It has been debated whether Locke holds direct realism or representative theory of perception. This paper examines the key concept, things themselves, to help determine that Locke is really a supporter of representative theory of perception. Yolton's view of things themselves — its emphasis on natural history of the day — is criticized for not adequately dealing with another decisive feature of things themselves — the corpuscular structure of the body. With this latter concept considered, Locke's idea should be seen as immediate object of mind, indicating that things themselves cannot be perceived in a direct way.

This paper intends to show that Adam Ferguson's moral philosophy has a body of theory, and that it follows the tradition of Scottish Philosophy. The tradition has 3 characteristics: 1. method of observation, 2. introspection, 3. a priori principles. Ferguson insists on the natural historian's method to find the ultimate facts, which are the superior facts that every theory must depend on.
As for the moral approbation, he explains it by the law of estimation — the ultimate fact. The law can also be the guiding principle of man's good actions, since this moral approbation is accompanied with simple emotions of admiration or contempt.

This paper examines J. G. A.Pocock's interpretation of Edmund Burke. Pocock's interpretation of Burke is well known among scholars of Burke's thought, but its relevance to other interpretations of Burke is not so clear.
I make it clear that Pocock's interpretation can be read as a counterargument to the Namier school, who regarded Burke as an opportunist.
This type of the interpretation propounded by the Namier school was virtually denied by the Natural Law Interpretation of Burke, which was offered by the American political philosophers under the influence of Leo Strauss.
Pocock's interpretation is an counterargument not only to the Namier school but also to the Natural Law Interpretation.
Through this examination, I suggest some implications of Pocock's interpretation in helping to appreciate the pragmatic aspects of Burk's thought.

In this paper, I will focus on Bernard Williams' discussion on reasons for action. He takes a position called ‘internalism’, and claims that a statement ‘A has a reason to φ' is true if and only if there is a sound deliberative route from A's subjective motivational set to A's φ-ing. I will examine the necessary connection between this ‘internal reason statement’ and an agent's motivational state, and show why internal reasons have normative force. Then, I will suggest that statements which Williams calls ‘external reason statement’ can be well interpreted if we take them as a kind of advice or recommendation.