This paper first discusses the nature of the crisis faced by the Philippine National Bank that was directly related to the collapse of the currency reserve fund during 1919-1922, then the political consequences of the financial crisis in the Philippine Legislature under American colonial rule during the early 1920s is discussed.
The Philippine National Bank was established in 1916 as the multi-purpose semi-governmental bank to provide loans for the agricultural export industry, extending business as a commercial bank, and issuing bank notes while depositing government funds. In 1917 the National Bank opened its New York agency, and soon larger parts of Philippine currency reserves, such as the Gold Standard Fund and the Silver Certificate Reserve (these two were combined into the Currency Reserve Fund in 1918) were deposited in the New York agency. The currency reserves were Philippine government funds that the National Bank could not utilize for its own purpose. However, strangely enough, most of the currency reserves were transferred to the Manila office of the National Bank by the end of 1918 through the following method. Making use of currency reserves as its own capital, the bank issued bank notes to provide a large amount of loans for export businesses. As a result, the Philippine economy incurred hyper-inflation and exhausted currency reserves.
Why did this happen? The US government sent the Wood-Forbes Mission to investigate Philippine political and financial conditions in 1921. Its purpose was to examine the Filipino people's ability to govern themselves in not only political and legislative, but also financial and economic affairs. The most serious financial and economic matters were the near bankruptcy of the Philippine National Bank and the collapse of the currency reserve system. The Mission concluded that the incompetence of bank officials was the cause of the deep financial and economic crisis that had hit the Philippines. This observation was widely accepted in the Philippines, and one of main issues for Filipino political leaders became who should take responsibility for the crisis: Sergio Osmeña or Manuel L. Quezon, the most powerful leaders in Philippine politics, both from the Nacionalista Party. In this situation, it was Quezon who opened fire against Osmeña. At the end of 1921, Quezon, taking advantage of his No. 2 position in Philippine politics, started criticizing the sole leadership of Osmeña, emphasizing Osmeña's responsibility for the financial crisis. The Nacionalistas were split into two: the Nacionalista Colectivistas led by Quezon and the Nacionalista Unipersonalistas led by Osmeña. It was Quezon who won the struggle. When the two Nacionalista parties were merged into one Nacionalista Consolidado party, Quezon became president, with Osmeña as vice-president.
To conclude, the rivalry between Quezon and Osmeña was an outcome of the political impact of the Wood-Forbes Mission report on the Philippine society, but not a direct outcome of the financial and economic crisis in the Philippine government. The mismanagement of the Philippine National Bank and the collapse of the currency reserve system were caused by the combined elements of the weak structure of the American colonial government in the Philippines, where American officials, both in Manila and Washington, DC, were also deeply involved.

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This article deals with the three major sultanates of Melaka (ca. 1400-1511), Johor (ca. 1528-1718) and Johor-Riau (1722-1824), in order to discuss Malay political culture and its development in the early modern era. Up till now many scholars have studied most of the pre-colonial Malay sultanates. Their research points out daulat (divinity of the Malay ruler), derhaka (treason against the ruler) and nama (titles of people, fame of the ruler) as important concepts for understanding ruler-subject relations. For example, Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid stresses that since people of the Malay sultanates have believed in daulat and its effect on those who committed derhaka, they have always been loyal to their rulers from the Melaka period. While J. M. Gullick suggests that those concepts were not influential in 19th century Malay society, A. C. Milner states that nama has been the most important concept among them since Islamization. These different views make it necessary to reconsider the transformation of Malay political culture during early modern times.
Although other studies pay little attention to the perjanjian (contract) between Sri Tri Buana and Demang Lebar Daun in the Sejarah Melayu (a Malay chronicle written in early 17th century Johor), its descriptions show that this perjanjian, which includes both the values of daulat and Islam, seemed to be the most important political principle in Melaka and Johor. In fact, ruler-subject relations in Johor were influenced by the two different values of daulat and the above-mentioned perjanjian. This can be seen in such incidents as the coup d'etat of the Paduka Raja (1688), the regicide of Sultan Mahmud (1699) and the Minangkabau conquest of Johor (1.718). While the non-Muslim orang laut (boat people) were always loyal to their tyrannical ruler in these incidents, the Muslim orang kaya (noblemen) committed regicide in 1699. Apparently, the former believed in daulat, while the latter respected the perjanjian.
During the 17th and 18th centuries, Malay society experienced the following four changes: the penetration of Islam, the migration of Bugis, who possessed the perjanjian, tradition in ruler-subject relations, the disappearance of the direct descendants of the Melaka rulers after the regicide of 1699, and the spreading conflicts among the Malay sultanates. These incidents undermined the value of daulat among the Malay ruling class. Evidence of this can be seen in the 18th and 19th versions of Sejarah Melayu, that added more criticism of the rulers. In the case of Johor-Riau, an article concerning the disposition of the sultan was enacted. Those incidents also forced the ruling class to pay much more attention to both concepts of perjanjian and nama during the 18th century. The perjanjian sumpah setia (the oath of loyalty) between the Malay sultan and the Bugis raja muda (vice-king) was the most important political principle in Johor-Riau. Moreover, the perjanjian is often mentioned in the hikayats (chronicles) of the such Malay sultanates as Johor-Riau, Siak, Pahang and Perak. On the other hand, the growing importance of the ruler's charm among his people, like muka manis (sweet) and lemah lembuh (soft) and the mention of nama in the hikayats, shows that name grew to be important in Malay political life.
Nama is often mentioned in the hikayats edited from the 18th century on. While titles were usually expressed by the word gelaran in the pre-18th century hikayats, the word nama was used to refer to titles in the Hikayat Hang Tuah, which was edited in the early 18th century. Furthermore, this is the oldest hikayat that often stresses that this world is not eternal but only the ruler's nama that remains after his death. It is

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The Lung Khê Citadel site is located on the natural levee of the old Dâu River at Lung Khê hamlet, Thành Khu'o'ng village, Thuân Thành district in Bac Ninh Province. The citadel includes a large rectangular walled fort (north wall: 680m, south wall: 520m, east wall: 320m, west wall: 328m).
Previous studies have identified the Lung Khê Citadel as the central citadel of Luy Lâu district, which was established as the capital of Chiao Chih (Giao Chi) Prefecture in the Western Han period and was also a place where Si Nhiêp, the prefect of Chiao Chih, resided. Recent studies have reshuffled the previous understanding.
Excavations and field research have revealed that the citadel was built in the 2nd century AD and continuous occupation can be confirmed to the end of the 5th or early 6th century AD. A large-scaled bronze workshop has been confirmed in the north central area inside the walls. A mold fragment of a bronze drum found in this area indicates a part of the workshop was used for casting late Heger I type drums. Although the majority of the artifacts are of Chinese-origin, several types, such as end roof tiles, a table-shaped stone mortar (pesani) and kendi, show cultural affinity with artifacts found in Trà Kiêu and Óc Eo, where the early Southeast Asian states were formed.
Among the early citadels or fort sites in the Red River Delta, Lung Khe is the largest one next to Cô Loa. The construction of Cô Loa can be dated between the 1st century BC and 1st century AD, but it seems that after its construction Cô Loa was not used for a very long time. On the other hand, the scale, occupation period and material culture of Lung Khê are worthy of the central capital of the Red River Delta, which must have been Long Bien. While there are many historical or legendary relics of Si Nhiêp around Lung Khê, no early document mentions any relation between Si Nhiêp and Luy Lâu. The title Long Ben Hâu conferred to Si Nhiêp as the lord of the district recorded in the San kuo chih is supporting evidence for this hypothesis.
The development of the Nan Hai trade from the end of the 1st millennium BC between China and Southeast Asia or further west stimulated the socio-economic development of the Red River Delta as an entrepôt, and the political power at Lung Khê should have been related to trade. However, from the late 3rd or 4th century a change in the trade route may have brought about a decline in the economic position of the Red River Delta. The later period of the Lung Khê Citadel were less connected with the south, so more domestic factors inside the Red River Delta need to be understood in a historical context.

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In Singapore during the 1890s, local-born Chinese asserted themselves as “Straits Chinese” and became active in political and social movements. Their activities included the formation of the Chinese Philomathic Society in 1896, the publication of the Straits Chinese Magazine in 1897, and cutting off their queues in 1898.
However, at the beginning these movements, led by the younger intellectuals, did not gain popularity and were not smoothly developed. Their attempts were often criticized or ignored by the older establishment. In addition, around this time, the organization of the whole Chinese community in Singapore, regardless of dialect group or the place of birth, against interference from the Straits Settlements Government was more broadly desired than the organization of just the local-born Chinese.
Nevertheless, the Straits Chinese established a large-scale organization, the Straits Chinese British Association, which limited its membership only to British subjects in 1900. It was supported by a much larger number of local-born Chinese than any previous organization. The conflict between younger intellectuals and the older establishment seemed to have disappeared, both realizing a grand coalition under the Association.
In the research to date, the reason why this grand coalition was realized and solidarity strengthened in 1900 has been attributed to the “privilege” of being a British subject. The logic is as follows. This privilege shared among Straits Chinese automatically gave rise to common interests. To assure such interests, they needed to overcome conflict and general indifference, and finally reached integration. Additionally, given such privilege, Straits Chinese came to appreciate the Straits Settlements Government and were eager to show their appreciation.
Nevertheless, what this privileges was has not yet been determined exactly. This article examines this point and finds that there were no large basic differences between the rights of British subjects and those of foreigners, except for the Banishment Ordinance and its amendment in 1899, which greatly threatened the local-born people.
Originally, banishment was solely applied to aliens, not to natural born subjects like the Straits Chinese. And even if a Straits Chinese was issued the order, he could avoid it as long as he could submit evidence proving that he was a natural born subject. However, the amendment of 1899 determined that the order of banishment “shall be conclusive evidence in all Courts of Justice and for all purposed that the person thereby ordered to be banished is not a natural born British subject.” Though it was provided that the Ordinance would not prevent a person ordered to be banished from submitting evidence before the Governor to prove his nationality, there were no guarantees that such evidence could overrule the executive decision. This means that British subjects could possibly have been subject to the ordinance.
Straits Chinese were thus faced with uncertainty over their status as British subjects at the end of 1890s, rather than enjoying “privileges” or superior status. Recognizing, the uncertainty of their status, they strove to unite themselves and strengthen their voice against the Straits Settlements Government, while at the same time showing their loyalty as British subjects.

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During the Vietnam war, there arose social movements throughout the world. The Thai people rose up and toppled their military government, but civilians were able to take control for only three years; October 1973-October 1976. The democratic process was important, even though it only lasted a short while.
The Vietnam war had an impact on Thai politics, economy, society, and culture. Vietnamese communism was a threat to Thailand. The national interest centered on this issue of American military bases and facilities being built in Thailand. The American military stationed itself there, and many American soldiers arrived. Collaterally, the Thai military government received aid and support from the US. The Americans constructed the infrastructure from Bangkok to the rural areas to support their military strategies. The special demands of the Vietnam war enriched the Thai economy. American culture thoroughly invaded Thailand. Americanization destroyed Thai culture and tradition. Many nightclubs and bars were opened in places where there had been nothing of that sort before, and the resulting prostitution aroused anti-American sentiment among Thai people.
The anti-Vietnam war movement prevailed all over the world, but it was difficult for the Thai to organize a similar movement. Thailand had been under the military dictatorship for a long time. There was no freedom of expression, and Thai intellectuals, including students, could not criticize the establishment.
Much anti-war sentiment however existed, stemming from anti-American nationalism. The anti-war movement for the Thai involved writing, talking and discussing. This movement criticized the US for supporting the Thai military government for its own benefit. The Thai military government could not have lasted without American support, and Thai intellectuals and students accused the Americans of propping up that government. The anti-Vietnam war movement was connected to the anti-government movement.
My essay will show four major factors which led to the anti-Vietnam war movement in Thailand. First, there was magazine journalism. The role of Seven Inslitutes and Social Science Review were important. They opposed the Vietnam war at the beginning. Second, Thai people living abroad played important roles. Some of them watched the anti-Vietnam war movement, and some joined. They sent information on the war to Thailand, some writing essays opposing the Vietnam war in Thai magazines. Third, the rise of student activism promoted the anti-Vietnam war movement. Students formed small political groups on their campuses, providing books on the Vietnam war, holding discussions and demonstrations against American policy toward Vietnam. Fourth, the counter culture reflected anti-war sentiment. It used art for the improvement of society under the military dictatorship, and this art raised the political and social consciousness of the Thai people. There were poems, novels, non-fiction and plays dealing with the Vietnam war, and they were accepted by people from every walk of life. These four factors shared anti-American nationalist sentiment against the American bases and soldiers in Thailand that supported the Thai military government. It was Thai nationalism, influenced by the anti-Vietnam war movement in the US, that helped the movement in Thailand.

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