In spite of significant innovations in information technologies, e-government remains at an early stage of implementation. A large number of studies have been made on e-government. In recent years, there has been renewal of interest in e-democracy. Although most e-government resources reside in the administrative side of government, the online activities of representative institutions have to be accelerated as well, i.e., parliaments, legislatures, and local councils are compelled to take up the IT challenge in order to remain politically relevant.
What seems to be lacking, however, is to speculate on conceptual frameworks, theories, and methods. I have examined e-government and e-democracy from the viewpoint of Public Choice which can be defined as the economic study of non-market decision making. The basic behavioral postulate of public choice is that man is egoistic and rational. I should like to explore a further possibility, which to the best of my knowledge has never been examined.

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This paper proposes a new mechanism which can generate the “democratic failure” that democratic institution may select socially inefficient policy outcome. The key assumption is: voters are almost rational in the sense that they are most concerned with economic payoffs that the adopted policy yields, but they are also concerned with policy itself, i.e. ideology, and if they vote for the policy different from their ideology, they incur psychological costs. Under this assumption, even though each voter's ideological preference is negligible, it has a large impact on the society's political choices through the election that aggregates each voter's opinion. Specifically, it is shown that the resulting policy outcome can be irrational in the sense that it substantially reduces the voter's utility. It is also shown that in the presence of negligible ideological preference, each voter's choice can depend on his/her expectations about other voter's choices, which in turn leads to unpredictability of electoral outcome.

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Now, the Japanese public pension system operates the principle of intergenerational support. In this system, it is susceptible to uncertainties such as changers in a nation's demographics and economical conditions, it may cause future generations to bear a disproportionately high share of the burden of such support, causing intergenerational disparity in contributions.
In addition to this intergenerational support, there is an “inner” generational support system in the Japanese pension system. Though all working generation (includes to students and unemployed workers) have to pay contributions, full-time housewives of salaried worker are exempt from contributions. Other all workers share the contributions of them. This structure of public pension's financial system causes working generations to making feel unfair.
In this paper, I discuss to be inequity by an income transfer through those Japanese public pension systems. Using the basic model that calculates the 1999the actuarial valuations presented by the ministry of welfare and labor, conduct various policy simulations. I'd like to think about a sustainable and an equity public pension's system through this research.
Even under the same assumption as Ministry of Labor and Welfare, what the intergenerational equity pension system exist became clear from result of analysis. If the baby boomers retire, the cost of the system reform is large. The reform in 2004 is the last chance of a drastic reform.

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