The Allied Nations publically announced their intentions to establish Korean independence through the Cairo and Potsdam declarations. Furthermore, the Allied Powers decided to apply trusteeship in Korea and not to land their forces for combat. Japan, on the other hand, in order to encounter the American-Soviet joint attack in Korea, increased military strength there while inducing the Koreans to cooperate with Japan in her war aims by improving their treatment and allowing them a certain amount of privilege to participate in politics.
Soviet troops invaded northeastern Korea immediately after the declaration of war against Japan. The Soviet participation in the war brought about U. S. -U. S. S. R. joint occupation of Korea for the purpose of demilitarization of the Japanese troops in Korea, establishing the 38th parallel as a border line between the two occupation armies. On the last day of the war the Secretary-General of the Government-Genreal in Korea invited the cooperation of a Korean leader, Yo Wun-hyong, in maintaining law and order. Yo organized the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence, and directed the people through his organization.
The Soviet troops which invaded northern Korea organized Korean People's Committees in each province and took over administrative power from the Japanese. The American troops, meanwhile, carried out a ceremony of the signing of surrender in in Seoul with the Japanese, and established the United States Army Military Government in (USAMGIK), patterned after the Japanese Government-General in Korea. Since then, both North and South Korean regimes carried out a separation process between Japan and Korea, involving repatration of Japanese nationals, and take-over of Japanese property. Meanwhile, approximately 1, 500, 000 Koreans returned home from Japan, leaving some 500, 000 behind.
Three years after the liberation of Korea, there emerged two independent nations in Korea, one in the North and the other in the South. After three years and eight months since the emergence of the two regimes in Korea, the Peace Treaty was signed between Japan and the Allied Powers, recognizing the independence of Korea.

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Korea, whose independence was promised by the Allied Powers during World War II., witnessed the division of the country into two as a result of American-Soviet disagreement. Moreover, in 1948, each section took necessary steps for independence while the country remained disunited.
Japan formally recognized Korea's independence when the Peace Treaty became effective. She had, however, acknowledged the existence of independent Korea even before the Peace Treaty was concluded. Furthermore, the Japanese Government was ready to accept the government of the Republic of Korea as the legitimate regime in Korea in view of American wishes and the resolution adopted by the Third General Assembly of the United Nations. Subsequently, as soon as the Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, the government of Japan entered into negotiations with the Korean Government on various problems which would arise when the treaty became effective.
The talks, however, brought about no result, and without any agreements between the two governments, the Peace Treaty went into effect. Since then, six sessions of intermittent talks were held between the two governments during the past eleven years. There are many reasons for the prolongation of the talks. These include, emotionalism among the peoples of Japan and Korea, as well as the extreme anti-Japanese sentiment which prevailed in Korea during the Rhee administration. Concrete causes for the failure, however, have been, among others, the questions of property settlement and fishery in which the fundamental differences of opinion of both parties have been evident.
The ROK government regarded the question of property as vital, and maintained the attitude that without the settlement of this issue other problems existing between Japan and Korea would remain unsolved. In the face of such a stiff argument of the ROK government, the Japanese Government made significant concessions on two occasions. The first was the withdrawal of the six-year old Japanese demand, in late 1957, for compensation for the property previously owned by the Japanese nationals in Korea. The second concession involved Japan's modification regarding her demand for property compensation based on legal principle. The new Foreign Minister Ohira hoped to settle this issue on the basis of political expediency rather than on legal basis. These concessions brought about a basic agreement regarding the property question which had been one of the greatest obstacles in the talks. This being accomplished, hopes for the conclusion of talks brightened.
Be that as it may, the future of the talks seems to depend on the degree of the concessions by the ROK government on the question of fishery (the removal of the Rhee Line) which the Japanese Government consider important.

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My aim in this paper is to critically explore previous studies on “Marshall Mission” and to offer a new approach.
Most of previous studies can be reduced into two different views. The first school argues that the main purpose of the mission was to make a truce and form a united democratic government in China in an effort to minimize US intervention in Asia, particularly in China. The second school focuses on the northeast of China in which the United States had endeavored to support the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) efforts to regain territory and interprets the US policy as one of anti-communist “containment”. Each of the two schools emphasizes only one of the missions of Marshall, which in each case is considered unimportant by the opposing approach. Both of them fail to capture how the United States aimed at uniting the whole areas of China.
I will explore the US policy regarding China's unification. America's postwar Asian regional order was based upon the assumption of a “united China” whose territory and political regime had to be respectively restored and fixed. However, due to the lack of such a united China, the United States had to directly or indirectly intervene in the process of the unification. Thereupon, arguments over whether the formation of the “united democratic China” or a territorial restoration unilaterally by KMT should be given primacy appeared and continued to confuse US government policy at least from 1943 to 1947. The former was emphasized mainly by the State Department and the latter mainly by the War Department.
The Marshall Mission can be reexamined in this context. In this paper, by focusing on how the US government formulated the missions of Marshall from November to December of 1945, it is argued that the resulting missions were composed of the two directions mentioned above: the mission to the northeast of China reflects the policy advocated by the War Department; while that in “China proper” (except for the northern China) was decided according to the policy of the State Department; finally in the liberated areas of northern China we find a mixture of both policy approaches. Eventually, however, the Marshall Mission failed to achieve any of the missions and thereafter the United States gave up its policy aiming at the unification of China.

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There are two main streams of thought concerning the studies of Sino-American relationship; one argues America's China policy from the context of the U. S. -Soviet-China strategic triangle, the other stresses the importance of America's domestic politics in the formation of its China policy. This article tries to add another perspective on the analysis on Sino-American relationship: the interaction of U. S. China policy and its Taiwan policy.
In late 1948, the Truman Administration began to re-examine the strategic importance of Taiwan. As NSC37/1 (Jan 19, 1949) noted, the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the basic aim of the U. S. should be to deny Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores to the Communists. However, there was a slight difference between them. The State Department also wanted to deny Taiwan to the Chinese Nationalists in order to keep some options open in the case of a Sino-Soviet split and subsequent Sino-American accommodation in the future, while the military establishment was indifferent to such political implications. The JCS insisted that overt military commitment in Taiwan would be unwise at that time, but the U. S. should bolster the Nationalists forces and collaborate with them if amphibious operations were launched from mainland China.
When the Korean War broke out, the U. S. Government dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait not only to protect against an attack by the Communists but also to block any Nationalist action in the strait. In this situation, the difference between the State Department and the JCS still continued. Secretary Acheson tried to avoid a deep commitment to Chiang Kai-shek, but the military was establishing a strong relationship through the military aid and advice programs to the Kuomintang Forces. However this difference ceased. The alternative forces to the Nationalists did not emerge in Taiwan, the State Department, therefore, had to commit itself to the Kuomintang government however reluctantly, which was one of the reasons why Sino-American relations were not improved after the Korean War, even though the U. S. Government sought various chances for rapprochement with China.

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The purpose of this study is to clarify the changes and factors of a series of munitions factories that have been manufacturing and developing aircraft engines. Concretely, the transition of factory size and land use was clarified through the identification of the offices related to the daiko factory. This paper also examines the social conditions at that time and the policies of the military government and GHQ that influenced these factory transformations, and clarifies the spatial characteristics of the factory corresponding to most advanced production system in aircraft manufacturing.

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本稿は集団的自衛権が1945年から今日まで行使されたことがないのか検証することを目的とする。また、本稿は日本を取り巻く国際環境が刻々と変化し、従来の考え方が国際社会において通用しにくくなってきている今日、安全保障環境を憲法解釈というレンズを通して判断することは非常に重要であると考えたことを問題意識としている。

2015年に成立した安全保障関連法案は限定的な集団的自衛権の行使を認めるものであり、国際環境の変化を如実に示すものであった。この法案が審議されている間、国会近辺等では学生団体まで巻き込んだ反対運動が展開され、テレビや新聞もこれを大々的に喧伝した。この時に反対する勢力が口を揃えて言ったのはこれまで1人も戦死者を出していない自衛隊が集団的自衛権の行使容認によって戦死者が出るような組織になってしまうのではないかという危惧であった。

では、これまで、本当に戦後日本は集団的自衛権を一度も行使したことはなかったのであろうか。このことについて研究を始めた際、偶然、朝鮮戦争時に日本が朝鮮海域に「日本特別掃海隊」を派遣していたことを知った。そして、そこでは若い隊員が「戦死」していたのである。

朝鮮戦争はどのような経緯で始まり、どのような経過を辿ったかについて、国際環境や戦局を概観し、当時組織された国連軍がどのような状況にあり、日本の助けを必要としていたかについて考える。

そして、この戦争において日本は自国の領域内外においていかなる協力を行ったのか。占領期であったとはいえ、日本国憲法が施行されて5年経つ日本が行った協力について考える。日本が行った協力には現在の法制ではとても考えられないような協力を行っている場合もあり、これについては政治的判断以上の解釈を行うことは難しい。

その様々な協力を踏まえた上で、現在、日本国憲法下において国防任務にあたっている自衛隊の成立過程と変化してきた憲法解釈についても考え、どのような解釈が時代の変化とともに採られるようになってきたのかを併せて考える。

日本の憲法解釈の変遷に基づいて、PKO協力法、周辺事態法、イラク特措法、そして平和安全法制について、成立の経緯や歴史、当時の国際環境等を勘案し、述べていく。

そして最後に、日本の集団的自衛権行使を限定的ながら認めるという新しい憲法解釈が政治的判断を狭めるものであり、時代に適したものであるのか、そうでないのかについても判断する。

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