When the Yedo Treaties were concluded in 1858, it was a well-known fact among the Japanese intellectuals that they were signed without Mikado’s approval, which gave rise to the tremendous political turbulences of the following years, leading ultimately to the Meiji Revolution. However, the same fact was hidden by the shogunate from the Western diplomats who began residing in Yedo in 1859. On the other hand, the American representative Harris, who negotiated the first Yedo Treaty, was probably aware of the lack of imperial consent but remained silent about it toward his European colleagues. Consequently, it was only around 1862 that they learned the fact, interpreting the situation that the current treaties had not yet been ratified by the true sovereign of Japan. This article reveals that the perception gap thus generated among the Western diplomats influenced their diplomacies to such an extent that it led to the division and swing of their policies over the important diplomatic issues, including antiforeign terrorism and the deferring of the opening of the other Japanese ports. The lack of ratification meant the necessity of its achievement. This article also depicts at its end how the Western diplomats reached their perception, which was to culminate in their policy in 1865 of obtaining the imperial approval of the treaties with display of naval forces.

  In the North German Confederation and the German Empire, diplomatic power was not centralized in the Confederation, but was partially reserved for the federal states. This is in contrast to the United States of America and Switzerland, where the diplomatic activities of the federal states were prohibited. In the process of establishing the constitution of the North German Confederation, Bismarck aimed to preserve the sovereignty of the federal states as much as possible, and the right of the federal states to send and receive diplomatic missions was not abolished.

  Concerning the public law jurisprudence of the imperial period, the question of how one should understand the multiple layers of federal and state diplomacy became a point of contention. There were many discussions relating federal and state diplomatic rights to the concept of a federal state. In particular, the issue was how to organize the multilayered diplomacy and prevent the federal state from interfering with state diplomacy.

  This paper examines how the local authorities in early Meiji Japan dealt with foreign negotiations at treaty ports, taking Niigata, which was opened after the Meiji Restoration, as an example.

  Foreign negotiations in Tokugawa era were defined by the structure of the status system, in that each location was obligated to take charge of its own foreign relations. Even after the opening of the port, treaty ports continued to be a special area, as the governor was a special official who handled foreign relations. Prefectural officials of Meiji Government with jurisdiction over treaty ports also served as officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, this system creates policy discrepancies between the prefectures in charge of treaty ports and the prefectures of the hinterland. The dispute over the ban on rice transfers that occurred in Niigata in 1869 can be understood as an example of such a problem.

  This system was favorable to the treaty Powers, but the dismantling of status system made this impossible. It was only when this situation came to a head that the recovery of the right to enact administrative regulations became a focal point between the powers and the Japanese government.

  This article considers the administration in the open ports of Japan as a ‘bundle of administrative rules’ that only became effective by agreement between Japan and its contracting powers and clarifies how such administration was established by examining the changes in the content of the ‘Port Regulations’. An examination of the contents of the ‘Draft Port Regulations’ from 1854 to 1870 reveals that, in the early years, the contents included not only those relating to ships on the water but also those relating to crew behaviour and security on land but, as time went on, the contents gradually narrowed down to rules for the water area. As for regulations on land, some reached an agreement between Japan and the foreign powers, while others did not. As a result, each open port was a patchwork of administrative areas where administrative rules had been established somewhere and not elsewhere. The administrative rules difficult to negotiate were transferred from the local to the national level, forming a significant part of the subsequent negotiations on treaty reform.

  The establishment of quarantine system in Meiji Japan was essentially an entanglement of political and diplomatic conflict over the administrative autonomy of Japan on the one hand and development of medical and sanitary measures on the other. Japan faced a cholera epidemic in 1879 without an agreed quarantine measure because the “Quarantine Committee” held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1878 could not establish a clear policy due to the confrontation between “medical inspection” measures and “strict quarantine” measures debated throughout the international community. Japan was no exception. The enactment of the “Maritime Quarantine Act of Cholera Prevention” measure indicated that the Meiji government’s preference on rigid measures was based on “strict quarantine” policies. However, this quarantine did not work well because of its unilateral issuance without prior consultation with foreign ministers in Japan who protested and refused to comply. After 1882, the Meiji government switched to a simpler quarantine by “The regulation for the inspection of vessels arriving from localities infected with cholera” to gain the cooperation of foreign ships. The Meiji government planned to return to “strict quarantine” in the face of repeated cholera epidemics and developed medical science. However, Japan needed to continue its simple quarantine until the establishment of “Quarantine Act” in 1899 because of the cholera endemic theory as well as the need to acquire coordination with foreign powers.

  The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation that Japan signed with Germany in 1896 had intrigued less attention than the one singed with Britain in 1894.

  However, Germany should not be neglected as it played a leading role along with Britain through the treaty revision negotiations between Japan and the Western Powers in the Meiji era.

  Therefore, this paper traces the process of negotiations of the above-mentioned German Treaty based on German documents as well as Japanese ones.

  Although Germany was struck by the above-mentioned British Treaty, Germany started negotiation with Japan as the German Minister to Japan, Gutschmid, urged for fear of isolation. German demands for Japan were formulated on basis of rivalry with Britain and precaution against Japan. Germany tried to gain more profits than Britain and to suppress Japan to maximize its own interests.

  Japan was forced to make concessions in the protection of patents, etc., partly due to the conciliatory attitude of Aoki Shuzo, Japanese Minister to Germany.

  German high profile was the reflection of its recognition that Japan may compete with Germany in the future, which symbolized the new stage of Japan-Germany relations.

  This study analyzes the relationship between citizen deliberation for constitutional reform in Iceland and a new political party, the Icelandic Pirate Party. Furthermore, it reveals the momentum for citizen deliberations to lead to the formation of political parties.

  Against the backdrop of the 2008 financial crisis, constitutional reform through citizen deliberation took place from 2009 to 2013 in Iceland. Although the constitutional reform failed eventually, it was followed by the emergence of the Icelandic Pirate Party, whose central policy is to enact a new constitution. This study first examines the transformation of the political opportunity structures as environmental conditions for the citizen deliberation to influence the formation of the Icelandic Pirate Party. Next, it analyzes the linkage between citizen deliberation and the formation of the Icelandic Pirate Party by focusing on collective identity.

  The Icelandic citizen deliberation has often been taken as the most important case of “partyless” democracy. However, the case study reveals that the citizen deliberation contributed to the formation of the Icelandic Pirate Party. Based on the analysis’ results, this study concludes that citizen deliberations can be a driving force for party-centered democracy.

  North Korea has launched a series of missiles toward Japan in recent years. The present study used surveys to clarify how such an increase in military threats affects Japanese individuals’ attitudes about potential revisions of the country’s constitution. Earlier research identified the existence of a rally ’round the flag effect in which support for a country’s leader suddenly increases when the military threat against the country increases; however, the target of that rallying effect is (essentially) political actors, and its effect on specific issue attitudes has been unclear. In this study, the “J-Alert” nationwide emergency broadcast system was used to test the extent to which citizens become more positive toward the revision of Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution when a military crisis looms. A priming experiment and a list experiment were performed. The survey results revealed that the respondents who showed a slightly favorable attitude toward maintaining the constitution as it is now written were more likely to be positive about a constitutional revision when they saw the J-Alert screen. This suggests that as threats from countries such as North Korea and Russia increase, the opinion among Japan’s public may become more favorable to the revision of the constitution.

  This article examines the integration problem of Japan’s internal security agencies in the end of the occupation. Utilizing American and Japanese primary sources, and focusing on struggles within conservative elites, it analyzes the process up to the failure of the establishment of a centralized ministry in charge of Japan’s internal security. The Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, cooperating with leaders of the Liberal Party and his advisors, sought to reinforce Japan’s internal security capabilities through the integration of agencies such as the National Rural Police, the Municipal Police, the Special Investigation Bureau of the Law Ministry, the National Police Reserve, and the Maritime Safety Board. This attempt, however, was faced with criticisms within conservative political circle that the integration of the internal security agencies would result in the revival of the police state. Therefore, the Japanese government could not reach an agreement on the creation of a new ministry in charge of Japan’s internal security. Through analyzing this process, this article sheds light on the role of conservative elites in preventing the accomplishment of postwar Japan’s “Reverse Course.”