本稿は、1941年太平洋戦争勃発の契機となった日本海軍による真珠湾攻撃によって、沈没したアメリカ

第二次世界大戦終了後、

人気観光スポットとなったアリゾナ記念碑における見学者の待ち時間対策として、後に建設された付属博物館ビジターセンターでは、当初「野蛮な」敵としての日本軍のイメージを打ち出していたが、施設のリニューアル後は日米関係の歴史を世界史的な視点から丹念に追い、以前は敬遠された戦時におけるハワイの日系人男女の表象も取り入れている。特に、これまでは忌避された原爆のイメージの展示として、《原爆の子の像》のモデルである佐々木禎子による折鶴が採用された。本来治癒祈願として制作された禎子の折鶴は、その物語が繰り返し語られるなかで、平和のナラティヴとしての「サダコ・ストーリー」へと転化した。また、アメリカに保護される戦災孤児、無力化された天皇とマッカーサーの会見写真の展示など、徹底した日本の女性化が試みられる。

アリゾナ記念碑が史上初めての軍事的な失敗による男性性喪失から回復を遂げるアメリカの表象であるのに対し、戦後日本は「平和を願う少女」などの女性化されたメタファーで表象された。あらゆる暴力の否定を前提に日本を「女性化」＝「平和化」しなければ、「日本」の展示は不可能だったと考えられる。

アメリカが、「力による支配」によって維持される「本物の民主主義」を体現する国家であるのに対し、日本は「あらゆる暴力の否定」の上に成立する、「偽物の民主主義国家」であるという日米間のジェンダーポリティクスが立ち現れているといえよう。

Emperor Hirohito’s radio announcement of the Japanese surrender on

August 15, 1945 was a mediated collective experience for mainland Japanese

people, but the Okinawan experience was different as a result of media deprivation.

On the same day, the U.S. Military Government of Okinawa announced

Japan’s defeat to local Okinawan leaders, handing out the Uruma Shimpo, a

handwritten Japanese language mimeograph prepared in a U.S. civilian camp.

The Uruma Shimpo headlined Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration

as good news: “a long-waited peace finally came!” The Emperor’s rescript was

not published in the same issue, but on September 12 after the 9.2 Surrender

Ceremony on the U.S. Missouri between Japan and the Allied Powers. Based on

U.S. archives and the reconsideration of Okinawan memoires, this paper discusses

the U.S. occupation force’s strategic suppression of the presence of the

Japanese Emperor as a symbol in order to psychologically detach Okinawans as

part of their plan to separate Okinawa from mainland Japan. However, on September

12, the U.S. Military Government of Okinawa published the rescript for

the purpose of psychological warfare to effectively organize the U.S. mopping

up operations, targeting Japanese soldiers and local civilians who still showed

resistance. While the U.S. Military Government regarded the Uruma Shimpo as

their official newspaper for disseminating news regarding the Japanese surrender

to the Okinawan society without any civilian media, the Okinawans engaged in

its early production regarded it as their own newspaper. The Ryukyu Shimpo,

the successor of the Uruma Shimpo, documented the mimeograph days in a

corporate publication in 1973. Unable to fully record the experience in 1945

under U.S. censorship, the Okinawan press reported the media history after the

reversion.

This paper reconsiders the Outlawry of War Movement which was launched by the Chicago lawyer Salmon 0. Levinson during World War I and gained popularity during the Interwar Period. Levinson’s main argument was that the war, which was recognized as the legitimate method for settling disputes between nations under existing international law, should be declared to be illegal under any circumstances. What made Levinson’s idea radical was its rejection of all coercive measures against recalcitrant states. He insisted that it was the institution of war and not particular wars which were to be outlawed, and that the war system could be abolished only through the voluntary condemnation and renunciation of war by the nations. Levinson founded the American Committee for the Outlawry of War in Chicago, and won ardent supporters such as Senator William E. Borah and John Dewey.

Most historians have regarded the outlawrists as na’ive idealists, who believed that noncoercive measures such as international law and public opinions would suffice to maintain international peace. They have failed to note, however, that the outlawrists opposed to physical force not because they naively believed in moral force, but because they realized the fundamental weakness of sanctionists’ arguments. Effective military sanction was possible only when there was enough solidarity among nations. Yet, the European nations still deeply distrusted each other after the end of World War I. The outlawrists also pointed out that it was impossible to make a sharp line between “sanction” and “war.” Even though tempered by the name of “sanction,” international police action necessarily involved the use of disastrous weapons and resulted massive losses of human lives. They emphasized the moral force because it was the only force that would not reintroduce the war system.

On August 27, 1928, the Pact of Paris was signed by 15 nations including the major powers at that time. In contrast to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the pact contained no provision for enforcement and solely relied on each nation’s voluntary commitment. The outlawrists saw the pact as an ideal basis upon which the nations could cooperate more closely to overcome the war system. At the same time, however, they were realists enough to know that the bare renunciation of war would not suffice. Certainly they had rejected the League of Nations, which was empowered to initiate sanctions against recalcitrant states, but they recognized that there could be no stable peace without a permanent international organization. They emphasized that the pact was only one half of the outlawry of war, and that the genuine outlawry of war could be achieved only with a competent mechanism through which all international disputes would be settled amicably.

Since the outbreak of World War II, the majority of Americans accepted the idea of strong international force for security guarantee. They have ceased to think about the possible negative effects of coercive measures, and often resorted to military force too easily. In order to develop a more balanced approach to international security, it would be useful to shed light on the neglected “realism” of the Outlawry of War Movement.