This paper aims to clarify some of the intentions of Hume's arguments concerning the mind-body problem in his Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 5. It attempts to examine three main things: (1) the features of Hume's argu­ments compared with those of Locke; (2) Hume's own use of the words, such as ‘notion’, ‘fiction’ or ‘feign’, and ‘imagination’ or ‘fancy’; and (3) Hume's new method of explanation in terms of human nature on the problem concern­ing a conjunction of mind and body in place. In the course of these examina­tions, it will be shown that Hume's sceptical arguments suggest a new solution on the problem concerned, and lead to the naturalism, presented in the light of human nature.

The purpose of this paper is two: One is to reveal Burke's aesthetics based upon the double character of both ‘imagination’ and ‘imitation’, giving attention to his parallel of poetry and painting. The other is to point out that ‘obscurity’ and ‘terror’ are the prime and coherent ideas closely related to the Sublime, resulting in his view of the superiority of poetry to painting. I will demonstrate the true image of the young Burke in A Philosophical Enquiry (1757).

A great deal of effort has been made on Bentham's thought in general. What seems to be lacking, however, is a systematic analysis of Bentham's conception of government in his early times. In this paper, I intend to sketch Bentham's conception of government as the “régime of publicity”. My analytical approaches are based on the ideas in his Fragment and Introduction (IPML). I shall extract a “mutual enlightenment” from his Essays on Political Tactics and “mutual discipline” from his Panopticon. For these concepts reflect relationship between governor and governed, I shall concentrate my attention on analyzing a “pessimistic legislator” and a “progressive public”. When examining some of these, it surely makes sense that Bentham's conception of government as the “régime of publicity” is characterized by “mutual enlightenment” and “mutual discipline”.

J. L. Austin presented an elaborated correspondence theory of truth. His formulation of the truth condition of statements roughly is as follows: a statement is true when the situation to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions is of a type of situations with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions. Austin uniquely asserts there are various degrees of truth. His truth condition can explain this in two ways. Firstly, the degree of truth is that of a situation's being of a given type. Secondly, it is the position, in the hierarchy of types, of the type which a given situation is of.