Albert Einstein once said, “unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our ways of thinking.” He further suggested that this gap would generate new unthinkable wars. His warning is especially pertinent in the arena of current missile defense. This article argues that despite the assurances of missile defense (MD) advocates, MD will invite a full space war and a new version of nuclear war, which would include nuclear blasts into outer space and various military attacks on nuclear power plants, thus causing nuclear blasts similar to that of the Fukushima disaster.

A new warfare system that the United States developed in the 21st century has been called “space-based network-centric” warfare. There are three Achillesʼ heels for the emerging semi-space war system: cyberspace, outer space, and nuclear power plants.

If a hostile group was to explode a nuclear warhead 200 km over Tokyo, the whole electronic infrastructure would be shut down by the vast electromagnetic puzzle waves. At the same time, the major satellite constellation system would be broken down sooner or later. Regarding nuclear sites, currently the most vulnerable is TEPCO’s Fukushima nuclear site #1. Even a suicide car bomb could easily destroy it.

MD not only fosters military buildup to the heavens but also encourages a missile target shift from on-ground to outer space and to nuclear sites, thus opening up a new version of nuclear war. Victims would not die instantly like they did in Hiroshima and Nagasaki but instead would die over a longer period as in Chernobyl.

This article explores biotechnology and its environmental impacts, health effects, and corporate dominance. Genetically modified (GM) crops, such as soybeans, corn, and rapeseed, are sold worldwide by Monsanto and other large companies. Their main characteristics are herbicide resistance and pest resistance. While weeds are killed, herbicide-resistant GM plants flourish. Thus, even if pesticide use diminishes, the residual volume of herbicide increases. Governments are, therefore, forced to deregulate the residual standards for herbicides when herbicide-resistant GM plants are approved. So-called Roundup Ready GM plants increase consumer intake of glyphosate (the most well-known herbicide), which is carcinogenic as well as has other health effects. In Córdoba, Argentina, where the incidence of cancer has been increasing in GM crop areas, researchers consider glyphosate to be one possible cause.

Monsanto has been making improper use of intellectual property rights; for example, the company pursues compensatory damages when the wind or insects carry GM pollen to nearby locations, often resulting in the bankruptcy of American and Canadian farmers.

The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has expanded the export and import of GM plants. Pollen from GM plants is polluting wild and older races of corn in Mexico.

Monsanto’s GM cotton is driving the extinction of traditional (non-GM) cotton breeds, causing seed prices to increase. This situation has perhaps contributed to the increasing suicide rate among Indian peasants, as shown in the book and movie by Marie-Monique Robin.

Dominant companies and their agents harass important and independent researchers such as Dr. Ignacio Chapela.

A new generation of biotechnology known as genome editing has come into the spotlight in the fields of medicine and agriculture; however, there are problems such as difficulty finding off-target mutations.

“Biopolitics,” according to Foucault, concerns the natural environment and bodies, both of which are “ungovernable.” Problems with radiation risk are typically problems of governability; radiation can contaminate the whole environment and eventually damage genes and destroy the reproductive capacity of biological bodies. Because radiation can be neither seen nor sensed, problems relating to the so-called “radiation exposure safety level” become political problems concerning the scientific construction of invisible reality and the definition of its meanings for human health. We shed light on the concrete ways in which biopolitics operates in the nuclear age, running from Hiroshima to Chernobyl to Fukushima, with an eye to justice as security for biological bodies. Emphasis is placed on the controversies over so-called depleted uranium (DU) shells.

DU is a radioactive waste generated from the production of enriched uranium, which is necessary for nuclear weapons and energy. In the 1950s, the United States began research on how to dispose DU and developed antitank rounds with DU in their penetrators. DUʼs rare hardness and density are considered “ideal” for destroying tanks. Furthermore, because it is nuclear waste, it is available to the munitions industry at virtually no charge. DU weapons are said to be “revolutionary,” rendering traditional tanks virtually useless. Troublingly, however, DU starts to burn upon impact, dissolving into minute airborne radioactive particles. Once absorbed into the body, some particles remain and irradiate surrounding cells. In Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and other areas where DU rounds have been used in combat or exercises, reports cite alarming increases in cancer, leukemia, and congenital defects among the local population and the soldiers stationed in affected areas. Despite international warnings regarding its toxicity, the DU risk has been denied by its users and WHO as well.

Starting with the issue of chemical weapons such as sarin and the involvement of scientists in their development, various types of structural violence brought on by pesticides are discussed; in particular, the severe negative influences on the brain development of children caused by a newly introduced pesticide-neonicotinoidare focused upon.

Finally, examples of overcoming this type of violence through organic farming are introduced, some of which could bring peace without hunger to this troubled world.

The author is a board member of the Asian Rural Institute and a former professor of chemistry at the International Christian University.

Is confrontation between the economy and ecology out of date? The school of ecological modernization (EM) supposes that ecotechnology would enable environmental preservation without relinquishing economic growth. Such an idea is the prevailing discourse in the realm of environmental policies in advanced societies today. However, it is important to verify the theoretical availability of EM if we intend to commit ourselves to environmental issues and contribute to the theme of peace and technology. In particular, publication of The Ecological Modernisation Reader promotes public discussion on the achievements, prospects, and limits of EM.

The first section of this article describes the development of EM and discusses its theoretical feature. It is probably useful to refer to other critical standpoints such as neo-Marxism and deep ecology to recognize its technocentric approach, which tries to transcend industrial modernity. EM, which promises a moderate solution for ecological crises, is associated with the concept of sustainable development and is therefore acceptable even to business executives. Such a story reinforces my hypothesis: EM is a counter-discourse against the counter-discourse of the 1980s, when capitalism and technology were regarded as the main causes of environmental destruction.

Such an argument suggests further questions. In the second section, we investigate whether EM has absorbed anything from the theory of reflexive modernity. Typology of the weak and strong versions is also meaningful.

Theory should be accompanied by empirical verification. The third section refers to a comparative study that illustrates that Germany is closest to having the ideal type of strong EM. However, I insist that there is neither theoretical nor empirical evidence for the transition from weak EM to strong EM. It is only a typological category of environmental political modes. The program of German red-green federal government was a typical weak EM.

This paper provides a historical analysis of the Special Permission for Residence (SPR), a discretionary measure of relief for undocumented immigrants in Japan until the 1970s, the period before the Japanese government signed the Refugee Convention. SPR deserves close attention in the sense that it has served as a strategic measure to make Japanese immigration system work for the authority’s purposes. According to the Immigration Bureau, decisions to grant permission are made from two apparently incompatible points of view, namely,“humanitarian considerations”and“national interests,”although it seems that the latter has always been given priority over the former in actual cases. It needs to be explained how this relief measure was incorporated and utilized in the postwar Japanʼs immigration control system.

The historical origin of the SPR in Japan was the relief measure during the Allied Occupation granted to illegalized immigrants, Korean in most cases, based on a petition submitted to the General Headquarters. After the restoration of sovereignty, as the South Korean government refused to accept deportees, the Japanese government reintroduced this relief measure, from an allegedly “humanitarian”standpoint, for those to be deported. Thus, the SPR functioned as a complement to postwar Japanʼs foreign policy of reincorporating itself into the international community while avoiding postcolonial responsibilities. On the other hand, the SPR was never applied to political refugees in spite of the existence of those seeking asylum in Japan. It was in this situation that three cases in court filed in the 1960s functioned as challenges to Japanʼs immigration policy. The results of these cases showed that Japanʼs immigration authority was never tolerant of any substantial restrictions to its large discretionary power over immigrants.

Namely, the authority succeeded in reversing the judgement to restrict its discretionary power by a particular international norm, a political offense exception in extradition, whereas it did not strongly resist the judgement to restrict its discretionary power by an universal but abstract humanitarian principle.

In the wake of the gang rape of a teenage girl by U.S. marines in Okinawa in 1995, local feminists led protests against the insecurity experienced by women and girls in the name of national security, defining sexual assaults by U. S. soldiers as “structural violence” caused by the presence of a military that upheld militarism and sexism. It was also during this time that the invisibility and impunity of sexual violence under conflicts was problematized around the world, leading to the strengthening of international institutions to address the issue. However, after 20 years, sexual assaults by U.S. military-related persons (including soldiers, civilian workers, and their families) in Japan continue to occur despite repeated promises of prevention by both governments in the face of the deepening of U.S.Japan military cooperation. How much has the state response to military sexual violence changed in practice?

This paper examines Japanese criminal justice responses to sexual assaults committed by U.S. military-related persons stationed in Japan since 2000, focusing on the criminal justice system as a major institution through which sexual violence by allied forces is normalized despite the strengthened international norms on women’s rights in international security. Much literature points to the unequal nature of the Status of Forces Agreement, restricting the sovereign power of Japan as well as subordinating the practices of Japanese authorities, as a major factor leading to the impunity of crimes committed by U.S. military-related persons.

Although the unequal relationship with the United States affects the way those crimes are handled, one should not neglect how Japanʼs discriminative sexual violence laws and institutional practices facilitate Japanese authorities in dropping charges in more than 80% of sexual assault cases.

By examining the data of Japanese criminal justice institutions, this paper confirms that sexual assaults by U.S. military-related persons continue to pose a constant threat to communities that host military bases, and impunity is rampant even after the 1995 gang rape case, although access to the information of the U.S. military is limited. Further, by examining cases in which Japanese prosecutors have failed to indict, the author discusses how discriminative institutional arrangements, inappropriate investigation practices, and social biases play crucial roles in discouraging victims to file complaints and facilitate the dropping of charges by prosecutors. Finally, the author discusses how the Japanese state and the U.S. military jointly construct an image of the U.S. military as a well-disciplined force and thus legitimize the failure of the Japanese state to indict sexual assaults, which further denies justice to the victims.

Why do intervening states have difficulty deciding whether to withdraw from armed peace operations? Previously, it has been argued that intervening states lack the will or ability to plan exit strategies, but this paper argues that even with those traits, they struggle with justifying withdrawal.

When intervention begins, intervening states need internal and international support. From the intervening statesʼ perspective, it is necessary to portray the intervention objective as a “just cause” to obtain as much support as possible. Intervention objectives tend to be ambiguous. For example, if an intervening state announces that its objective is to “prevent hotbeds of terrorism,” almost all states and people will agree with the objective because they can interpret it to suit their own purposes.

However, ambiguous objectives are accompanied by complex criteria with which to evaluate whether those objectives have been achieved. For example, if the objective is to “prevent hotbeds of terrorism,” does this goal require the elimination of all terrorists in the intervened states or does it only mean protecting civilians until the intervened statesʼ security forces are prepared to protect them?

Given this ambiguity, termination factions emphasize the least demanding criteria for achievement of the objective, for example, that protecting civilians has been achieved. In contrast, continuation factions emphasize the most demanding criteria, for example, that the elimination of all terrorists has not been achieved. Owing to these different evaluation criteria, the continuation factions fail to persuade the termination factions and vice versa. Thus, both factions end up talking past each other.

In summary, ambiguous objectives may justify intervention, but the very same objectives may not necessarily justify withdrawal. Every advantage has its disadvantage. Intervening states face a dilemma that I will refer to as the dilemma of exit strategy.

Albert Einstein once said, “unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our ways of thinking.” He further suggested that this gap would generate new unthinkable wars. His warning is especially pertinent in the arena of current missile defense. This article argues that despite the assurances of missile defense (MD) advocates, MD will invite a full space war and a new version of nuclear war, which would include nuclear blasts into outer space and various military attacks on nuclear power plants, thus causing nuclear blasts similar to that of the Fukushima disaster.

A new warfare system that the United States developed in the 21st century has been called “space-based network-centric” warfare. There are three Achilles’ heels for the emerging semi-space war system: cyberspace, outer space, and nuclear power plants.

If a hostile group was to explode a nuclear warhead 200 km over Tokyo, the whole electronic infrastructure would be shut down by the vast electromagnetic puzzle waves. At the same time, the major satellite constellation system would be broken down sooner or later. Regarding nuclear sites, currently the most vulnerable is TEPCO’s Fukushima nuclear site #1. Even a suicide car bomb could easily destroy it.

MD not only fosters military buildup to the heavens but also encourages a missile target shift from on-ground to outer space and to nuclear sites, thus opening up a new version of nuclear war. Victims would not die instantly like they did in Hiroshima and Nagasaki but instead would die over a longer period as in Chernobyl.

This article explores biotechnology and its environmental impacts, health effects, and corporate dominance. Genetically modified (GM) crops, such as soybeans, corn, and rapeseed, are sold worldwide by Monsanto and other large companies. Their main characteristics are herbicide resistance and pest resistance. While weeds are killed, herbicide-resistant GM plants flourish. Thus, even if pesticide use diminishes, the residual volume of herbicide increases. Governments are, therefore, forced to deregulate the residual standards for herbicides when herbicide-resistant GM plants are approved. So-called Roundup Ready GM plants increase consumer intake of glyphosate (the most well-known herbicide), which is carcinogenic as well as has other health effects. In Córdoba, Argentina, where the incidence of cancer has been increasing in GM crop areas, researchers consider glyphosate to be one possible cause.

Monsanto has been making improper use of intellectual property rights; for example, the company pursues compensatory damages when the wind or insects carry GM pollen to nearby locations, often resulting in the bankruptcy of American and Canadian farmers.

The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has expanded the export and import of GM plants. Pollen from GM plants is polluting wild and older races of corn in Mexico.

Monsanto’s GM cotton is driving the extinction of traditional (non-GM) cotton breeds, causing seed prices to increase. This situation has perhaps contributed to the increasing suicide rate among Indian peasants, as shown in the book and movie by Marie-Monique Robin.

Dominant companies and their agents harass important and independent researchers such as Dr. Ignacio Chapela.

A new generation of biotechnology known as genome editing has come into the spotlight in the fields of medicine and agriculture; however, there are problems such as difficulty finding off-target mutations.

“Biopolitics,” according to Foucault, concerns the natural environment and bodies, both of which are “ungovernable.” Problems with radiation risk are typically problems of governability; radiation can contaminate the whole environment and eventually damage genes and destroy the reproductive capacity of biological bodies. Because radiation can be neither seen nor sensed, problems relating to the so-called “radiation exposure safety level” become political problems concerning the scientific construction of invisible reality and the definition of its meanings for human health. We shed light on the concrete ways in which biopolitics operates in the nuclear age, running from Hiroshima to Chernobyl to Fukushima, with an eye to justice as security for biological bodies. Emphasis is placed on the controversies over so-called depleted uranium (DU) shells.

DU is a radioactive waste generated from the production of enriched uranium, which is necessary for nuclear weapons and energy. In the 1950s, the United States began research on how to dispose DU and developed antitank rounds with DU in their penetrators. DUʼs rare hardness and density are considered “ideal” for destroying tanks. Furthermore, because it is nuclear waste, it is available to the munitions industry at virtually no charge. DU weapons are said to be “revolutionary,” rendering traditional tanks virtually useless. Troublingly, however, DU starts to burn upon impact, dissolving into minute airborne radioactive particles. Once absorbed into the body, some particles remain and irradiate surrounding cells. In Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and other areas where DU rounds have been used in combat or exercises, reports cite alarming increases in cancer, leukemia, and congenital defects among the local population and the soldiers stationed in affected areas. Despite international warnings regarding its toxicity, the DU risk has been denied by its users and WHO as well.

Starting with the issue of chemical weapons such as sarin and the involvement of scientists in their development, various types of structural violence brought on by pesticides are discussed; in particular, the severe negative influences on the brain development of children caused by a newly introduced pesticide-neonicotinoidare focused upon.

Finally, examples of overcoming this type of violence through organic farming are introduced, some of which could bring peace without hunger to this troubled world.

The author is a board member of the Asian Rural Institute and a former professor of chemistry at the International Christian University.

Is confrontation between the economy and ecology out of date? The school of ecological modernization (EM) supposes that ecotechnology would enable environmental preservation without relinquishing economic growth. Such an idea is the prevailing discourse in the realm of environmental policies in advanced societies today. However, it is important to verify the theoretical availability of EM if we intend to commit ourselves to environmental issues and contribute to the theme of peace and technology. In particular, publication of The Ecological Modernisation Reader promotes public discussion on the achievements, prospects, and limits of EM.

The first section of this article describes the development of EM and discusses its theoretical feature. It is probably useful to refer to other critical standpoints such as neo-Marxism and deep ecology to recognize its technocentric approach, which tries to transcend industrial modernity. EM, which promises a moderate solution for ecological crises, is associated with the concept of sustainable development and is therefore acceptable even to business executives. Such a story reinforces my hypothesis: EM is a counter-discourse against the counter-discourse of the 1980s, when capitalism and technology were regarded as the main causes of environmental destruction.

Such an argument suggests further questions. In the second section, we investigate whether EM has absorbed anything from the theory of reflexive modernity. Typology of the weak and strong versions is also meaningful.

Theory should be accompanied by empirical verification. The third section refers to a comparative study that illustrates that Germany is closest to having the ideal type of strong EM. However, I insist that there is neither theoretical nor empirical evidence for the transition from weak EM to strong EM. It is only a typological category of environmental political modes. The program of German red-green federal government was a typical weak EM.

This paper provides a historical analysis of the Special Permission for Residence (SPR), a discretionary measure of relief for undocumented immigrants in Japan until the 1970s, the period before the Japanese government signed the Refugee Convention. SPR deserves close attention in the sense that it has served as a strategic measure to make Japanese immigration system work for the authority’s purposes. According to the Immigration Bureau, decisions to grant permission are made from two apparently incompatible points of view, namely, “humanitarian considerations” and “national interests, ” although it seems that the latter has always been given priority over the former in actual cases. It needs to be explained how this relief measure was incorporated and utilized in the postwar Japanʼs immigration control system.

The historical origin of the SPR in Japan was the relief measure during the Allied Occupation granted to illegalized immigrants, Korean in most cases, based on a petition submitted to the General Headquarters. After the restoration of sovereignty, as the South Korean government refused to accept deportees, the Japanese government reintroduced this relief measure, from an allegedly “humanitarian” standpoint, for those to be deported. Thus, the SPR functioned as a complement to postwar Japanʼs foreign policy of reincorporating itself into the international community while avoiding postcolonial responsibilities. On the other hand, the SPR was never applied to political refugees in spite of the existence of those seeking asylum in Japan. It was in this situation that three cases in court filed in the 1960s functioned as challenges to Japanʼs immigration policy. The results of these cases showed that Japanʼs immigration authority was never tolerant of any substantial restrictions to its large discretionary power over immigrants.

Namely, the authority succeeded in reversing the judgement to restrict its discretionary power by a particular international norm, a political offense exception in extradition, whereas it did not strongly resist the judgement to restrict its discretionary power by an universal but abstract humanitarian principle.

In the wake of the gang rape of a teenage girl by U.S. marines in Okinawa in 1995, local feminists led protests against the insecurity experienced by women and girls in the name of national security, defining sexual assaults by U. S. soldiers as “structural violence” caused by the presence of a military that upheld militarism and sexism. It was also during this time that the invisibility and impunity of sexual violence under conflicts was problematized around the world, leading to the strengthening of international institutions to address the issue. However, after 20 years, sexual assaults by U.S. military-related persons (including soldiers, civilian workers, and their families) in Japan continue to occur despite repeated promises of prevention by both governments in the face of the deepening of U.S.Japan military cooperation. How much has the state response to military sexual violence changed in practice?

This paper examines Japanese criminal justice responses to sexual assaults committed by U.S. military-related persons stationed in Japan since 2000, focusing on the criminal justice system as a major institution through which sexual violence by allied forces is normalized despite the strengthened international norms on women’s rights in international security. Much literature points to the unequal nature of the Status of Forces Agreement, restricting the sovereign power of Japan as well as subordinating the practices of Japanese authorities, as a major factor leading to the impunity of crimes committed by U.S. military-related persons.

Although the unequal relationship with the United States affects the way those crimes are handled, one should not neglect how Japanʼs discriminative sexual violence laws and institutional practices facilitate Japanese authorities in dropping charges in more than 80% of sexual assault cases.

By examining the data of Japanese criminal justice institutions, this paper confirms that sexual assaults by U.S. military-related persons continue to pose a constant threat to communities that host military bases, and impunity is rampant even after the 1995 gang rape case, although access to the information of the U.S. military is limited. Further, by examining cases in which Japanese prosecutors have failed to indict, the author discusses how discriminative institutional arrangements, inappropriate investigation practices, and social biases play crucial roles in discouraging victims to file complaints and facilitate the dropping of charges by prosecutors. Finally, the author discusses how the Japanese state and the U.S. military jointly construct an image of the U.S. military as a well-disciplined force and thus legitimize the failure of the Japanese state to indict sexual assaults, which further denies justice to the victims.

Why do intervening states have difficulty deciding whether to withdraw from armed peace operations? Previously, it has been argued that intervening states lack the will or ability to plan exit strategies, but this paper argues that even with those traits, they struggle with justifying withdrawal.

When intervention begins, intervening states need internal and international support. From the intervening statesʼ perspective, it is necessary to portray the intervention objective as a “just cause” to obtain as much support as possible. Intervention objectives tend to be ambiguous. For example, if an intervening state announces that its objective is to “prevent hotbeds of terrorism,” almost all states and people will agree with the objective because they can interpret it to suit their own purposes.

However, ambiguous objectives are accompanied by complex criteria with which to evaluate whether those objectives have been achieved. For example, if the objective is to “prevent hotbeds of terrorism,” does this goal require the elimination of all terrorists in the intervened states or does it only mean protecting civilians until the intervened statesʼ security forces are prepared to protect them?

Given this ambiguity, termination factions emphasize the least demanding criteria for achievement of the objective, for example, that protecting civilians has been achieved. In contrast, continuation factions emphasize the most demanding criteria, for example, that the elimination of all terrorists has not been achieved. Owing to these different evaluation criteria, the continuation factions fail to persuade the termination factions and vice versa. Thus, both factions end up talking past each other.

In summary, ambiguous objectives may justify intervention, but the very same objectives may not necessarily justify withdrawal. Every advantage has its disadvantage. Intervening states face a dilemma that I will refer to as the dilemma of exit strategy.