In this report, wheel ruts of ancient Roman chariots in the ruins of Sabratha is investigated. Sabratha is famous for Roman ruin in Tripolitania of Libya. Sabratha has Greek theater and many Roman ruins. Some chariot gauge are measured, and they are very nearly equal to the present international standard railway gauge 1,435mm.

抄録全体を表示

This is an anthropological approach to the political actions of the Awlad Ali Bedouins in Egypt. Its purpose consists in finding some problematic points to be further studied in the process of selecting candidates among the Awlad Ali for the general election of the People's Assembly held in the end of November, 1990. The Awlad Ali are the Bedouins now mostly settled and living in the Governorate of Marsa Matrouh on the Mediterranean coast of the Western Desert. They are divided into five tribes (gabilas), and each tribe is into some sections ('a' ilas). During my stay in Egypt in 1988-1991, I visited the area many times and thereafter lived with the Awlad Ali in one of their villages for a year and half so as to do my fieldwork on them. This paper should be considered, therefore, as one of the studies on the tribal system of the Arab nomads, and the election of 1990 is taken up just as a case. The Governorate has two electoral districts, in both of which the number of representatives are two, so that four are to be elected in sum. As the Awlad Ali hold an absolute majority of the population of the area, they consider representatives of the Governorate as representatives of the Awlad Ali. Moreover, in order that those are representatives of the Awlad Ali as a whole, they say they all must reach an agreement on their candidacy. But reaching is so much difficult because of the lack of the established political institutions. Although they say as a rule that four of the five tribes share the seats and that the remaining one is to wait for its turn in the next occasion, the outcome of 1990 did not accord with this saying. The claim for the agreement of the tribes, nevertheless, has certain effects. The Awlad Ali people think of a candidate with the agreement as more legitimate and fair than those without it. So, if one gets the tribal agreement, he can take advantage of it tactically as a merit. The better one can pretend to have obtained an agreement of the tribes, the more easily he can win. The Awlad Ali also say that the agreement of the tribes on candidates should be reached through meetings of the 'umdas and the sheikhs, both of whom represent their tribal section against other sections. I myself attended some of the meetings held before the election and there found that the agreement was not reached positively but just accepted passively. As all of the meetings are locally held and not organized into larger ones, it is impossible in such conditions to gather up the will of each tribesman into united one. Therefore it must be considered that the Awlad Ali say the agreement is reached in the tribal meeting, not because it is actually done but because it should be ideally done. The 'umda and the sheikh are titles rather than posts, and not every section has both of them. There is no established organization to which they are belonging. Some of them, especially some living in Matrouh City, are rich and strong. They have relatively large influences over other 'umdas, sheikhs and other tribesmen. It is they who, in fact, play the power game among themselves, ratify candidates and lead the process of reaching (=accepting) an agreement of the Awlad Ali as a whole. They are powerful and behaving tactically so as to benefit themselves, but they still remain under the influence of the traditional norms. Here, norms work not as a burden on the individuals but just as a guideline along which people interact with one another. Behaving as a political unit, the Awlad Ali elected their representatives. The tribal system working on the normative basis was still effective and taken much seriouly in the process of decision making and agreement reaching. But it did not prevent anyone, candidates, the influential or any, from developing his own possibility. It just guided his way in harmony with others', if possible and favored. Those points are to be cleared in other case studies in different occasions.

抄録全体を表示

エジプトの西部砂漠地中海沿岸に居住するベドウィンは,祖先との関係が現在生きている人々の関係に反映され,それを整序すると見なす。父と子の間にたどられるアスル(起源)という概念に結集する祖先との関係性は,これまではしばしば「部族」組織と関連づけてとらえられてきた。しかしながら,父系出自集団への帰属は,祖先と自己を結び付ける仕方の一つにすぎず,ベドウィンたちがアスルを社会関係に繁栄する多様な方法の一部としてある。本稿はそうしたアスルの表現の形式を四つに分け,個人の名前への埋め込みと系図化,介在する祖先の網羅と特定の祖先の選出という観点から,たがいを対比して紹介する。それらが全体としてベドウィンの社会的な位置の認識にどのように関わっていくかを論じ,最終的にはベドウィンが自分たちを「ベドウィンである」あるいは「アラブである」と見なす認識も,そうした祖先との関連付けの延長上にあることを指摘する。

抄録全体を表示

The evolution of Tethys had been the result of activity of plates between Europe and Africa. The Tethys and concurrent alpine orogeny were the big events in Mesozoie history. Petroleum explorationists have experiences and knowledges of the prolific ocean for generation of oil since long ago. The stratigraphy and depositional environment of source rock in lower Cretaceous was proven by DSDP in the present ocean.
In this report, the writer would like to describe petroleum geology in the main oil belt from Lybia to Iran-Iraq via Turkey where lower Cretaceous is main producing horizon and also heavy oil is derived through migration from basinal to marginal structures with connate water.
The Syrian arch from north Egypt toward north-east direction is probably paralel with shore of Tethys.In relation with Sarir field in Lybia, the extensive exploration work in the Levant basin will bring us a clue to lower Cretaceous oil by the Tethys.

抄録全体を表示

Diverging outcomes are unfolding in the post-Arab Uprising countries’ transitional processes. In January 2014, Tunisia successfully adopted a new constitution based on a consensus of the opposing political parties and factions. In contrast, Egypt abolished one constitution and hastily instituted another in a time span of slightly more than a year. Yemen has announced the final document of the National Dialogue Conference in the same month. Libyans finally voted for the long awaited and disputed elections of the Constitutional Drafting Committee in February 2014.

The paper picks up three factors which seem to be influential in determining the modality of transitional political process in the four Post-Arab spring countries. The first is the initial conditions of the transitional politics.. Differences in the way the previous regimes collapsed are analyzed to illuminate the continuity and break of the ruling institutions and state apparatus. The second factor is the type of the interim government. In line with Shain and Linz typology, provisional, power-sharing, caretaker, and international interim government models are applied to clarify the types of interim governments in each four countries’ different phases in transitional politics. The third is the “rules of the game,” particularly those pertaining to the constitutional process. Who set what kind of rules and how are to be considered in each of four countries and possible influences of each set of the rules of the game to the diverging results of the transitional politics are considered.

抄録全体を表示