As a result of the formation of the Common-wealth of Independent States (CIS) at the end of 1991, the former Soviet States accelerated their step along the road towards democratization and a free market economy.
The first part of this paper analyzes the dismantling process of the Soviet Union with its centralized economic planning system and Communist Party's monopoly, from an economic perspective, over a time series from 1985 to February, 1992.
The latter part of this paper analyzes the economic chaos that has been generated by difficulties associated with international cooperation by former communist states, whose aim is to become independent from the viewpoint of“the tragedy of the commons.”Chapter 5 deals with rising competition for the expansion of budget deficits and for the introduction of each country's own currency, which has become conspicuous since August 1991, with the change in the political system and confrontation between the states, which heightened as a result of the break up of the Soviet Union. In each state the supply of currency has been handled by the Gosbank, which was centered on monetary sovereignty in each of the states, but requested each state to raise it's prices in order to secure commodities in their own states.
Chapter 6 analyzes the external effect of the January, 1992 price liberalization in Russia on the economic policies of the other members of the CIS and examines the reasons why individual countries are demanding the introduction of their own currencies.

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This paper is the second installment of my geometric exposition of the so-called Ar row's General Impossibility Theorem. The first installment appeared as“A Diagrammatic Proof of Arrow's General Impossibility The-orem, ”in Keizai Kenkyu (The Economic Re-view), Vol. 43, No. 1, January 1992. In this second installment, I attempt to redress the relative neglect of the first paper regarding Arrow's most controversial axiom, “the social choice's independence from individuals' preferences for irrelevant alternatives.”
As in the first paper, I represent an individual's preference pattern by lines connecting notches on three parallel bars, each of which represents one alternative, and has three notches indicating the high, middle and low preference ranking. The slope sign and steepness of a line connecting notches in two neighboring bars show, respectively, the individual's preference order and intensity of his preference order between the alternatives represented by the two bars. The axiom of independence from irrelevant alternatives is to be shown as a way by which we, disre-garding intensity of individuals' preferences, reduce nine different intensity patterns in combining two individuals' preferences for two alternatives into a single social preference pattern.
Disregarding preference intensities enables us to determine the social choice order for the cases where two individuals' preference patterns do not permit application of the Pareto axiom from the social choice order of a case where their preference patterns do permit it, by using the “transtivity”relationship.
Once the social choice orders are determined for all possible combinations of two individuals' preferences for three alternatives, they reveal that there must be a dictator.

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There are a lot of literature which have analyzed whether governments are either competitive or monopolistic in the federal system. In other words, the hypothesis that the extent of fiscal decentralization and thus the competitive environment surrounding governments could affect a performance of each government and thus a government size has been presented and empirically tested.
We can see that this hypothesis which focuses on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and a government size, which is often called“the fiscal decentralization hypothesis”or“Leviathan hypothesis”, contains the four effects or aspects in it. Here we call those effects as (1) the centralism effect, (2) the fragmentation effect, (3) the consolidation effect, and (4) the generalizatino effect. The centralism effect results from the vertical decentralization between central and local governments. On the other hand, the fragmentation effect is due to the horizontal decentralization among local governments. We could say that any decentralization effect is made up of both effects. The consolidation effect focuses the difference before and after two or more governments are consolidated. The generalization effect means the difference by generalizing a single-purpose government to a multi-purpose government. Both two effects grasp the alteration of a government scale or government scope.
In this paper, we survey the empirical analyses concerning this fiscal decentralization hypothesis and imply an outlook for future analyses. Examining those literature, it could be shown that those have not always obtained common results but rather have presented a lot of points to be discussed. We typically mention the following four points as those, (1) in what government level, from a local to central level, the competitive mechanism among governments actually occurs, (2) how a government size should be defined, (3) how federal grants to state or local governments should be considered in this framework, and (4) how a government form, namely a generalpurpose government or a single-purpose government, could affect the performance of those local governments? Through examining these points, we clarify the common conclusions obtained and the problems left from the analyses.

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The aims of this paper is to analyze the relation between fluctuations of the macroeconomic variables such as real GNP and price index and policy decison making of fiscal and monetary policy by using Japanese data.
First we make a survey of the recent politico-economic theories and test the fitness of these theories in Japan. The conclusion of this test is that none of the theories fit well in Japan.
Second we test the causality between the fluctuations of macroeconomic variables (real GNP, price index) and the fiscal and monetary policy by using Granger's causality test. The conclusion of this test is that the fluctuations of macroeconomic variables cause the fiscal and monetary policy and that the fiscal and monetary policy cause the fluctuations of macroeconomic variables.
Third we propose a new model to explain Japanese politico-economic structure. This is as follows. We devide fiscal and monetary policy into two parts respectively. The former part is one which is explained by fluctuations of GNP and price. The latter part is one which does not belong to the former one. We can consider that the former part is ascribed to policy makers' office-oriented motivation and that the latter part is ascribed to policy makers' ideology-oriented motivation. By using Japanese data, we actualy make these division and get various characteristics of each parts.
Fourth we test the effect of the unanticipated policy. That is, we test whether Philips curve is vertical. The conclusion of this test is that the effect of the unanticipated policy is effective (Philips curve is not vertical) .
Throughout this paper, we confirm the interaction that the fiscal and monetary policy composed of office-oriented motivation and ideology-oriented motivation cause the fluctuations of the macroeconomic variables such as real GNP and price index regardless how to people anticipate and the fluctuations of the macroeconomic variables change the ratio of the policy motivation.

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[in Japanese]

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