The purpose of this study is to reconstitute Norbert Elias' arguments on 'civilizing processes' in terms of the sociological theory of violence. Although similar efforts have been made hitherto by using the concept of 'decivilizing processes', these efforts have not yet to offer a conclusive argument. I discuss this in three parts.
　First, I focus on Elias' discussion of human-images, 'homo clausus' and 'homines aperti', which have been largely ignored in the discussions that focus on the 'decivilizing processes'. Elias was concerned with why the majority of people were unable to foresee the rise of Nazism. In response, Elias conceptualized a human-image that is a single 'rational' person who despised violent phenomena as an incomprehensible act: a being Elias defined as the image of 'homo clausus' (closed person). I clarify the formation of the self-image of 'homo clausus' by reexamining Elias' discussions in The Court Society and The Civilizing Process. Here, Elias used a multiple, interdependent human-image he labelled 'homines aperti' (open persons). By basing his discussion on 'homines aperti', he induced that the formation of an interwoven monopolized violence (for example 'good Society' and 'nation-state') gives impetus to the 'civilizing process' and thus generates the self-image of 'homo clausus'.
　This first argument then leads us to our second problem: to explain the generation of violent phenomena within the context of the self-image, 'homo clausus'. From our first argument based on 'homines aperti', we can understand that the interwoven monopolized violence contains two opposing tendencies, assimilation and distinction. Assimilation is the process of becoming collaborators with those who battle the same conflict. Distinction indicates the distinction collaborators make between themselves and others involved in the conflict. In a nation-state these two tendencies emerge from two directions, inter- and intra-state, and these two opposing tendencies generate many tensions within the patterns that are subsequently interwoven. The 'civilizing processes' are promoted only when these tensions are dissolved through freezing violence. Then when violence is frozen, the only way to dissolve these tensions are through hierarchical ranking, that is, to con figure these collaborators according to their respective power relations in a form with which they can concur, irrespective of their satisfaction or disapproval of the situation. Only when this hierarchical ranking is constantly and stably reproduced, relatively 'civilized' conduct becomes meaningful and the image of 'homo clausus' as an ideological (but false) image can be enforced. Of course, these hierarchical ranking need to be reassessed constantly and the resulting reforms may involve some suffering by many of the collaborators. When this suffering becomes aggravated, dissatisfied participants start to remove others who are collaborating against the same conflict; in other words, they practice exclusion. This 'exclusion' then cause those who possess a self-image of 'homo clausus' to savour a 'lust for submission' and a 'lust for attacking' thereby leading them to become a 'homo clausus of violence'. Thus, we are able to clarify the production of violence within the 'civilizing processes'.
　Finally, in my discussion on "Nazism as a civilizing process", I demonstrate that there is no contradiction between Elias' discussion of 'civilizing process' and National Socialism, by reexamining Elias' discussion of this topic in The Germans.

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　There are boundaries which divide people into insider and outsider at the place of welfare services. Let us name them "the boundaries of home". On comparison between Sweden and the Netherlands, I consider why welfare for the aged and child is required. I wish to show that the logic of welfare for the aged differs from that of child welfare, and to clarify the logic of "the boundaries of home" behind them.
　Many scholars have argued that the development of social care services for the elderly and children is for the benefit of guaranteeing the female labor force. This is true of Sweden, but not of the Netherlands. Dutch homes for the elderly increased in the 1960s, yet the proportions of working women was small.
　First, I illustrate the difference in the services for the elderly and children between Sweden and the Netherlands; while Sweden has attached importance to children, the Netherlands have developed the services only for the elderly.
　Second, to explain Dutch welfare state, I review the argument of Bussemaker and van Kersgergen in "Gendering Welfare States." They argue that the peculiarity of Dutch welfare state is the male breadwinner - female caretaker model. Yet, they analyze only child welfare. Why do they ignore the welfare for the aged?
　Third, to find out why they ignore the aged, I discuss the concept of "reproduction" in the arguments of Therborn, and Ueno (Marxist-feminist sociologist). I explain that their arguments of "reproduction" do not give us the logic with which we can demand the Welfare State for the provision of care for the aged.
　Finally, I clarify the logic of Swedish welfare for the aged and discuss the meaning of the Japanese welfare model for the elderly and its future possibilities from the viewpoint of "the boundaries of home".

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　There have been many arguments over the modernist framework of knowledge in feminist theory recently. Feminist theory had critically reconsidered the male-centered framework of knowledge from women's standpoint. Counter arguments over the binary schema of "men vs. women", however, occurred within feminist theory in 1990's. They say that the essential task for feminist theory should be reconsideration of social and historical contexts that have made such binary schema possible.
　A Canadian sociologist Dorothy Smith has approached this problem from sociological perspective. She argues that knowledge is socially organized in and through local practices of "reading texts", and discusses "the objectified knowledge" and "the feminine subjects" in terms of "textually mediated discourse".
　It is often said that her discussion is based upon such binary schemata as "men vs. women" and "objective vs. subjective", and gives priority to "women" and "subjective". In this paper, however, we try to focus on another aspect of her argument. This paper reveals that her discussion can be interpreted as a feminist sociology of knowledge in which the modernist framework of knowledge itself including such binary schemata should be investigated as a social phenomenon. In so doing we attempt to develop feminist sociology of knowledge into a sociological exploration of social organization of knowledge/language.

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