This paper focuses on the development of the English concept of the ʻrule of lawʼ, analysing Edward Coke, Matthew Hale and William Blackstoneʼs works. I will demonstrate the diversity of this concept, as against the prerogative. On the other hand, the rule of law concept has been almost consistently under the sway of parliamentary sovereignty. The history of the English rule of law concept is one of formalisation. Cokeʼs restraint of the prerogative by ʻreasonʼ was replaced by Haleʼs restraint by ʻknown lawʼ. The English rule of law did not intervene where the legislatures acted in formally correct ways.

Lockeʼs account of the tacit consent presents many problems that scholars have not solved. One of these problems is whether one may become a member of a commonwealth by oneʼs tacit consent or not. Most interpreters think that the tacit consent is not condition of the membership. But this interpretation is not satisfactory, since Locke argues at times not only the express consent but also the tacit consent can make one to be the member. In this paper I try to offer a new solution for this problem. I argue that, firstly, the tacit consent commonly can be inferred as the express consent and, secondly, Pufendorf who has much influence on Locke admits that the tacit consent often plays the same role of the express consent, then Locke himself must accept Pufendorfʼs idea. Therefore, one may become the member by oneʼs tacit consent.

Edmund Burke seems to be a thinker who was one of critics to the modern social contract theory. But he had the idea of social contract. I think he did not deny the theory of social contract itself. This paper aims to reconstruct his theory from some writings and speeches. To do it, it is necessary to articulate the relation of civil society and civilized society in his thought, and to make clear how he understood the natural state. It seems to me that these arguments show the natures and conditions of modern government in his thought.

This paper re-appraises L.T. Hobhouseʼs (1864-1929) and J.A. Hobsonʼs (1858-1940) criticisms of British idealist philosopher Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923). Their critique has been seen as an indication of the theoretical and ideological distance between the new liberalism and British idealism. Comparing their attacks on Bosanquetʼs methodology, theory of will, and state and welfare theories with what Bosanquet actually argued, however, reveals not only the irrelevance of their criticisms but also some fundamental commonalities between these two philosophical movements: they shared an interest in the methodological integration of science and ethics, a focus on the reciprocity between morality and society, and a repudiation of the spirit of materialism, all of which provided the ʻidealist liberalʼ background for the early British welfare state.

Hume distinguishes two cases of personal identity in the Treatise, one with regard to ʻour thought or imaginationʼ and the other with regard to ʻour passions or the concern we take in ourselvesʼ. First, I consider Humeʼs concept of character from the perspectives of durability and revisability. I propose to interpret Humeʼs ʻcharacterʼ as the habit of particular ways of forming beliefs from these perspectives. Then I examine the reasoning from character to actions, and the relation between moral judgment and necessity in voluntary actions. Finally I present Humeʼs framework of the link between person and character evaluated in terms of reciprocal relationships in human life. Through this investigation, I show that Hume discusses, though implicitly, the second case of personal identity in terms of the concept of character in the three books of the Treatise.