[in Japanese]

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[in Japanese]

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Citizen participation into planning process has been an inevitable trend in local community. Rules by which representatives could be elected from several interest groups, however, have not yet been fully discussed.
This paper aims at evaluating rules for electing representatives concerning with community level planning where multi-objective decision making is especially required.
A theoretical framework to evaluate a set of alternative voting rules for election is constructed with due consideration given to the importance of information environments between voters and candidates. The optimality of the number of nomination is investigated by One-Level-Model which includes only the process where byvoters choose representatives. Simulation experiments suggest that the desired number of nomination be nearly a half of the number of candidates, under restriction that the number should not be greater than the number of representatives.
A two level model, referred as Two-Level-Model, is built so as to deal explicitly with the process by which elected representives choose the optimal policy mix among the alternatives. Two-Level-Model facilitates us to evaluate election rule by decision performance of the representative.

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This article aims at explaining the caracteristics of legal solution as a non-market decision making. For the purpose of explaining it, we try to study a recent legal case, i. e. the Petroleum Industry Cartel Case, which was prosecuted by FTC of Japan in May, 1974 andd arrived at a conclusion in Feb. 1984.
But we don't study the case from a jurist's point of view, because we are mainly interested in the influence of the confrontation between the two bureaus on the principle of independence or insulating rules of judicial administration and decisions. So we adopt the approach of both Public Choice Study and Economic Analysis of Law.
One of the issues in this case is the illegality of the cartel which is derected by“Gyôsei-shidô” (Japanese-style administrative guidance) of MITT. The Supreme Court declared“guilty”because even if the Cartel was directed by “Gyôsei-shidô”, it did restrict the competition and violated the Antimonopoly Laws. It means that the decision gives the priority to Antimonopoly Laws over the Petroleum Industry Law. Though the Petoleum Industry Law is the legal foundation of the “Gyôsei-shidô”, it is not a law of application exclusion of Antimonopoly Legislation. And so the oil companies were declared guilty.
But, both MITT and Keidanren (The Federation of Economic Organization) rather felt relieved at the decision, because the careful study of the decision makes it clear that“Gyôsei-shidô”is basically legal, unless it violates the Antimonopoly Laws. That is the Japanese way of allocating administrating power between the two bureaus.
In this article, we found the reason why the Supreme Court judgement made such a conservative decision-the reason is, we guess, in the nature and the process of legal decision making themselves which characterize nonmarket decision making.

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The aims of this paper are that we inves-tigate the voters' reactions to important factors, macroeconomic policy perfomed by the LDP and his administration, and predictions of election published by mass media, and try to analyse these relationships.
First, we estimate the voters' judgements of performances of macroeconomic policies managed by the incumbent party. For the estimation, we investigate two hypothesis on which every voter perceives the macro trade off between price increase and unemployment, or not, and infer the structure of voters' political preference with respect to the economic policies, indirectly.
Second, we analyze the voter's behavior reacts predictions published by mass media. H. Simon investigated two effects of voter's reactions to prediction, ‘Bandwagon Effect’ and ‘Underdog Effect’. Through operating the voter's behavioral model, we can estimate the effects on the space spanned by actual supporting vote and the prediction.
Third, we argue that the prediction of vote should be accurate as possible, so that the prediction procedure should be constructed not only by cross section data obtained by own research section but also by time series data announced by the authorities.

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