The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which consists of seven countries around the Horn of Africa, is one of the least recognized regional organizations in the world. In fact, in the small amount of literature dealing with this organization, it is quite common to depict it as a dysfunctional organization where conflicts and mistrust among the member states have hampered its proper functioning. It is even referred to as a ‘perfect example’ of a paralyzed organization. Given that the Horn has hosted many inter-state, as well as intra-state conflicts, such a harsh judgment might seem plausible.
In this article, a somewhat different view is suggested. By exploring various aspects of IGAD—its activities, motivation of the member states, their relations with each other and with the outside world—, it draws attention to the often overlooked roles of this organization, especially its utility for the survival of the governments of the member states.
First of all, IGAD is by no means a paralyzed organization. Tracking its record of activities reveals that member states have quite frequently gathered at regional meetings. Many of them have actively been involved in diverse activities such as mediations in civil wars in Sudan and Somalia, as well as building a regional conflict early warning system.
These activities are consistent with the urgent needs of the countries in the Horn, that is, regime survival in the context of a more or less fragile state. At the same time, however, these endeavors in IGAD do not necessarily entail deepening regional cooperation, much less integration, among the member states. While they have been trying to expand their cooperation in many fields, including mutual dialogue, conflict resolution, and even collective military action, these have been pursued mostly in an ad hoc manner and their effects remain very limited.
With its stated objective of integration a distant possibility, what aspect of IGAD could ensure its continued existence? The article illuminates the valuable link this organization provides, that is, the link with the wider international society. IGAD can be considered as a sort of forum where member states mobilize various extra-regional actors (AU, EU, UN, donor countries, etc.) for the survival of their own regimes. In fact, the countries in the Horn not only obtain external resources through IGAD, but also raise collective voices there, urging the international community to take specific policies that are conductive to strengthening their domestic rule.
Although the responses from outside the region have scarcely been as much as was expected, they can be helpful for the countries in the Horn, which have been struggling in desperate material and political conditions.

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The paper analyzes Middle Eastern countries’ foreign aid and military activities in African countries through the lens of Economic Statecraft (ES), the art of employing economic means to exert influence over other countries and thereby pursue geopolitical and strategic goals.

Due to changes in the strategic environment, such as the United States’ withdrawal from the Middle East and the escalation of intra-regional conflicts, Middle Eastern countries have pursued foreign and security policies that place greater emphasis on their national interests. Arab states in the Gulf and Turkey are upping their foreign aid to Africa and establishing military bases at geopolitical chokepoints to expand their spheres of influence. The economic and military expansion of Middle Eastern countries into Africa also intensifies competition among various state and non-state actors.

There have been studies on foreign aid to African countries and on the establishment of military bases by Middle Eastern countries. By examining these regional dynamics from the perspective of ES, this paper seeks to decipher the complex and multi-dimensional competition, confrontation, and cooperation. Additionally, the paper investigates the effectiveness of the ES as practiced by non-major powers, which is often overlooked, the impact of ES on regional politics and security, and the linkage with international order and international security.

ES is frequently discussed in the context of great power politics and strategic competition, such as the US-China rivalry. However, the same is true for regional and middle powers that use economic means to pursue their geopolitical objectives. The distinction is that great powers such as the US, China, and Russia are exceptional in the scale of their military and economic clout in international politics. Therefore, to better understand ES, it is necessary to focus on tactics being employed at the regional level and the geopolitical shifts that arise.

This paper outlines the debate on ES in/towards/from the Middle East and examines the trends and background of the pursuit of geopolitical goals linked to foreign aid, which has accelerated in recent years. Then, as a case study, this paper focuses on the Middle Eastern countries’ intervention in Sudan and the Horn of Africa region, as well as the competition among the regional countries. The intervention of Middle Eastern countries in Somalia and Libya is also analyzed to demonstrate that ES involves various actors, including unrecognized states and non-state actors.

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Historians of nomadic societies in East Africa have emphasized their high mobility as the core of the pastoral mode of subsistence. It has long been supposed that borders were procedures for containing this mode of subsistence and making such societies amenable to administration. However, recent scholars have approached the issue from a different angle. They insist that borders are arbitrary institutions that have been imposed regardless of the disposition of cultural areas. For them, the drawing of boundaries can be approached as a process in which a variety of actors negotiate with each other, produce meanings, and create profitable opportunities. On the basis of this methodological perspective, this study explores the political impact of boundaries drawn by the colonial state in northeastern Kenya on the Somali pastoralists. This study is distinctive in that it investigates administrative boundaries instead of international borders. To date, scholarly attention has been mainly devoted to the latter. However, this does not mean that administrative boundaries have less significance; internal borders offer a better opportunity to reflect on the specific meaning of statehood, especially in the case of peripheral borderlands. By examining how the government territorialized a specific sub-clan of Somalis and how the latter engaged with such territorialization, this study provides a nuanced understanding of colonial rule in the frontier region of northeastern Kenya. It argues that the porous boundaries were consequences not of the restrictive nature of state rule but of a specific kind of governmentality in a frontier region where administrative and judicial powers were concentrated in the hands of local officials. Furthermore, the Somali sub-clan, whose collective identity was anchored by the setting of these boundaries, struggled to utilize them for a politics of authority and territoriality.

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