The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has established a Committee on New Direction of Economic and Industrial Policies in the Industrial Structure Council since 2021. In this article, the author attempts to review existing studies on Japanese industrial policy and to examine the position and the meaning of“ new industrial policy” towards industrial location and regional economies in Japan.

This emerging new industrial policy is different from the traditional infant industry protection and government interventions in the 1960s and 70s and deregulation and structural reform in the 1980s. It is characterized by a‘ mission-oriented’ approach which aims to combat climate change, ensure energy security, and reduce regional disparities. This abrupt METI’s industrial policy reflected international politics under the competitive threat posed by China and the discussions of overseas scholars such as Dani Rodrik and Mariana Mazzucate. However, this seems to indicate discontinuity with unique Japanese industrial policy studies.

Recent manufacturing plant locations have also been strongly influenced by changing international politics such as Brexit and the conflict between the U.S. and China. Under such circumstances, in particular economic security, the role of national governments for industrial location has been strengthened. The target fields of subsidies for domestic locations included not only the medical supplies industry against COVID-19, but also the low-carbon industry and the semiconductor industry as the core of supply chains.

On the other hand, new industrial policy emphasizes ‘inclusive growth’ as a new point of view for regional policy. How to recognize the meaning of inclusive growth in an advanced nation is debatable, but METI targets social challenges such as inconvenient traffic and shopping under the population decline. It is necessary to extend policy related actors from just the government and industry to include various stakeholders such as NPOs and citizens groups to move in the direction of desired societal goals.

The semiconductor industry landscape has changed dramatically due to the development of a digital society and carbon neutrality, as well as discussions on economic security. While Moore’s Law is approaching its limit, 3DIC （heterogeneous integration） such as “chiplet” is attracting attention, while technological structural changes are also taking place. In Japan, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry （METI） formulated and implemented the “Semiconductor and Digital Industry Strategy” in June 2021, and an industrial policy that positions the semiconductor industry as the most important industry for economic security.

Against this backdrop, the location of TSMC has served as an opportunity for Kyushu to take advantage of the potential of its existing industrial and technological agglomeration, while promoting various initiatives that match the government’s policies.

More than 1,000 semiconductor-related companies are located in Kyushu, referred to as “Silicon Island.” Kyushu’s strength lies in the formation of local and global supply chains led by device companies such as Sony and Renesas Electronics. In addition to materials, manufacturing equipment, and design companies, there is also a concentration of user companies for products such as robots and automobiles. Furthermore, Kumamoto University, Kyushu University, Kyushu Institute of Technology, and Waseda University are focusing on research and development of semiconductors. Research support organizations such as the Kyushu Center of the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology （AIST）, Fukuoka Institute of System LSI Design Industry, and Research Center for 3D Semiconductors have advanced package prototype development lines and minimal fab package lines, used by companies and researchers in a wide range of business areas nationwide.

Local medium-sized companies are also growing their businesses, enhancing their R&D and business construction capabilities. We have broken away from single-track subcontracting management and are conducting strong management with double-track portfolio management.

Considering the development process of the European Green Deal（ GD）, this study explores the characteristics of contemporary European industrial policy, especially the trends in automobile industry policy, and GD as the policy response to the 21st century’s socio-economic problems.

As the European Union’s（ EU） post-pandemic growth strategy, GD has emerged as a serious response to addressing climate change. Essentially, coupled with policies aimed at building a resilient future society, GD is envisioned as a way to recover from the social and economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. In Europe, climate action is increasingly linked to all areas of social and economic policy through the promotion of GD, and positioned as the “governing agenda” of the 21st century.

The focus of industrial policy under the European GD is “industrial transformation”, with the main objectives of promoting renewable energy, digitalization, and the establishment of a circular economy model. Essentially, it is an initiative aimed at strengthening the EU’s industrial competitiveness and pursuing “open strategic autonomy,” while seeking leadership in the international community by establishing regulatory frameworks. As a “mission-oriented” industrial policy, the EU’s new industrial strategy has also substantially affected the formulation of growth strategies in major countries. However, it still has many issues that require international coordination, such as carbon border adjustment mechanism（ CBAM）. Furthermore, the linkages between various policies, such as industry, energy, environment, and security, as well as GD’s consistency as a comprehensive policy package are not clear.

This article tries to clarify Toyota’s reorganization, discuss a change of value chain and competitive advantage, and propose a hypothesis of Toyota as a brand-new business model as a mobility company in the coming CASE（ Connected, Autonomous, Sharing, and Electric） era.

Toyota is the company that most often springs to mind when one mentions the term “automaker.” Toyota group’s global sales equaled 10.5 million units in 2021, which ranked No. 1 worldwide and was one million units more than VW group which ranked No. 2. Looking at the latest operating profit ratio, Toyota’s was 8.1%, while VW’s was a mere 4.9% in 2021.

Toyota has been taking practical steps to transform itself into a mobility company in the past decade. First, the Toyota Research Institute （TRI） was established in January 2016. Then, in November 2017, President Akio Toyoda emphasized that, due to the impact of CASE, the automobile industry was facing a dramatic revolution occurring only once every 100 years. Finally, he officially announced that Toyota was transforming itself into a mobility company in January 2018.

This article conducts an empirical study of information contained in Toyota’s official publications and the business report compiled by FOURIN—a private automobile research institute—to explore Toyota’s reorganization. As a result, we understand that Toyota has firstly advanced connected-related projects and has also positively purchased companies in charge of autonomous-related R&D. The study also reveals that Toyota has mobilized its resources to rapidly start up sharing-related businesses, taken the initiative to provide its Fuel Cell and Hybrid Electric Vehicle technology to other institutions, and promoted alliances with municipalities regarding Mobility as a Service（ Maas）.

The case study also indicates that varieties of services in a value chain as a mobility company and software is becoming more critical for its competitive advantage. Moreover, we also understand that its new business model is becoming more open and horizontal through alliances with other business partners.

This study consists mainly 2 parts. First objective is to conduct quantitative study with data collection and its analysis of business transaction openness by utilizing HHI （Herfindahl-Hirschman Index） to clarify the difference between Japan and Germany regarding concentration for specific customers. In former studies, there are some theses provides transaction openness studies, but those studies are reported mainly within Japan domestic cases. Typically, Japanese Automotive Parts Inter-Firm relationships are specific and focusing on their preferred customers. This is due to Relation Specific Skills （Asanuma, 1997） and OEM’s purchasing strategies to restricts the numbers suppliers for each Parts. In chapter 3 and 4, author conducted the comparison of HHI between Japan and Germany and confirmed that the situation in Germany was completely different. In Germany, Automotive parts inter-firm relationship were significantly opening compared with Japanese Inter-Firm Relationships.

As second objective, author assumed the cultural difference as a key variable so interviews for German Supplier Executives were conducted to listen their understanding why German Suppliers can open inter-firm relationships from business culture standpoint. After the interview, author conducted Text Mining analysis and confirmed that German supplier has different culture and strength especially in Surface Competitiveness （Fujimoto, 2003） and self-efficacy. Those are the key factors to develop business relationships positively and aggressively so that they can open inter-firm relationships.

This research question is to clarify why Toyota Motor （hereinafter referred to as “Toyota”） could not achieve local production of passenger cars in China in the 1980s through the oral histories of five people. At the same time, I would like to clarify the actual situation and changes in the local production of commercial vehicles and export business from Japan in the 1980s.

The academic value of this paper is to clarify the background of the joint venture negotiations in 1980, which have not been sufficiently clarified so far, and the reasons why they were unsuccessful and why Toyota could not enter the“ Three Big and Three Small Passenger Car Projects, through the oral histories of the actual negotiators, and at the same time to clarify the actual situation of Toyota’s export business in the 1980s and its transition. That is, Toyota, as a joint venture, failed to prepare a feasibility study that balanced foreign currency revenues and expenditures and to reach an agreement with its negotiating partners in China.

What are the implications for business executive? The answer to this question is how to evaluate Toyota’s non-involvement in the“ Three Big and Three Small” and its export business at that time. Considering the foreign currency balance issue in joint venture negotiations and Toyota’s entry into local production in the U.S., compared with China in the 1980s, Toyota’s choice was rational. However, when asked whether the Beijing Jeep and VW Group joint ventures were able to balance foreign currencies after that, a big question remains in terms of sales destinations and export performance. Certainly, not all of the foreign manufacturers （VW, Chrysler, Citroen, Peugeot, and Daihatsu） that participated in the“ Three Big and Three Small” were successful. However, the subsequent growth of the Chinese auto industry suggests that the Germans are driving growth more than the Japanese, and that the Chinese government is expecting them to do so.

The implication for business executive is that it was necessary to make business decisions that were not limited to the framework of a single company negotiating a joint venture, but that were based on a deep understanding of the government’s intentions and that led to win-win answers for the stakeholders involved.

The Japanese government expressed the 2050 carbon-neutral declaration toward the world on October 2020. Then, in November of that year, the Offshore Wind Industry Vision set a national goal for electric power generation to be made 10 GW by 2030, and from 30 GW to 40 GW by 2040. And this package of policy decisions is enhancing the expectation feeling of offshore wind power business opportunities in Japan today.

However, Japanese huge windmill makers have withdrawn from that business, and supply chains for the huge windmill manufacturers are undeveloped in Japan. For that reason, the construction and manufacture of huge windmills of offshore wind power systems almost are depending on overseas makers.

Based on the above situations, this article aims to investigate the condition for Japanese offshore wind power to be the leading industry. Accordingly, we try to consider based on the following viewpoint.

First, an examination of the late cause of Japanese start-ups in this field and the withdrawal factor of Japanee huge windmill makers. Second, the explanation of the type of offshore wind power and its potential electric power generation in Japan, and the feature of the required supply chain networks. Third, the case study in Akita prefecture. Fourth, the analysis of success factors in Bremerhaven and Kingston upon Hull. And finally, the proposition of the condition for Japanese offshore wind power to be the leading industry in the light of industrial structurization and cluster formation.

Until approximately 2006, Japan led the world in solar cell technology, practical application, and production. However, around 2020, major domestic solar cell manufacturers withdrew one by one from cell and module production, resulting in a significant reduction. This is because Japan lost its competitiveness against China’s cost-effective products. In general, the competitiveness of Chinese goods is equated with their low labor costs. However, the solar cell industry in Japan has been declining owing to several inherent factors.

Specifically, the failure of the Solar Grade Silicon （SOG-Si） supply system contributed significantly to the decline of domestic solar cell manufacturers. Japan’s solar cell industry recognized the importance of securing SOG-Si from the earliest stages of its development and pushed for its practical application. However, Japan was unable to establish a SOG-Si production system. Meanwhile, although China started working on SOG-Si approximately 10 years after Japan, it quickly established a cost-effective mass production system.

This study investigates the history of Japan’s SOG-Si supply efforts and the impact of their failures, including China’s SOG-Si supply system.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the development process of a surface treatment supplier that originated from a private university business after World War II by using a historical approach to technology acquisition with innovation through industry-university cooperation.

Kanto Gakuin University in Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture, opened a university plant when it moved the campus from Miharudai to Mutsuura after World War II. This plant became a business for the university and developed into Kanto Kasei Co., Ltd, a Tier 1 automotive parts supplier.

The reasons for the conversion to Kanto Kasei Kogyo from the university plant were internal and external changes in the environment, including the expansion of the surface treatment business, the start of operations at a new plant outside the university, difficulties in operating the existing plant due to an intensifying university dispute, and a request from the senior management for an opinion on separation. As a result, Kanto Kasei Co., Ltd became independent from Kanto Gakuin University by inheriting the management philosophies, tangible assets such as capital and equipment, intangible assets such as the university’s school motto, and managerial and technical personnel from the university.

This study investigates the growth of Japanese manufacturing companies operating as suppliers for precision industrial machinery production. This study intends to identify the critical factors influencing their growth and management and understand how these factors interact with each other and present a competitive advantage for sustaining their growth.

To fulfil the research purpose, this study has developed the Elemental Composition Model （EC model）, a hypothetical model consisting of six elements, which attempts to describe the growth of the suppliers. Field research was conducted to verify the validity of the EC model by choosing twelve manufacturing companies working on mechanical component production for leading Japanese printing and paper-converting machinery companies. The manufacturing of these products involves highly advanced technology to lead the global market, thereby demanding a high level of manufacturing engineering and skills from their suppliers.

The field research involved a series of visits to the chosen companies and interviews with the top management. A detailed field research analysis indicated how the strategies were chosen and executed, and what changes were made in customer relations and manufacturing technology. Most notably, the analysis identified three significant focus areas for growth, namely technology, product, and market. Further investigation of these processes considering the EC model showed the validity and effectiveness of the EC model in understanding the growth and management process of the suppliers under the study.

In recent years, large-scale distribution difficulties have arisen in the ethical drug industry, particularly for generic drugs. The most significant factor is that a scandal involving a mediumsized generic drug company in Toyama Prefecture caused health damage to many patients taking the drug.

As a result of this scandal, an affiliated organization of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare conducted an unannounced inspection of generic companies, and the Japan Generic Association, an industry organization, also instructed them to conduct an internal investigation. As a result, violations of GMP were discovered at four companies, including the largest generic company, and several companies were suspended, prolonging distribution difficulties. However, even considering these factors, it will take a very long time until the distribution difficulties of generics are entirely resolved. Therefore, in this paper, we surveyed the entire supply chain of the generics industry and investigated the causes of distribution difficulties to explore the depths behind the protracted distribution difficulties of generics.

As a result, it was found that the difficulties in distribution have been protracted due to the fact that multiple related systems by the government are pursuing their objectives in different directions. Specifically, rapid and large-scale prescription promotion measures that ignore the production capacity of generic companies, the drug price system in Japan that makes it difficult to secure profits in the medium to long term, and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare will not easily approve the end of generic drug sales. It turned out that the revision of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law in 2002, which was intended to improve the efficiency of the original drug（ new drug） business, was the cause of the protracted difficulty in distribution.

A camera is only a tool for taking photographs. One cannot take a desired photograph just by buying a high-performance model and pressing the shutter. The relationship between the manufacturer and the customer does not end with the completion of the purchase of the product. If it is a high-end model to be used for a long time, then the relationship between the two becomes closer after the purchase is completed.

Photography enthusiasts are interested in how to skillfully use, enjoy, and consume the products. Manufacturers should strive to comply with their wishes. Such customer-centric development of business is necessary. The digital camera market is shrinking rapidly due to the spread of smartphones. The market structure has changed significantly.

Under these circumstances, manufacturers need not only to build competitiveness based on the aspects of production, technology, and distribution, but also to strengthen the relationship with customers. They have implemented four measures to that end. These are, 1） establishment and operation of manufacturers’ favorite user clubs, 2） activities to build relationships with customers, 3） manufacturer’s mécénat activities, and 4） support system for professional photographers.

Utilizing these measures, they have acquired new customers, engaged with existing customers, and stimulated replacement demand. They grasped customer needs, developed new technologies and products, and provided information to customers. Members could easily connect with each other, clubs and communities centered on photography. These produced synergies improving customer loyalty. Consequently, the relationship with customers was further strengthened, leading to increase in corporate profits.

Competition among companies is becoming more and more severe in many industrial fields in Japan. In such a corporate environment, all industries need to demonstrate competitiveness in terms of customer service.