中小靴メーカーである株式会社マルミツは、大手シューズ・メーカーのOEMメーカーであったが、2000年に自社

であるネグローニを立ち上げた。しかし、企業規模が小さいためマーケティングには多大な資金を使うことはできない。ところがマルミツは、ネグローニ・スパイダーという・カーを製作し宣伝に利用することや、カラーオーダーという独自のシステムを開発し百貨店でイベントを開催するといった強力な企画を効果的に利用する事によって、自社を効率的に確立することに成功した。この成功の裏には、他企業とのコラボレーションをうまく利用したマルミツの戦略があった。本稿は、マルミツの自社立ち上げの過程を記述したものである。

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In 1949, the GHQ Occupation authorities allowed Japanese automobile companies to begin producing cars. But the level of price and performance of domestic cars was inferior to that of industrially advanced nations. Consequently, common opinion in the auto-related business circles was that the Japanese automotive industry was inferior.
The regulation of car imports was relaxed in 1952, and many foreign-made cars were imported. Car imports became the source of conflict for the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and automobile companies. The Ministry of Transport did not oppose automobile manufacture in Japan but objected to the protective policy that regulated car imports.
The primary reason for importing cars was to promote smooth and efficient transportation. Taxi companies were the main users of cars at the time, and they opposed the protective policy as the price and performance of cars influenced their profit and reputation. They appealed to the National Diet in support of car imports, and their views were publicized through magazines and other means.
Opposition to the protective policy was resolved in 1954. The foreign currency shortage in 1953 and 1954 prompted public opinion to favor restriction of car imports. In addition, the price of domestic cars dropped and performance improved. Under these circumstances, the Ministry of Transport changed its policy by proposing the import of normal-size cars not widely manufactured in Japan, and thus the debate over car imports was concluded.

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While many researchers have emphasized that Japanese car makers’ high end original car navigation devices would not adapt to the global market whose main stream is reasonable generic car navigation devices such as PNDs, they failed to grasp the critical change which is the replacement of maker option devices by dealer option devices, inside the field of the original car navigation devices.
This paper aims to explore the implication of the current shifting of mainstream from the maker option to the dealer option in the market of car maker original car navigation device through the perspectives of dynamic market adaption of the product innovation.
The findings of this study are as follows.
First, currently dealer option car navigation devices have by far outnumbered the maker option car navigation devices in the Japanese original car navigation market. Most Japanese car makers have converted to the dealer option from the maker option in the product strategies in order to introduce market competition mechanism to original car navigation to some degree.
Second, according to the case study of Mark II (X) which is one of the Toyota’s passenger car models, during the process of shifting from the maker option to the dealer option in the original car navigation, we can also find changes. Firstly, the architecture between cars (especially the design of dashboards and center panels) and car navigation devices has been shifted from integration orientation to module orientation. Secondly, the scope of supply network of the original car navigation devices has been expanded.
Finally, this dealer option mode can be positioned between the mode of “interdependent architectures by integrated companies” and the mode of “modular architectures by nonintegrated companies”.

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Toyota Motor Corporation is a big company, and Toyota produces and sells large volume vehicles over the world. But in the BRICs market, especially China market, Toyota’s market share is very low. In China market, Toyota share is only 4.6% （2015）. In the 2000s, volume zone was Small-Low Segment. But Toyota introduced only two models, such as Vios and Yaris. Afterwards, volume zone has shifted to SUV Segment, But Toyota does not have enough model to introduce SUV segment. This is aim to analyze why Toyota failed business in China Automobile volume zone, against china motorization from the beginning of 2000s up to today. I focus on the Leadership and Organization Structure, compared with companies, which have excellent result and good industrial paradigm shift （Professor Mishina calls “TENCHI”） in Japan. 　As my analysis, the two key points to succeed in new developing countries, as BRICs, are, firstly to assign young leader to top management in BRIC`s volume zone market for more than ten years, and secondly to establish new organizational structure and national staffs, in order to produce much fit products and service. I found that Toyota did not do it, therefore Toyota failed in the past time. 　Top management from Toyota headquarter worked for average 2.8 years in joint-venture. They were all over 50 years old, when they were assigned. Toyota China Regional Headquarter （RHQ） and their Production, Sales and R&D companies are very complicated order and capital relationship. There are not enough functions in RHQ. The general managers are occupied by both mother companies, which have capital to joint venture. Sometimes order and decision were confused inside joint venture. National staffs have very small chance to promote their career. This is reason to do bad performance in China automobile volume zone, in leadership and organizational structure, by Toyota.

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In this paper, the author highlighted the importance of waste and recycling businesses of the industry by introducing the concept of “Vein Industry.” In Japan, form 1990s to the time of economical crisis triggered by the Lehman Shock in 2008, the system of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) has been adopted as a government postulate for waste management and recycling policy. Under the EPR, manufacturers began to enter the waste and recycling businesses, which had been operated mostly by the vein industry players. At the same time, barrier to entry to these businesses has eased for new comers from “Artery sector of the Industry.” For example, under the automobile recycling law, the Japanese recycling system has been introduced. Following these moves, in order to correct the conventional viewpoint, in which the manufacturer is divided from the recycler, to new one, in which both parties are involved in coordinated resource recycling, the author advocated an analytical viewpoint of the “Artery sector of the Industry” and “Vein sector of the Industry.”

However, the EPR for a specific product does not always improve economical efficiency. In fact, under the Act on Promotion of Small Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment, which enacted in 2013, EPR was forced to withdraw since the law simply encouraged manufacturers going toward large-scale business and mechanization. There was a criticism for high cost operations of the Japanese automotive recycling system.

Meanwhile, processing and recycling of Automobile Shredding Residue (ASR) is secured under the automobile recycling law. For other shredding residues rather than automotive, however, proper processing is not guaranteed. Economic globalization placed significant impact on Japan's used vehicle market and recycling system. In other words, vehicles' wiring harnesses, plastic parts, etc. were exported to China and other overseas countries as “resources” form Japan to avoid high cost processing. However, in 2017, China's Xi Jinping administration, in terms of tightening environmental regulations, ordered an embargo on importation of “resources”. As a consequence, industrial waste of Japan lost an outlet named China and the entire industry is confused. Behind the scenes, there is China's ambition to realize its expansion plan dubbed “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21^st century Maritime Silk Road,” thereby contending the initiative with Europe, U.S.A. and Japan in the field of the development of next-generation vehicles and infrastructure development towards the Fourth Industrial Revolution, as a result of China's constant pursue of its policy of increasing national prosperity and military power.

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