The current global (dis)order may be regarded unjust since over a billion people suffer human rights abuse and degrading poverty.From an ethical perspective, when the institutional order of a global society fails to safeguard its members’ human rights, those who significantly collaborate in the imposition of this order should share the burden of effectively carrying out their responsibility.

Focusing on the various global issues (for example, corruption in politics, terrorism, poverty, and financial instability) viewed as negative effects of global interdependence, this paper examines if the ethics of global responsibility may be a guiding principle for the construction of a more just global society.The paper also explores how global ethics can be conceptualized in reference to the theories that have recently been put forth by ethical philosophers such as Th. Pogge and A. Linklater.

The most remarkable characteristic of terrorists is that they are the criminal as well as the enemy.Terrorists should not only be defeated by the army but also be arrested and tried for their offenses.This means that neither the protected legal status of the criminal nor that of the enemy is conferred on terrorists.

In modern criminal law, on the one hand, even a serious offender cannot be outlawed as an enemy of the community but is provided with legal protection in the criminal legal procedure.Criminals do not lose their status as members of the community and enjoy the minimum legal protection given to each citizen of the community.In modern legal thought, the criminal is clearly different from the enemy because the former retains the status as a member of our community, while the latter has no such status.

On the other hand, the enemy has been well protected in the modern international law.The distinction between the enemy and the brigand, that is, the criminal organization, has been one of the most important elements of international legal thought since Roman law of nations.The distinction has been obviously accepted in the modern, interstate conception of international law.In a war against the enemy, soldiers should not be punished for combat, unless they violate the laws of war.When captured, soldiers should not be treated as criminals but they should enjoy the status of Prisoner of War.Soldiers should not be regarded as liable for their killing and destruction in combat because they don’t act as members of the criminal organization but as members of the regular army of the State.

The criminal, who is clearly distinguished from the enemy, has been under the protection of the modern criminal law, while the enemy, who is deliberately differentiated from the criminal, has enjoyed a protected status in the modern international law.When the distinction between the criminal and the enemy is lost in legal thought, the protection conferred on both legal status categories will be deprived of its long-established foundation.

This paper aims to explore the typical theories of “evil” in order to clarify the meanings of global justice in the contemporary age.It focuses on the following theories: Immanuel Kant’s theory of practical reason, Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil, and Jacques Derrida’s theory of justice.

Kant argues that justice resides inside of legality but is not quite the same. He contends that the existence of evil indicates that this gap between justice and legality is no longer being considered.Therefore, justice in Kant’s understanding of practical reason suggests an act of conscience and a reflection upon one’s past conducts, which presumably stays inside of legality and outside of justice. Arendt argues that the evil in the contemporary age is banal, as she found in Adolf Eichmman’s court case.In the court, she found that Eichmman was a banal and ordinary law-abiding citizen, unlike the general expectation that he would be a brutal and atrocious figure.Similar to Kant, she concludes that evil exists in acts of thoughtlessness.

The relationship between legality and justice differentiates Arendt from Kant. According to Kant’s philosophy, justice resides inside of legality, whereas Arendt states that justice can be found inside and outside of legality and thus claims that a just act sometimes takes place in the form of illegal action.

Derrida also contends that some just acts can be found outside of legality, and he regards deconstruction as justice.Therefore, his deconstructive arguments are sometimes used to criticize law and given orders for the sake of justice although his concern to justice has been often undervalued by contemporary political theorists and IR scholars.

This article examines a scholarly discourse concerning the ethics of the acceptance of refugees, which has appeared in the literature of contemporary political philosophy.It focuses on the discussion not “as it is” but “as it ought to be.” The first and second sections describe selected views of communitarians and cosmopolitans.Among the communitarians, the views of Michael Walzer are outlined.Subsequently, the cosmopolitan views of Joseph Carens and the utilitarians are described.These sections imply that to some extent, harmony exists between the communitarians and the cosmopolitans regarding the acceptance of refugees.

Subsequently, the third section closely examines the points where these views are harmonized.The issues of the definition of a refugee, limits of acceptance, causal relationships, and the priority of asylum seekers are covered.This section reveals the common questions to communitarians and cosmopolitans.At the same time, it reconfirms the different approaches employed by political philosophers to ethical enquiries, in spite of their conclusions being superficially similar.

The final section briefly discusses the arguments of internally displaced persons, who have attracted the attention of scholars of international studies and those of forced migration studies.This indicates that the trend of contemporary thought after the Cold War has influenced the practice of asylum.The relation between states and the international society is currently being redefined, and in this context, the value of asylum is being seriously questioned.

This paper discusses the blind spot in “Global Responsibilities (GR).” It has been proposed that all humanity shares a GR, which includes the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P).” However, is it actually possible to fulfill responsibilities in a complex, unpredictable world? In fact, even when we attempt to fulfill our responsibilities, we experience repeated failure.In spite of good intentions and noble pronouncements, the discourse on GR did not consider the actual practice of peace-keepers in the field.To overcome the uncertainty and inconsistency that continues, we need to consider the problem of GR from the perspective of practice rather than from one of concept.

This paper clarifies the blind spot of GR according to three points.The first point is the limitations of response responsibility and collective responsibility, which are the constitutive elements of GR.Response responsibility limits the responsibility of responding of those who are actually in a position to respond. Collective responsibility is based on the premise that people have a certain sense of identity within a group, such as a nation, which constitutes the parameters of this collective responsibility.It is doubtful whether this sense of identity exists within the “international community” and, if so, whether it exists to a sufficient degree. The second point is a certain lack of clarity in the actual practice of GR, for example, in R2P.The actual content of GR becomes unclear in terms of “who,” “for whom,” and “what,” when it is put into practice.The third point is that, in practice, the complete responsibility is actually given to the peace-keepers, in that they will be held responsible for harmful consequences.Although GR remains vague from the perspective of conceptualization, those who promote GR pursue the individual responsibility of peace-keepers.

A new institutional design for GR, sufficiently cognizant of the actual practice in the field, is necessary to overcome this blind spot.

The issue of citizenship in the theory of justice has focused almost exclusively on the relationship of individuals with the domestic government-of citizens with their state. However, the condition of citizenship is dynamically changing both inside and outside of the domestic government in the era of globalization.

This paper will theorize the reflection on the notion of citizenship in hospitality, building on Derrida’s engagement with “unconditional hospitality” through the bridging of political theory, moral philosophy, and international relations theory, especially by focusing on the implication of recent ideas on the concept of “the principle of affected interests” and stakeholder democracy. In doing so, I define the suitable postulates and conditions of citizenship, which is compatible with global ethics, by referring critically to some of the dichotomic debates between communitarianism’s “thick moral” and cosmopolitanism’s “thin moral”; I attempt to go beyond this dichotomy, a term that is sometimes used overenthusiastically, neglecting the negative implications it may carry.

A similar uncritical stance may be observed in the reception of Kant’s notion of “the right of a stranger,” which is limited to the conditions of universal hospitality, developed in his famous piece on Perpetual Peace, a text that has been at the core of recent debates on cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan citizenship. I revisit Kant’s text to discuss the implications of his project and Derrida’s critique of Kant’s idea on the conditional hospitality of “the right of a stranger.”

After distinguishing between the “conditional hospitality” and “unconditional hospitality” of the stranger, I attempt to develop a politics and ethics of hospitality due to the stranger. I conclude with a few implications of “the politics of hospitality.”

The current global (dis)order may be regarded unjust since over a billion people suffer human rights abuse and degrading poverty.From an ethical perspective, when the institutional order of a global society fails to safeguard its members’ human rights, those who significantly collaborate in the imposition of this order should share the burden of effectively carrying out their responsibility.

Focusing on the various global issues (for example, corruption in politics, terrorism, poverty, and financial instability) viewed as negative effects of global interdependence, this paper examines if the ethics of global responsibility may be a guiding principle for the construction of a more just global society.The paper also explores how global ethics can be conceptualized in reference to the theories that have recently been put forth by ethical philosophers such as Th. Pogge and A. Linklater.

The most remarkable characteristic of terrorists is that they are the criminal as well as the enemy.Terrorists should not only be defeated by the army but also be arrested and tried for their offenses.This means that neither the protected legal status of the criminal nor that of the enemy is conferred on terrorists.

In modern criminal law, on the one hand, even a serious offender cannot be outlawed as an enemy of the community but is provided with legal protection in the criminal legal procedure.Criminals do not lose their status as members of the community and enjoy the minimum legal protection given to each citizen of the community.In modern legal thought, the criminal is clearly different from the enemy because the former retains the status as a member of our community, while the latter has no such status.

On the other hand, the enemy has been well protected in the modern international law.The distinction between the enemy and the brigand, that is, the criminal organization, has been one of the most important elements of international legal thought since Roman law of nations.The distinction has been obviously accepted in the modern, interstate conception of international law.In a war against the enemy, soldiers should not be punished for combat, unless they violate the laws of war.When captured, soldiers should not be treated as criminals but they should enjoy the status of Prisoner of War.Soldiers should not be regarded as liable for their killing and destruction in combat because they don’t act as members of the criminal organization but as members of the regular army of the State.

The criminal, who is clearly distinguished from the enemy, has been under the protection of the modern criminal law, while the enemy, who is deliberately differentiated from the criminal, has enjoyed a protected status in the modern international law.When the distinction between the criminal and the enemy is lost in legal thought, the protection conferred on both legal status categories will be deprived of its long-established foundation.

This paper aims to explore the typical theories of “evil” in order to clarify the meanings of global justice in the contemporary age.It focuses on the following theories: Immanuel Kant’s theory of practical reason, Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil, and Jacques Derrida’s theory of justice.

Kant argues that justice resides inside of legality but is not quite the same. He contends that the existence of evil indicates that this gap between justice and legality is no longer being considered.Therefore, justice in Kant’s understanding of practical reason suggests an act of conscience and a reflection upon one’s past conducts, which presumably stays inside of legality and outside of justice. Arendt argues that the evil in the contemporary age is banal, as she found in Adolf Eichmman’s court case.In the court, she found that Eichmman was a banal and ordinary law-abiding citizen, unlike the general expectation that he would be a brutal and atrocious figure.Similar to Kant, she concludes that evil exists in acts of thoughtlessness.

The relationship between legality and justice differentiates Arendt from Kant. According to Kant’s philosophy, justice resides inside of legality, whereas Arendt states that justice can be found inside and outside of legality and thus claims that a just act sometimes takes place in the form of illegal action.

Derrida also contends that some just acts can be found outside of legality, and he regards deconstruction as justice.Therefore, his deconstructive arguments are sometimes used to criticize law and given orders for the sake of justice although his concern to justice has been often undervalued by contemporary political theorists and IR scholars.

This article examines a scholarly discourse concerning the ethics of the acceptance of refugees, which has appeared in the literature of contemporary political philosophy.It focuses on the discussion not “as it is” but “as it ought to be.” The first and second sections describe selected views of communitarians and cosmopolitans.Among the communitarians, the views of Michael Walzer are outlined.Subsequently, the cosmopolitan views of Joseph Carens and the utilitarians are described.These sections imply that to some extent, harmony exists between the communitarians and the cosmopolitans regarding the acceptance of refugees.

Subsequently, the third section closely examines the points where these views are harmonized.The issues of the definition of a refugee, limits of acceptance, causal relationships, and the priority of asylum seekers are covered.This section reveals the common questions to communitarians and cosmopolitans.At the same time, it reconfirms the different approaches employed by political philosophers to ethical enquiries, in spite of their conclusions being superficially similar.

The final section briefly discusses the arguments of internally displaced persons, who have attracted the attention of scholars of international studies and those of forced migration studies.This indicates that the trend of contemporary thought after the Cold War has influenced the practice of asylum.The relation between states and the international society is currently being redefined, and in this context, the value of asylum is being seriously questioned.

This paper discusses the blind spot in “Global Responsibilities (GR).” It has been proposed that all humanity shares a GR, which includes the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P).” However, is it actually possible to fulfill responsibilities in a complex, unpredictable world? In fact, even when we attempt to fulfill our responsibilities, we experience repeated failure.In spite of good intentions and noble pronouncements, the discourse on GR did not consider the actual practice of peace-keepers in the field.To overcome the uncertainty and inconsistency that continues, we need to consider the problem of GR from the perspective of practice rather than from one of concept.

This paper clarifies the blind spot of GR according to three points.The first point is the limitations of response responsibility and collective responsibility, which are the constitutive elements of GR.Response responsibility limits the responsibility of responding of those who are actually in a position to respond. Collective responsibility is based on the premise that people have a certain sense of identity within a group, such as a nation, which constitutes the parameters of this collective responsibility.It is doubtful whether this sense of identity exists within the “international community” and, if so, whether it exists to a sufficient degree. The second point is a certain lack of clarity in the actual practice of GR, for example, in R2P.The actual content of GR becomes unclear in terms of “who,” “for whom,” and “what,” when it is put into practice.The third point is that, in practice, the complete responsibility is actually given to the peace-keepers, in that they will be held responsible for harmful consequences.Although GR remains vague from the perspective of conceptualization, those who promote GR pursue the individual responsibility of peace-keepers.

A new institutional design for GR, sufficiently cognizant of the actual practice in the field, is necessary to overcome this blind spot.

The issue of citizenship in the theory of justice has focused almost exclusively on the relationship of individuals with the domestic government-of citizens with their state. However, the condition of citizenship is dynamically changing both inside and outside of the domestic government in the era of globalization.

This paper will theorize the reflection on the notion of citizenship in hospitality, building on Derrida’s engagement with “unconditional hospitality” through the bridging of political theory, moral philosophy, and international relations theory, especially by focusing on the implication of recent ideas on the concept of “the principle of affected interests” and stakeholder democracy. In doing so, I define the suitable postulates and conditions of citizenship, which is compatible with global ethics, by referring critically to some of the dichotomic debates between communitarianism’s “thick moral” and cosmopolitanism’s “thin moral”; I attempt to go beyond this dichotomy, a term that is sometimes used overenthusiastically, neglecting the negative implications it may carry.

A similar uncritical stance may be observed in the reception of Kant’s notion of “the right of a stranger,” which is limited to the conditions of universal hospitality, developed in his famous piece on Perpetual Peace, a text that has been at the core of recent debates on cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan citizenship. I revisit Kant’s text to discuss the implications of his project and Derrida’s critique of Kant’s idea on the conditional hospitality of “the right of a stranger.”

After distinguishing between the “conditional hospitality” and “unconditional hospitality” of the stranger, I attempt to develop a politics and ethics of hospitality due to the stranger. I conclude with a few implications of “the politics of hospitality.”