This paper aims to clarify and explicate Humeʼs two definitions of “cause.” These definitions are not reductive, since they do not analyze the idea of causation into its parts; nor are they ostensive in that they do not directly point to the core element of causation. Rather, Humeʼs definitions are “causal” and describe situations in which the idea of causation is formed in our minds. I argue that once Humeʼs definitions are understood this way, typical objections to them are off the mark. In addition, I point out that they play a constitutive role in preventing the idea of causation from being more obscure, by excluding wrong analyses of causation that lead to a mistaken conception of causation.

Berkeleyʼs philosophy holds that we have knowledge of our own minds. However it is not very clear what the mind is. I examine the mind from two aspects. First, I examine the epistemological aspect of the mind. I show that for notional knowledge we do not have any notion of mind without ideas. The notional knowledge of mind includes the faculties which ascend from sense, memory, imagination, and reason to intellect. Yet they are only faculties, not substance. Secondly, I examine the metaphysical aspect of mind as substance. Its essence is one, and its one participates in One of To Hen. Through this examination we will have the fundamental principles to reconstruct the metaphysics of mind and God in Berkeleyʼs Philosophy.

In this paper I will discuss the laws of nature according to Humeʼs philosophy, and the problem of accidental regularities which arises. I aim to show, through a fresh interpretation of his theory, that in fact, he was able solve the problem of accidental regularities. To begin with, I will clarify the problem of accidental regularities and criticize the Tom Beauchamp and Alexander Rosenberg interpretation. Then, I will explain the way in which their interpretation fails to solve the problem. Finally, I will give my interpretation, making it possible to distinguish between lawlike and accidental regularities in Humeʼs theory.