The impact of the US-led War on Terror has received a great deal of attention in the field of international law governing warfare. The emergence of a global battlefield suggests the declining relevance of the concept of the localized battlefield and the regulatory function of the laws of war, as the use of unmanned drones in conducting trans-border targeted killings exemplifies.

The dominant narrative of international legal studies is that the laws of war―whose contemporary expression is international humanitarian law―date back to the 19th century, when a classic battlefield was normatively constructed in Europe. The Battle of Solferino is remembered as among the most typical battles wherein two opposed organized armies clashed in the field. The battlefield was the geographical and normative foundation of the laws of war.

Though technological and intellectual developments in the 20th century posed multifaceted challenges to the concept of the battlefield, it is the post-9/11 security narrative that has prompted a fundamental transformation of the practice and regulation of warfare. War is not only conducted by the opposing parties, but it is also constructed by a legal and political discourse.

The contemporary reality is such that the battlefield unfolds everywhere in the globe, a phenomenon legitimized by the concomitant normative development on the use of force against non-state entities. The traditional boundaries between international and internal armed conflicts are now effectively redrawn to expand the space for the use of force beyond national borders. The threshold of selfdefense, a jus ad bellum doctrine for armed conflicts of inter-state character, is being so lowered that even the mere inability to prevent a terrorist attack is considered enough to legitimize a resort to force by the victim state.

The normative transformation of warfare is clearly and technically driven by legal experts. Under the prevailing circumstances, international lawyers who are committed to Peace Studies are urged to revisit their intellectual environment in an attempt to reformulate the roles properly played by socially responsible academics.

Our construction of meaning may be shaped by one of two possible approaches to phenomena. The first assumes a set of concrete facts, existing in the material world, which may be used as the basis of analysis. This process results in the development of a conceptual interpretation of the phenomenon, which may then be applied more broadly in order to ascribe meaning to other situations or events. The second approach involves the analysis of an abstract principle as the starting point of inquiry, leading to the development of a general theory.

If these two perspectives are applied to peace studies, the former approach will involve the exploration of specific conflicts that have occurred in the history of the world. Through such an exploration, a theory of conflict resolution may be developed. An alternative course of inquiry might be to examine the notion of peace itself as an abstract or theoretical construct. Both approaches to the subject may be viewed as equally valid. However, the narrative that has been produced by the United Nations on the subject of the Rule of Law derives its meaning from the analysis of a set of assumed concepts, without there being reference to specific facts or empirical evidence. In this respect, its narrative may be seen to be flawed in that it fails to take into account world history; it also does not provide clarity with regard to the activities of the international organization. This omission should be viewed as a matter of concern, given that the charter of this organization enables it to use force in the resolution of perceived conflict.

As the use of force is mostly prohibited in today’s inter-state relations, political and often militarized conflicts among sub-national groups are what will threaten peace and human security the most. However, the primary interest of international legal scholarship has not been the structural instabilities of internal governance, but rather, the post-hoc management of the ensuing humanitarian atrocities. In reality, such political unrest is rooted in international relations, without an understanding of which we could not reach the appropriate solutions to this problem. Of particular importance is the fact that the requirements for statehood under international law went through a profound change in the process of post-war decolonization, significantly influencing the internal structure of newlyindependent states. In this paper, I attempt to shed light on the essential background of political instabilities in these new states through an analysis of the functions of the “right to self-determination.” On the one hand, this right forcefully advanced the independence of colonies, even though these colonies generally lacked an effective governmental structure. On the other hand, it required each new state to implement statehood after achieving independence by making the government truly representative of all citizens. This logical link between the external and internal aspects of self-determination is the conceptual basis that enables us to identify the root cause of social unrest in developing countries, and to find an effective remedy for it.

Norms and systems of international criminal justice are rapidly developing through the creation and activities of international criminal tribunals and courts. At the same time however, their functions and impacts have been variously criticized. In addition to the traditional “peace vs. justice” debate, there is an emerging question of whether the pursuit of justice through international criminal mechanisms truly meets the needs and expectations of local communities that have been victims of heinous crimes. This becomes a crucial issue as international criminal justice comes to be regarded as an important tool for the implementation of “transitional justice,” which focuses on the people affected by violence. Critics of international criminal justice argue that local communities do not welcome international tribunals and courts because trials do not concord with local customs and understandings of justice. However, empirical studies on conflict-affected societies show that among local populations, particularly among victims of crimes and violence, there is substantial support for criminal justice. Instead, local dissatisfaction stems from the way the international community approaches trials. Past cases show that local people have been unhappy about the lack of information on the international criminal justice process and their direct participation in it and have taken issue with the international standard of justice regarding jurisdiction and punishment. More substantially, there is a potential tension between international justice and local justice based on their different conceptions of the function of international criminal justice: the former sees international trials as important for consolidating international norms, whereas the latter sees them as a tool of transitional justice that serves the victims. These two views currently coexist, but there is no clear criterion by which to prioritize them when they come into conflict. This illustrates how international criminal justice has come to embody multiple functions and expectations for different constituencies of the world. It suggests both great possibilities and challenges for international criminal justice.

Shortly after September 11, 2001, the US administration, headed by former President George W. Bush, declared that it was engaged in a War on Terror (or War against Terrorism). This “war” was seen as a single worldwide international armed conflict against a non-state actor (Al-Qa’ida).

The present administration, headed by President Barack Obama, does not use this or any similar expression. According to the administration, the US is currently engaged in a non-international armed conflict with the Al-Qa’ida and its associated forces. Yet it commonly looks at terrorism within a war or armed conflict paradigm. In this sense, there are important similarities in howthe two administrations deal with terrorism.

In this article, the author discusses the interrelationship between terrorism and international humanitarian law (IHL). Since the applicability of IHL is dependent on the existence of an armed conflict situation, clarifying this concept is of first importance. After a brief look at the concept of terrorism, this paper analyzes howarmed conflicts are categorized in IHL and considers howparties to armed conflicts are conceptualized. In this vein, it is argued that it would be difficult for terrorist groups to qualify as parties to armed conflict.

Historically, the international community has taken actions against terrorism from the perspective of international criminal law (ICL). Indeed, there exist many international legal instruments designed to prevent designated “terroristic” activities and punish individual perpetrators (ICL treaties). However, the context in which terrorist acts are committed is not limited to so-called peacetime. The second half of this article is devoted to the question of the interplay between these ICL treaties and IHL. An analytical focus is placed on regime setting clauses or exclusionary clauses in the treaties.

This article analyzes Tachi Sakutaro’s international legal doctrines in relation to the Manchurian Incident, in particular, his academic response to the Manchukuo recognition problem. It focuses on the historical significance of the incident, stemming not so much from military confrontations between Japan and China as from political intrigues behind the creation of Manchukuo and Japan’s recognition of that “puppet state.”

At the time, Tachi was a leading Japanese international lawyer and legal advisor to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His published works on the Sino-Japanese conflict mostly reflected the official views of the Japanese government. Tachi has been described as a naive intellectual whose academic efforts were dedicated to the rationalization of Japan’s expansionism in the abstract universalistic terms of international law. This article presents a different picture of Tachi Sakutaro.

It looks at Tachi both as a lawyer and as an eminent historian, who had substantial comprehension of East Asian international relations. He founded the diplomatic history course at the Imperial University of Tokyo. He was also appointed private tutor for diplomatic history to Emperor Hirohito, and remained in that position for 10 years.

Tachi maintained personal contact with Makino Nobuaki, a liberal-minded politician in those times. During the Manchurian Incident, Makino served as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and was the Emperor’s closest advisor. From that position, he influenced government policy-making and tried to restrain the insubordinate expansionist moves of the Kwantung Army. Tachi sent personal letters to Makino, giving him his academic judgments on the Manchurian situation and other relevant legal problems. An analysis of these letters reveals that Tachi’s justification of Japan’s unilateral recognition of Manchukuo in fact contradicted his academic judgment on the issue.

Tachi’s published article also justified Japan’s unilateral recognition of Manchukuo and yet contained indirect criticism of the same policy in addition to the suggestion that the Japanese government avoid excessive unilateralism. These observations lead to a more nuanced understanding of Tachi Sakutaro, a man who, while being faithful to his office and consciously playing the role of an apologist of Japanese imperialism, tried to moderate the course of Japan’s foreign relations.

Through this article, I aim to reevaluate the classic just war theory and defense it against major criticism. The criticism the theory has garnered is due to its unique legal structure, or composition, which is entirely different from that of major modern international theories. One of the tasks I have undertaken is to clarify the differences between the legal structures of the classic just war theory and that of modern international theories. My main task is to highlight the fact that the unique theoretical structure of the classic just war theory can contribute toward limiting and restraining a war, and eventually lead to peace itself. The key concept of the structure is proportionality.

The concept of proportionality has been articulated, as in the Naulilaa case, as a requirement for reprisals. The impact or the scope of the use of force in general, however, has not been fully determined because the inter-war period was referred to as a transitional period for the law prohibiting the use of force. After World War II, reprisals were banned as illegal use of force, and this meant that the requirement of proportionality itself was outdated.

I trace the roots of the concept of proportionality in classic just war theory. The reevaluation of the theory thus leads to a reevaluation of the concept of proportionality. This means that the historical continuity of the concept of proportionality is confirmed by its presence in the classic just war theory; the significance of the concept in military issues is characterized as a consequence of the legal and theoretical structure of the classic just war theory. By following these steps, through this article, I will provide, in some way, a new viewpoint for the regulation of the use of force.

The impact of the US-led War on Terror has received a great deal of attention in the field of international law governing warfare. The emergence of a global battlefield suggests the declining relevance of the concept of the localized battlefield and the regulatory function of the laws of war, as the use of unmanned drones in conducting trans-border targeted killings exemplifies.

The dominant narrative of international legal studies is that the laws of war―whose contemporary expression is international humanitarian law―date back to the 19th century, when a classic battlefield was normatively constructed in Europe. The Battle of Solferino is remembered as among the most typical battles wherein two opposed organized armies clashed in the field. The battlefield was the geographical and normative foundation of the laws of war.

Though technological and intellectual developments in the 20th century posed multifaceted challenges to the concept of the battlefield, it is the post-9/11 security narrative that has prompted a fundamental transformation of the practice and regulation of warfare. War is not only conducted by the opposing parties, but it is also constructed by a legal and political discourse.

The contemporary reality is such that the battlefield unfolds everywhere in the globe, a phenomenon legitimized by the concomitant normative development on the use of force against non-state entities. The traditional boundaries between international and internal armed conflicts are now effectively redrawn to expand the space for the use of force beyond national borders. The threshold of selfdefense, a jus ad bellum doctrine for armed conflicts of inter-state character, is being so lowered that even the mere inability to prevent a terrorist attack is considered enough to legitimize a resort to force by the victim state.

The normative transformation of warfare is clearly and technically driven by legal experts. Under the prevailing circumstances, international lawyers who are committed to Peace Studies are urged to revisit their intellectual environment in an attempt to reformulate the roles properly played by socially responsible academics.

Our construction of meaning may be shaped by one of two possible approaches to phenomena. The first assumes a set of concrete facts, existing in the material world, which may be used as the basis of analysis. This process results in the development of a conceptual interpretation of the phenomenon, which may then be applied more broadly in order to ascribe meaning to other situations or events. The second approach involves the analysis of an abstract principle as the starting point of inquiry, leading to the development of a general theory.

If these two perspectives are applied to peace studies, the former approach will involve the exploration of specific conflicts that have occurred in the history of the world. Through such an exploration, a theory of conflict resolution may be developed. An alternative course of inquiry might be to examine the notion of peace itself as an abstract or theoretical construct. Both approaches to the subject may be viewed as equally valid. However, the narrative that has been produced by the United Nations on the subject of the Rule of Law derives its meaning from the analysis of a set of assumed concepts, without there being reference to specific facts or empirical evidence. In this respect, its narrative may be seen to be flawed in that it fails to take into account world history; it also does not provide clarity with regard to the activities of the international organization. This omission should be viewed as a matter of concern, given that the charter of this organization enables it to use force in the resolution of perceived conflict.

As the use of force is mostly prohibited in today’s inter-state relations, political and often militarized conflicts among sub-national groups are what will threaten peace and human security the most. However, the primary interest of international legal scholarship has not been the structural instabilities of internal governance, but rather, the post-hoc management of the ensuing humanitarian atrocities. In reality, such political unrest is rooted in international relations, without an understanding of which we could not reach the appropriate solutions to this problem. Of particular importance is the fact that the requirements for statehood under international law went through a profound change in the process of post-war decolonization, significantly influencing the internal structure of newlyindependent states. In this paper, I attempt to shed light on the essential background of political instabilities in these new states through an analysis of the functions of the “right to self-determination.” On the one hand, this right forcefully advanced the independence of colonies, even though these colonies generally lacked an effective governmental structure. On the other hand, it required each new state to implement statehood after achieving independence by making the government truly representative of all citizens. This logical link between the external and internal aspects of self-determination is the conceptual basis that enables us to identify the root cause of social unrest in developing countries, and to find an effective remedy for it.

Norms and systems of international criminal justice are rapidly developing through the creation and activities of international criminal tribunals and courts. At the same time however, their functions and impacts have been variously criticized. In addition to the traditional “peace vs. justice” debate, there is an emerging question of whether the pursuit of justice through international criminal mechanisms truly meets the needs and expectations of local communities that have been victims of heinous crimes. This becomes a crucial issue as international criminal justice comes to be regarded as an important tool for the implementation of “transitional justice,” which focuses on the people affected by violence. Critics of international criminal justice argue that local communities do not welcome international tribunals and courts because trials do not concord with local customs and understandings of justice. However, empirical studies on conflict-affected societies show that among local populations, particularly among victims of crimes and violence, there is substantial support for criminal justice. Instead, local dissatisfaction stems from the way the international community approaches trials. Past cases show that local people have been unhappy about the lack of information on the international criminal justice process and their direct participation in it and have taken issue with the international standard of justice regarding jurisdiction and punishment. More substantially, there is a potential tension between international justice and local justice based on their different conceptions of the function of international criminal justice: the former sees international trials as important for consolidating international norms, whereas the latter sees them as a tool of transitional justice that serves the victims. These two views currently coexist, but there is no clear criterion by which to prioritize them when they come into conflict. This illustrates how international criminal justice has come to embody multiple functions and expectations for different constituencies of the world. It suggests both great possibilities and challenges for international criminal justice.

Shortly after September 11, 2001, the US administration, headed by former President George W. Bush, declared that it was engaged in a War on Terror (or War against Terrorism). This “war” was seen as a single worldwide international armed conflict against a non-state actor (Al-Qa’ida).

The present administration, headed by President Barack Obama, does not use this or any similar expression. According to the administration, the US is currently engaged in a non-international armed conflict with the Al-Qa’ida and its associated forces. Yet it commonly looks at terrorism within a war or armed conflict paradigm. In this sense, there are important similarities in howthe two administrations deal with terrorism.

In this article, the author discusses the interrelationship between terrorism and international humanitarian law (IHL). Since the applicability of IHL is dependent on the existence of an armed conflict situation, clarifying this concept is of first importance. After a brief look at the concept of terrorism, this paper analyzes howarmed conflicts are categorized in IHL and considers howparties to armed conflicts are conceptualized. In this vein, it is argued that it would be difficult for terrorist groups to qualify as parties to armed conflict.

Historically, the international community has taken actions against terrorism from the perspective of international criminal law (ICL). Indeed, there exist many international legal instruments designed to prevent designated “terroristic” activities and punish individual perpetrators (ICL treaties). However, the context in which terrorist acts are committed is not limited to so-called peacetime. The second half of this article is devoted to the question of the interplay between these ICL treaties and IHL. An analytical focus is placed on regime setting clauses or exclusionary clauses in the treaties.

This article analyzes Tachi Sakutaro’s international legal doctrines in relation to the Manchurian Incident, in particular, his academic response to the Manchukuo recognition problem. It focuses on the historical significance of the incident, stemming not so much from military confrontations between Japan and China as from political intrigues behind the creation of Manchukuo and Japan’s recognition of that “puppet state.”

At the time, Tachi was a leading Japanese international lawyer and legal advisor to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His published works on the Sino-Japanese conflict mostly reflected the official views of the Japanese government. Tachi has been described as a naive intellectual whose academic efforts were dedicated to the rationalization of Japan’s expansionism in the abstract universalistic terms of international law. This article presents a different picture of Tachi Sakutaro.

It looks at Tachi both as a lawyer and as an eminent historian, who had substantial comprehension of East Asian international relations. He founded the diplomatic history course at the Imperial University of Tokyo. He was also appointed private tutor for diplomatic history to Emperor Hirohito, and remained in that position for 10 years.

Tachi maintained personal contact with Makino Nobuaki, a liberal-minded politician in those times. During the Manchurian Incident, Makino served as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and was the Emperor’s closest advisor. From that position, he influenced government policy-making and tried to restrain the insubordinate expansionist moves of the Kwantung Army. Tachi sent personal letters to Makino, giving him his academic judgments on the Manchurian situation and other relevant legal problems. An analysis of these letters reveals that Tachi’s justification of Japan’s unilateral recognition of Manchukuo in fact contradicted his academic judgment on the issue.

Tachi’s published article also justified Japan’s unilateral recognition of Manchukuo and yet contained indirect criticism of the same policy in addition to the suggestion that the Japanese government avoid excessive unilateralism. These observations lead to a more nuanced understanding of Tachi Sakutaro, a man who, while being faithful to his office and consciously playing the role of an apologist of Japanese imperialism, tried to moderate the course of Japan’s foreign relations.

Through this article, I aim to reevaluate the classic just war theory and defense it against major criticism. The criticism the theory has garnered is due to its unique legal structure, or composition, which is entirely different from that of major modern international theories. One of the tasks I have undertaken is to clarify the differences between the legal structures of the classic just war theory and that of modern international theories. My main task is to highlight the fact that the unique theoretical structure of the classic just war theory can contribute toward limiting and restraining a war, and eventually lead to peace itself. The key concept of the structure is proportionality.

The concept of proportionality has been articulated, as in the Naulilaa case, as a requirement for reprisals. The impact or the scope of the use of force in general, however, has not been fully determined because the inter-war period was referred to as a transitional period for the law prohibiting the use of force. After World War II, reprisals were banned as illegal use of force, and this meant that the requirement of proportionality itself was outdated.

I trace the roots of the concept of proportionality in classic just war theory. The reevaluation of the theory thus leads to a reevaluation of the concept of proportionality. This means that the historical continuity of the concept of proportionality is confirmed by its presence in the classic just war theory; the significance of the concept in military issues is characterized as a consequence of the legal and theoretical structure of the classic just war theory. By following these steps, through this article, I will provide, in some way, a new viewpoint for the regulation of the use of force.