and technology. The author starts his argument with his experience which exemplifies that it failed to give critical perspective to experts. Then he moves on to the retrospect of 25 year history of Japanese STS from the establishment of STS Network Japan in 1990 to that of the Japanese Society for the Science and Technology Studies. He concludes that Japanese STS has been shaped under the strong influence of the social establishment of Japan, and it is destined to lose its critical role. He suggests that, in order to retrieve its relevant function, Japanese STSers should pay much more attention not to ‘Kuhnified’ main line studies but to the achievements of non-mainstream scholars.

　 Fukushima Nuclear Disaster was brought about by the “Safety Dogma.” This dogma's main mention was that there would not be any accident in Japanese nuclear industry forever. Why did we believe such a stupid myth? At the beginning of Japan's nuclear industry, there was a large repertoire of fear of risks, which was pointed out by some scientists. But that fear was not reflected to science policy at that time. We must understand what prevented scientific knowledge from being utilized for safety precaution. In this paper, we try to chase the historical pass in which Japanese technocratic structure was made. And in that pass, we would see an illiberal thought was adopted for science policy. Japanese technocracy demanded scientists to limit their own academic liberty for realizing economic plan. Instrumental reason was in priority to scientific reason. This kind of conflict between two reasons has been maintained in technocratic world after WWII. The contemporary nuclear industry has all but isomorphic structure compared with the prewar structure of technocracy. For transcending the “Safety Dogma” and dependence on technocracy, it is necessary for us to recognize the inherent risks of technology, and to surveil our science policy and technocracy.

　 Prior to March 11, 2011, the seismic risk for nuclear facilities was controversial, while health risks arising from radiation were noted after the Fukushima accident. Scientific information is thus necessary, but science is not sufficient to settle such disputes, owing to intrinsic uncertainties. This article discusses results of a pilot program for professionals to encourage deliberation on problems of scientific uncertainty. Six professionals from different fields held five meetings to discuss risks related to nuclear facilities from seismic and tsunami events. They included those from natural sciences and engineering who frankly discussed area of uncertainty in their disciplines. After deliberating on unknown elements and limitations of each field, they discussed seismic and tsunami risks faced by nuclear facilities, and steps to be adapted by professionals in cases of uncertainty. Five professionals participated in discussions regarding the health risks of radiation. Their discussions, however, reveals their common sense on health impacts for less than 100 mSv and their knowledge of basic concepts to protect people from radiation. They have different opinions on the scientific credibility of new studies as well as the role of the government and experts in Fukushima to counteract people's distrust of experts and their anxiety as regards radiation.

　 This article analyzes whether the common deficits of risk governance identified by IRGC could be observed or not in the case of emergency preparedness and severe accident management of Japanese nuclear power plant before and after the Fukushima nuclear disaster. In summary, the followings are underlined as critical deficits. First, risk-related knowledge base was deficient or inadequate. Second, interface problem among stakeholders was a serious underlying problem. A failure of interdisciplinary communication in the phase of risk knowledge generation causes oversight or disregard of early risk signals. Third, appreciation or understanding fundamental changes and interdependencies of agents in complex societal system was lacking. Fourth, deficits in legal system and departmentalized emergency response scheme could exacerbate risks and make organizations insensitive to risk. Fifth, organizational capacity building for managing risks (in particular, specialized competence and knowledge, organizational integration, flexibility and its network) was inadequate. Lessons from the Fukushima and our challenges ahead are to urgently and seriously correct the deficits noted above. After the Fukushima, however, a few deficits are slightly corrected, but critical deficits still remain.