Recent trends in disaster information dissemination for natural disasters are leveling, meshing and high resolution to reduce the lead time for evacuation, and weather disaster warning being increasing and diversifying. However, disaster information of risk communication does not have to be scientifically accurate, precise, and detailed.

　 It is difficult to accurately predict the occurrence of weather-related disasters or natural disaster in the first place. And even with the increase and diversification of weather information, there is no information that can be called definitive enough to lead to evacuation. It is not right to tell people the risks as they are. Even if you understand the risks accurately, you should evacuate just in case, or if you do not understand the risks accurately, you should feel the risks more than necessary or evacuate earlier.

　 It is important to make a clear distinction between the goal of disaster prevention, which is to provide information to protect human lives, and the goal of outreach, which is to deepen understanding of seismology, volcanology, and meteorology and to provide information based on academic knowledge.

　 The paper examines the limitations of analyzing certain societal challenges and phenomena solely as a problem of “communication,” as well as the perils of misunderstanding such approaches as authentic analytical approaches and unique contributions of science and technology studies (STS). After the 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Accident, the use of a real-time simulation system for radionuclide dispersion and its radiological consequences on nuclear emergency (SPEEDI) became a focus of significant controversy. With the pre-disaster planning characterized by unrealistic idealization of and simplistic overdependence on SPEEDI swiftly replaced with a rebuke of it as utterly useless, it was abandoned altogether for future nuclear emergency. Intensity of a public debate can obscure subtle but critical interactions among technoscience, policy, historical backgrounds, and other social factors that are essential to unpack and understand for social-learning from a disaster. I argue that STS at its best attends to those intricate mechanisms and critically interrogate who possesses the most relevant expertise, how to use it to protect people and community, and ultimately, what common goods and societal objectives should be prioritized in times of a crisis or as society in general. Reducing the debate to a communication issue deprives us of this opportunity.

　 This paper examined aspects of communication in crisis situations, based on the discussion in the symposium on “Reconsidering communication: How can we understand Covid-19, natural disasters and nuclear accidents”, held by Japanese Society for Science and Technology Studies in 2021. First, this paper describes the essential difficulty of communication in a crisis situation from the viewpoint of the self-destruction of prediction. Next, this paper summarized problems and aspects of communication in specific disasters based on the reports of Covid-19 (by Nara), natural disaster (by Sekiya), and nuclear power plant accident (by Juraku) presented in the symposium. Finally, problems which were common to three disaster arenas were taken out again, and the ideal way and positioning of the communication were considered.

　 Dr. Yasuo Nakagawa, professor of Kobe University, determined the underestimations of acute radiation effects in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S. Atomic Bombings. The U.S. Armed Forces Joint Commission and ABCC arbitrarily designated only epilation and purpura as symptoms of the acute radiation injuries which were often seen within 2 kilometers from the hypocenter. Other injuries such as fatigue, fever, and vomiting and so on often seen beyond 2 kilometers from the hypocenter were excluded from acute radiation ones. Nakagawa argued that the underestimation had been made to justify the U.S.atomic bombings.

　 After the World War Ⅱ , American scientists who had committed to the Manhattan Project launched the new concept of “permissible dose of radiation exposure,” instead of “tolerance dose” challenged by geneticists. During 1950s, Americans-led ICRP succeeded in curbing the anti-nuclear voices raised by concerned citizens to the U.S. Atomic Bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as a series of nuclear tests at the Bikini Atoll.

　 Nakagawa saw through ICRP’s “international standards” of radiation exposure as “administrative means” to develop nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. He argued such “social standards” with scientific taste, forced people to accept radiation exposure. We must reevaluate his study as those standards are still enforced to the people suffering from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident.

　 This study aimed to describe how the policies of assistive technologies and definitions have changed, and find keys to analyze how the current situation causes ICT to become a barrier for persons with disabilities.

　 In the process of reviewing the history of assistive technology policy in Japan, the author found an issue regarding whether the target of the policy programs includes products manufactured exclusively for people with disabilities or generally available products as well. Most programs were applicable only in especially produced assistive technology.

　 In the Discussion section, the author referred to the “equality of accommodation” theory (Ishikawa 2004) and pointed out that the assistive technology used by the minority is an “accommodation that requires a special cost,” whereas the technology used by the majority, which is also an “accommodation,” remains invisible. As a result, policy trends, especially for products manufactured for people with disabilities, emphasize on the understanding regarding assistive technology as“accommodations that require special costs,” making them auxiliary and adaptive and leaving behind the general development of ICT. To promote social participation of persons with disabilities, the policy and understanding of assistive technologies need to be modified.

　 This paper is a case study of “Invisible Touch,” a participatory play produced in collaboration between a theater expert and a science and technology communicator. The author participated in the rehearsal of the play and observed that the actors and the playwright were revising the script through dialogue. In this paper we will discuss the function of the dialogue in revising the script. First, in the dialogue of the process of script revision, issues were “presented”, “selected”, and “conditioned”. Second, it was inferred that the criteria for script revision were “own experience” and “impartial information provision”. Thirdly, the dialogue in the revision process was itself“ own experience” and at the same time it functioned as a procedure of “impartial information provision” through understanding of various positions.