The purpose of this paper is to consider Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy in the 1960s. After the conflict with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia rejected not only Soviet domination but also the Soviet model of socialism and opted for self-management socialism in the 1950s. Yugoslav socialism did not concentrate decision-making in the hands of bureaucratic structures but developed a system which was neither Western nor Soviet inspired.
In the late 1960s, the Yugoslav leadership carried out a series of changes by which they altered the fundamental characteristics of the political and economical process in both the state and the party in an effort to resolve policy conflicts among themselves and control rising levels of internationality hostility and conflict among the masses. During this decade a series of reforms partially decentralized the organization and operation of the economy and partially democratized the political system. These reforms increased dramatically both the ability of regional leadership in the party and state to represent the economic interests of their respective regions in decision-making processes at the center.
In foreign policy, on the other hand, Yugoslavia adopted nonalignment as the leading doctrine of the foundation for intenational activities. Yugoslavia's nonaligned foreign policy led to a strengthening of the Yugoslav's international position but contributed to the struggle for the construction of self-management society in the country.
There were also compelling domestic reasons for adherence to nonalignment: it was the only foreign policy that proved acceptable to all factions of the party, to the different republics within the Yugoslav federation, and to the main strata of the population-serving as a compromise policy both for those who at various periods favored closer ties with the Soviet camp and for those who generally preferred a more West European orientation.
In the sixties Yugoslavia obtained good results in economic development and political decentralization, but, at the same time, yielded and accumulated many contradictions in the country. In this sense it may safely be said that the sixties for Yugoslavia cut a path to the crisis of the seventies and moreover to the disintegration of the Federation in the eighties after-wards.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the interdependence between a national question and a nonaligned foreign policy by focussing on the political process during and after the Croatian Crisis in 1971. Ethnically, Yugoslavia is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the world. The largest group, the Serbs, makes up less than 40 percent of the population, and the second largest group, the Croats, represents approximately 20 percent of the total population.
The South Slavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrines) were once under the rule of two empires set against each other—Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Consequently the South Slavs have had entirely different characteristics between the so-called northerners and the southerners. The potential for national discord was built into the structure of the country when it was founded on December 1, 1918, as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The conflict among these various nationalities made Yugoslavia practically ungovernable in the interwar years and led to its self-disintegration when Germany invaded in the spring of 1941.
In the process of constructing a scialist society the Yugoslav communists have attempted to reconcile these differences. In response to past conflicts, Tito and the rest of the Yugoslav leadership have striven to create a political system that strikes a balance between a recognition of the diversity throughout the country, on the one hand, and the extent of centralization essential to the maintenance of an integrated state, on the other. In contrast to the Soviet Union, where a major requisite for Communist rule is the dominance of the Russians, Communist rule in Yugoslavia is most likely to be maintained only if no single nationality is permitted to become too strong.
Since the middle of the 1960's—the economic reforms of 1965 and Rankovic's downfall in 1966—Yugoslavia's leaders have established a pattern of decisionmaking characterized by decentralization, inter-regional consultations, and consensus. In this situation Croats began to insist on political and economic decentralization, while in the southern underdeveloped republics they favored the “firm hand” of the federal organs for their development. Given these competing cross-currents, the policy of nonalignment constituted a viable compromise giving partial satisfaction to all. Any deviation from nonalignment in favor of the Soviet Union would have created major repercussions in Slovenia and Croatia; any explicitly close affiliation with the West would have alienated important party elites with the southern constituencies. A nonaligned foreign policy enabled the Yugoslav government to keep a balance between all states externally and all nationalities domestically.
The fate of multinational Yugoslavia lies in the fact that she must achieve equality among diffirent nationalities by the principle of balance-of-power as an unstable system. It may safely be said that the only alternative compatible with this is nonalignment.

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While more than a quarter of a century has passed since the end of the Cold War, globally, wars and conflicts are unending. Translation and interpreting play a crucial role in international conflict and peace processes. This study focuses on the new phenomenon and practice of translation and interpreting observed in the Bosnian conflict and its peace processes, and explores the challenges and roles of translation and interpreting from the perspective of the languages and boundaries of modern post-Cold War nations. The study reveals how the ethnic conflict constructed language boundaries causing the necessity of translation and interpreting between nations who previously spoke the same language. The study demonstrates that it is vital to reconsider the premise of the boundaries of language, and translation and interpreting should focus on the commonness, rather than the differences, between languages in the interest of multicultural coexistence in a globalized world.

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Yugoslavia disintegrated due to internal war in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) were newly born, and one more republic (Kosovo) is appearing. The warring party which participated in all three of the internal wars was the Serbs. In this paper, I reconstruct the process of these internal wars from the perspective of the Serbs. The international community considered Serbs, especially their leader, Slobodan Miloševic as an “evil, ” through a simple dichotomy, but Serbs always felt fear as a minority during the internal wars.
Generally speaking, when relations among ethnic groups are worsened, there will be a tendency for the minority to feel fear. Which factors will worsen interethnic relations? First of all, it is pointed to that a decline in the economy can deepen the cleavage among ethnic groups. Then, the security dilemma will function, especially when there is a certain pattern of demography, and/or interethnic history. Nevertheless, leadership will be needed when an ethnic minority makes a hostile action against the majority, even if the minority feels dissatisfaction, uneasiness, and fear.
Serbs were the largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia. According to the census in 1981, 36.3% of the total population was Serbs. Serbs were also the most powerful ethnic group in politics. Nevertheless, the Serbs had two problems in maintaining their power. Firstly, Serbs were an ethnic minority in some republics and autonomous regions which belonged to Serbia. In 1981, the proportion of Serbs was really 85.4% in Serbia (excluding two autonomous regions, Vojdodina, and Kosovo), and 54.4% in Vojvodina. However the proportion was 32.0% in Bosnia, 13.2% in Kosovo, 11.6% in Croatia, 3.3% in Montenegro, and 2.3% in Macedonia. Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo would therefore drop from relative ethnic majority to minority when those areas became independent. Secondly, the ratio of Serbs in the population was decreasing year by year. The proportion of Serbs decreased from 14.2% to 12.2% in Croatia from 1971 to 1991, from 37.2% to 31.3% in Bosnia, and from 18.4% to 10.0% in Kosovo. In contrast to the Serbs, the proportion of Muslims in Bosnia increased from 39.6% to 43.7%, and the proportion of Albanians in Kosovo from 73.7% to 84.0%.
Serbs hoped to hinder the independence of the republics from Yugoslavia, but there were no mechanisms for mediation in the conflict between ethnic groups, and no leadership for resolving the ethnic conflict as had been provided by Josip Broz Tito. Particularly, the federal leaders could not use their power to support new leaders in the republics, because the latter obtained more democratic legitimacy through democratic elections in 1990. Serbs who wanted to maintain their status as an ethnic majority could only build their quasi-states, and attack the newly-born states.

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